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In the information age, the growth in availability of both technology and exploit kits 
have continuously contributed in a large volume of websites being compromised or 
set up with malicious intent. The issue of drive-by-download attacks formulate a high 
percentage (77%) of the known attacks against client systems. These attacks 
originate from malicious web-servers or compromised web-servers and attack client 
systems by pushing malware upon interaction. Within the detection and intelligence 
gathering area of research, high-interaction honeypot approaches have been a long-
standing and well-established technology. These are however not without 
challenges: analysing the entirety of the world wide web using these approaches is 
unviable due to time and resource intensiveness. Furthermore, the volume of data 
that is generated as a result of a run-time analysis of the interaction between website 
and an analysis environment is huge, varied and not well understood. The volume of 
malicious servers in addition to the large datasets created as a result of run-time 
analysis are contributing factors in the difficulty of analysing and verifying actual 
malicious behaviour. The work in this thesis attempts to overcome the difficulties in 
the analysis process of log files to optimise malicious and anomaly behaviour 
detection.  
The main contribution of this work is focused on reducing the volume of data 
generated from run-time analysis to reduce the impact of noise within behavioural 
log file datasets. This thesis proposes an alternate approach that uses an expert 
lead approach to filtering benign behaviour from potentially malicious and unknown 
behaviour. Expert lead filtering is designed in a risk-averse method that takes into 
account known benign and expected behaviours before filtering the log file. 
Moreover, the approach relies upon behavioural investigation as well as potential for 
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system compromisation before filtering out behaviour within dynamic analysis log 
files. Consequently, this results in a significantly lower volume of data that can be 
analysed in greater detail. The proposed filtering approach has been implemented 
and tested in real-world context using a prudent experimental framework. An 
average of 96.96% reduction in log file size has been achieved which is transferable 
to behaviour analysis environments.  
The other contributions of this work include the understanding of observable 
operating system interactions. Within the study of behaviour analysis environments, 
it was concluded that run-time analysis environments are sensitive to application and 
operating system versions. Understanding key changes in operating systems 
behaviours within Windows is an unexplored area of research yet Windows is 
currently one of the most popular client operating system. As part of understanding 
system behaviours for the creation of behavioural filters, this study undertakes a 
number of experiments to identify the key behaviour differences between operating 
systems. The results show that there are significant changes in core processes and 
interactions which can be taken into account in the development of filters for updated 
systems.  
Finally, from the analysis of 110,000 potentially malicious websites, typical attacks 
are explored. These attacks actively exploited the honeypot and offer knowledge on 
a section of the active web-based attacks faced in the world wide web. Trends and 





Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... 1 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter 1 – Introduction ........................................................................................... 21 
1.1 Motivation ....................................................................................................... 21 
1.2 Research goals ............................................................................................... 23 
1.3 Contributions................................................................................................... 24 
1.3.1 Methodology in developing the expert driven behavioural filters .............. 24 
1.3.2 Identification of differences in behavioural manifestations in different 
versions operating systems. .............................................................................. 25 
1.3.3 Observed active exploits and malicious behaviours attacking honeypots 26 
1.4 Thesis organisation ......................................................................................... 26 
1.5 Publications .................................................................................................... 29 
Chapter 2 – Literature review ................................................................................... 31 
2.1 Introduction to drive-by-download and research area ..................................... 31 
2.1.1 Drive-by-download attacks ....................................................................... 31 
2.1.2 Detection, intelligence gathering parties and technologies ...................... 37 
2.1.3 Collecting drive-by-download samples ..................................................... 40 
2.2 Methods of analysing drive-by-downloads ...................................................... 41 
2.2.1 Low-interaction ......................................................................................... 42 
2.2.2 High-interaction ........................................................................................ 43 
2.2.3 Hybrid-interaction ..................................................................................... 45 
7 
 
2.2.4 Chosen approach and rationale ............................................................... 47 
2.3 Malware .......................................................................................................... 48 
2.3.1 Malware analysis ...................................................................................... 48 
2.3.2 Research around malware analysis ......................................................... 51 
2.3.3 Malware packers ...................................................................................... 53 
2.3.4  Differentiating drive-by-download and malware analysis ........................ 55 
2.5 Instruments for drive-by-download collection and analysis ............................. 56 
2.5.1 Capture-HPC ............................................................................................ 56 
2.5.2 Cuckoo sandbox ...................................................................................... 58 
2.6 Related work ................................................................................................... 59 
2.6.1 Malicious Domain name servers .............................................................. 59 
2.6.2 Systems monitoring state change ............................................................ 59 
2.6.3 JavaScript research ................................................................................. 62 
2.6.4 Current trends in client honeypot research .............................................. 63 
2.6.5 Applicability of machine learning .............................................................. 64 
2.6.6 Clustering approaches ............................................................................. 65 
2.6.7 Classification approaches ........................................................................ 66 
2.6.8 Closely related work ................................................................................. 68 
2.7 Gap identification and research questions ...................................................... 70 
2.7.1 Behaviour filtering in behaviour analysis environments ............................ 71 
2.7.2 Expert driven filtering and exclusion lists ................................................. 72 
8 
 
2.7.3 Windows 7 applicability and operating system behaviours ...................... 76 
2.7.4 Research scope and summary ................................................................. 77 
Chapter 3 – Methodology and experiment design .................................................... 82 
3.1 Safe, prudent and valid malware experimentation .......................................... 86 
3.1.1 Correctness in malware experimentation ................................................. 88 
3.1.2 Realism in malware experimentation ....................................................... 90 
3.1.3 Transparency in malware experimentation............................................... 92 
3.1.4 Safety in malware experimentation .......................................................... 93 
3.1.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 95 
3.2 Drive-by-download resource gathering ........................................................... 97 
3.2.1 Creation of the data corpus ...................................................................... 99 
3.2.2 Justification for the creation of the malware data corpus ....................... 101 
3.2.3 Sample size evaluation .......................................................................... 102 
3.3 Experimental setup ....................................................................................... 104 
3.3.1 Experimental methodology justification .................................................. 105 
3.3.2 Capture-BAT .......................................................................................... 106 
3.3.3 Duration of malicious webpage analysis ................................................ 107 
3.4 Testing the validity of experimental setup ..................................................... 111 
3.5 Alternate resource gathering evaluations ..................................................... 111 
3.6 Roundup ....................................................................................................... 111 
Chapter 4 – Expert driven behaviour filter development ......................................... 115 
9 
 
4.1 Background .................................................................................................. 116 
4.2 Research requirements ................................................................................ 117 
4.2.1 Limitations of Capture-BAT within the Windows 7 environment ............. 118 
4.2.2 Identification of behavioural vectors within Windows 7 .......................... 119 
4.2.3 Exclusion list creation rationale .............................................................. 120 
4.2.4 Aims and goals of exclusion lists ............................................................ 123 
4.3 Methodology used in developing expert driven behavioural filters ................ 124 
4.3.1 Decision making process behind classifications of behaviour ................ 127 
4.3.2 Processing behavioural log files to synthesise expert driven behavioural 
filters ............................................................................................................... 128 
4.4 Inside an exclusion list .................................................................................. 130 
4.4.1 Typical Windows 7 native system calls .................................................. 133 
4.4.2 System behaviours: The Windows 7 file system behaviours .................. 136 
4.4.3 System behaviours: The Windows 7 processes’ behaviours.................. 142 
4.4.4 System behaviours: The Windows 7 registry behaviours ....................... 148 
4.4.5 Differences between Windows 7 with Windows XP system calls ........... 157 
4.5 The development cycle of exclusion lists ...................................................... 161 
4.5.1 Environment set up ................................................................................ 162 
4.5.3 Created exclusion lists within a Windows 7 application profile ............... 166 
4.5.4 Limitations of behavioural filters ............................................................. 167 
4.7 Contributions to knowledge and key findings ............................................ 168 
Chapter 5 – Behaviour analysis environment experiments .................................... 171 
10 
 
5.1 Assessing the efficiency of the created behavioural filters ............................ 171 
5.1.1 Aim ......................................................................................................... 171 
5.1.2 Hypothesis ............................................................................................. 171 
5.1.3 Experiment description ........................................................................... 172 
5.1.4 Limitations & mitigations......................................................................... 172 
5.1.5 Experimental set-up ............................................................................... 174 
5.1.6 Methodology & justification..................................................................... 174 
5.1.7 Results ................................................................................................... 177 
5.1.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 178 
5.1.9 Evaluation .............................................................................................. 181 
5.2 Understanding how analysis environment changes different versions of an 
operating system ................................................................................................ 182 
5.2.1 Aim ......................................................................................................... 183 
5.2.2 Hypothesis ............................................................................................. 183 
5.2.3 Experiment description ........................................................................... 184 
5.2.4 Limitations & mitigations......................................................................... 185 
5.2.5 Experimental set-up ............................................................................... 186 
5.2.6 Methodology & justification..................................................................... 186 
5.2.7 Results ................................................................................................... 188 
5.2.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 196 
5.2.9 Evaluation .............................................................................................. 199 
5.3 Key findings .................................................................................................. 203 
11 
 
Chapter 6 – Log file analysis and observed Windows 7 attacks ............................. 206 
6.1 Behavioural drive-by-download log file analysis ........................................... 206 
6.1.2 Behavioural distribution analysis ............................................................ 206 
6.1.3 Malicious file writes ................................................................................ 210 
6.1.4 Visual basic exploits within Windows 7 .................................................. 211 
6.1.5 Malicious .bat file exploits....................................................................... 212 
6.1.6 Observed malicious executables manifesting process behaviours ........ 212 
6.1.7 Observed malicious Dynamic-link library (.dll) and Temporary file (.tmp) 
process behaviours ......................................................................................... 214 
6.1.8 Exploits targeting scheduled tasks within Windows 7 ............................ 216 
6.1.9 Observed registry behaviours within the dataset .................................... 216 
6.1.10 False positives within dataset ............................................................... 217 
6.1.11 False positives and grey behaviours within the dataset and improving 
creating exclusion lists .................................................................................... 220 
6.2 Case study advanced drive-by-download exploits: Full log file analysis ....... 221 
6.3. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 226 
6.4 Key findings .................................................................................................. 229 
Chapter 7 – Conclusions ........................................................................................ 231 
7.1 Overall conclusion ........................................................................................ 231 
7.1.2 Chapter 4 – Behavioural exclusion list development .............................. 233 
7.1.3 Chapter 5 – Behaviour analysis environment experiments .................... 234 
7.1.4 Chapter 6 – Log file analysis and observed Windows 7 attacks............. 235 
12 
 
7.2 Contributions to knowledge .......................................................................... 236 
7.2.1 Expert driven behavioural filters ............................................................. 236 
7.2.2 Identifying key behaviours within different versions of behaviour analysis 
environments................................................................................................... 238 
7.2.3 Observed malicious behaviour and attack vector insight ....................... 239 
7.3 Evaluation, limitations and delimitations ....................................................... 239 
7.3.1 Evaluating Capture-BAT ........................................................................ 240 
7.3.2 Limitations of the research ..................................................................... 240 
7.3.3 Delimitations discussion ......................................................................... 242 
7.4 Future Work .................................................................................................. 245 
7.5 Summary ...................................................................................................... 246 
Glossary ................................................................................................................. 249 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 252 
Appendix ................................................................................................................ 269 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................. 269 
Appendix B ............................................................................................................. 276 
3.4 Testing the validity of the experimental setup ............................................... 276 
3.4.1 Hypothesis ............................................................................................. 277 
3.4.2 Test control ............................................................................................ 277 
3.4.3 Results ................................................................................................... 279 
3.4.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 280 
3.5 Evaluating twitter as a source of gathering malicious domains ..................... 282 
13 
 
3.5.1 Experimental purpose and background .................................................. 282 
3.5.2 Results ................................................................................................... 283 
3.5.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 286 
3.5.4 Evaluation .............................................................................................. 287 
Appendix C ............................................................................................................. 333 





List of tables and figures 
Figure 2.0: The drive-by-download problem and client side attacks illustrated based 
on knowledge provided by Dell'Aera & Seifert (2012). ............................................. 32 
Figure 2.1: Drive-by-download attacking client systems from poisoned advertisement 
streams (Dell'Aera, 2012). ........................................................................................ 33 
Figure 2.2 Malicious webpage attack vectors. .......................................................... 34 
Figure 2.3: Anatomy of the creation and exploitation process. ................................. 36 
Figure 2.4:  Overview of malware analysis approaches including requirements based 
on Zeltser (2016). ..................................................................................................... 49 
Table 3.1: Prudent practices for designing malware experiment framework (Rossow 
et al., 2012). ............................................................................................................. 88 
Table 3.2: Applicability of the prudent experimentation framework. ......................... 96 
Figure 3.1: Events and required time upon Capture-BAT boot up. ......................... 108 
Table 3.3: Tests for required time for website analysis in seconds. The chosen 
settings for Capture-BAT is provided in Chapter 4. ................................................ 108 
Table 3.5: Datasets created for experiments carried out in the thesis. ................... 110 
Table 4.0a: behavioural log file upon visiting a benign website initially before the 
creation of exclusion list. This is a snippet of the log files and the rest has been 
excluded from the thesis as it is over 100 entries long. .......................................... 123 
Figure 4.3: Methodology used for picking benign websites to identify benign 
behaviour. .............................................................................................................. 126 
Figure 4.4: example Capture-BAT log file which includes malicious behaviour (drive-
by-download being saved to temp Internet Files folder). ........................................ 126 
Table 4.1a. Example of how a single behaviour changes after processing ............ 128 
15 
 
Figure 4.0b: Example ‘stock’ process monitor exclusion list for Windows XP SP2, 
IE6. ......................................................................................................................... 130 
Table 4.1b. Snippet example of FileMonitor exclusion list. The full exclusion list 
available in Appendix B. ......................................................................................... 131 
Table 4.0c: A benign Windows 7 behavioural activity log, without exclusion lists and 
without malicious behaviours and interactions. Only a snippet of the log file is shown.
 ............................................................................................................................... 134 
Table 4.2: Typical benign Windows 7 File system behavioural interactions. .......... 137 
Table 4.3: Observed grey/situational Windows 7 file system behavioural interactions.
 ............................................................................................................................... 140 
Table 4.4: Typical malicious Windows 7 file system behavioural interactions. ....... 141 
Table 4.5: Typical benign Windows 7 processes with their default pathways. ....... 144 
Table 4.6: Typical grey / situational Windows 7 processes with their default 
pathways. ............................................................................................................... 146 
Table 4.7: Typical malicious Windows 7 processes based on real attacks in our 
dataset. .................................................................................................................. 147 
Table 4.8: Examples of benign registry behaviours that can be filtered in behavioural 
exclusion lists. ........................................................................................................ 150 
Table 4.9: Examples of registry grey, unknown and inconsistent behaviours that 
should within Windows 7. ....................................................................................... 154 
Table 4.10: Examples of registry malicious behaviours that should be flagged up and 
investigated within Windows 7. .............................................................................. 156 
Figure 4.1: Capture-BAT experimental setup used to gather benign log files. ....... 163 
Figure 4.2a: Interactions between Capture-HPC server and Capture-BAT clients. 164 
Figure 4.2b: Capture-HPC’s configuration file (config.xml) for Capture-BAT. ......... 165 
16 
 
Figure 5.1: Overview of methodology used to calculate behavioural reduction in 
filtered exclusion list dataset. ................................................................................. 176 
Table 5.1: Comparison if goodware behaviour from Alpha and Beta datasets. ...... 177 
Figure 5.2: The percentage reduction in benign behaviour per behaviour type from 
using exclusion lists in Windows 7 Capture-BATs. ................................................. 178 
Table 5.2: Additional observed behaviours for Sppsvc interactions present only in the 
patched dataset. ..................................................................................................... 190 
Table 5.3: Comparison of Svchost process interactions in patched and unpatched 
Windows 7 datasets: .............................................................................................. 191 
Table 5.4: iexplore.exe behavioural interactions in both datasets. ......................... 192 
Table 5.5: Services.exe behavioural interactions in both datasets. ........................ 192 
Table 5.6 Taskhost.exe behavioural interactions in both datasets. ........................ 192 
Table 5.7: Patched behavioural environment showing unique Rundll32.exe 
interactions. ............................................................................................................ 193 
Table 5.8: Shadow copy service triggering in patched dataset. ............................. 194 
Table 5.9: Rare and native behaviours observed within patched Windows 7 
behavioural analysis environment .......................................................................... 196 
Table 6.0: Malware analysis of the malicious file write (Svchost.exe) within the user 
temp folder to find signatures and family classification by Anti-Virus (AV) vendors.
 ............................................................................................................................... 207 
Figure 6.1: Behavioural distribution analysis pie chart. .......................................... 210 
Figure 6.2: Unique behaviour distribution pie chart. ............................................... 210 
Table 6.1: Examples of malicious executable exploits being written in the user temp 
folder of Windows 7. ............................................................................................... 211 
17 
 
Table 6.2: minor differences between benign behaviours which were not being 
filtered by our exclusion lists. The behavioural similarity is highlighted. ................. 218 
Table 6.3: Minor differences between benign behaviours which were not being 
filtered by our exclusion lists. The differences are highlighted. .............................. 219 
Figure 6.3: output from Malwr.com in analysing the malicious file captured by 
Capture-BAT (Based on Cuckoo sandbox) ............................................................ 224 
Figure 6.4a: output from VirusTotal.com in analysing the malicious file captured by 
Capture-BAT (Based on multiple Av-Vendors) ....................................................... 224 
Figure 6.4b: output from VirusTotal.com in analysing the actual URL which was 
detected by Capture-BAT ac malicious. ................................................................. 225 
6.5: Websense analysis of the Fadedboys webpage showed that an IFrame that 
points to a malicious website. ................................................................................. 226 
Paper 2A: Challenges in the development of Capture-HPC exclusion lists. ........... 269 
Figure 2C: Screenshot of Virus Total. .................................................................... 274 
Figure 2D: Potential data obtainable from Virus Total part 1. ................................. 275 
Figure 2D: Potential data obtainable from Virus Total part 2. ................................. 275 
Table 3.4: Percentage URLs classified as malware originating from twitter when run 
in Capture-HPC. ..................................................................................................... 283 
Figure 4A: Example log file of figure 4.0a in full. .................................................... 291 
Figure 4B: Our Windows 7 process monitor exclusion list. ..................................... 312 
Figure 4C: Our Windows 7 File monitor exclusion list. ........................................... 314 
Figure 4D: Our Windows 7 Registry monitor exclusion list. .................................... 320 
Table 4E: Process and default path table. .............................................................. 330 
Table 5A:  Full list of applied updates for experimental transparency. ................... 333 
Figure 5B: General setup used in chapter 5 experiments. ..................................... 339 
18 
 
Table 6A: Signatures for table 6.1, malicious file writes. ........................................ 340 
Table 6B: Malicious process creations within the 5,132 dataset: ........................... 344 
Table 6C: Malicious .tmp files executed within dataset. ......................................... 349 
Table 6D: Examples of some malicious .exe file writes within the 5,132 dataset. .. 350 
Table 6E: Examples of malicious .bat file writes within the 5,132 dataset .............. 354 
Table 6F: Examples of malicious .VBS file writes within the 5,132 dataset. ........... 354 
Table 6G: Malicious additions to auto-start sections of the registry observed in 5,132 
dataset. .................................................................................................................. 354 
Table 6H : Observed Malicious registry behaviour within 5,132 dataset. ............... 355 
Table 6I: Observed Malicious registry behaviours triggered by malicious Portable 
Executable files within 5,132 dataset. .................................................................... 358 
Table 6J : Record of a  malicious server1[1].exe that was submitted to Virus Total 
showing level and volume of data currently stored for each analysed malicious files.
 ............................................................................................................................... 360 
Log file 6K: Drive-by-download behaviour based on the malware shown in Table 6J.
 ............................................................................................................................... 364 
Table 6L: Record of a svchost.exe discussed in chapter 6 files submitted to virus 
total showing level and volume of data currently stored for each analysed malicious 
files. ........................................................................................................................ 367 
Sample 6M of part Log file 6L drive-by-download filtered log file for the sample in 
Table 6L. ................................................................................................................ 371 
Screenshot 6N: Drive-by-download behavioural log file size. ................................. 379 
Screenshot 6: of a drive-by-download captured by capture bat submitted to Virus 














Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The internet that people have grown to love, depend on for livelihood, used as 
entertainment and carry out transactions has grown uncontrollably with the number 
of websites currently at over 1.1 billion (Internet Live Stats, 2017). Within the cyber 
security landscape, the realisation that web-based threats are one of the major 
attack vectors that exploit client systems which often are seen as the easier target to 
compromise motivates this research. It is an unsettling thought that within the world 
wide web, malicious websites exist to exploit information systems for monetary 
gains, at someone’s expense. The cybercrime landscape is no longer but a few 
malicious software (malware) writers in a closed community sharing malicious script: 
nowadays organised cybercrime is on the rise – and a significant amount of this, 
comes from web-based threats. 77.26% of detected attacks were caused by 
malicious websites (Kaspersky, 2016). Merely visiting a malicious website or a 
compromised website that was exploited can cause a client system to be 
compromised and effectively ‘owned’. Clearly within this area much more research is 
required to identify the methods and threats facing the user and client systems. 
 Traditional defence mechanisms such as anti-viruses and intrusion prevention 
systems are ineffective at coping with the volume of web-based malware. Within the 
detection of web based threats, the volume of the available websites on the internet 
is far greater than the analysts can cope with. Furthermore, the volume of data 
obtained from analysing the behaviour of websites to detect signs of maliciousness 
is huge.  The work in this thesis capitalises on this volume of websites and the 
current limitations of analysing such vast amounts of data generated from run-time 
analysis. Optimisation techniques for understanding and analysing log files are a key 
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requirement as the world dives further in the cyber age. Furthermore, the design of 
behaviour analysis environments which are key to analysing both drive-by-download 
attacks and sandboxed malware is not currently sufficiently investigated.  Knowledge 
of system behaviours from performing a behaviour study where behaviours are 
labelled and investigated further helps the decision-making process of understanding 
what happened to a system as a result of a captured behaviour. 
Much like using a powerful magnet to gather needles from a haystack, expert driven 
behaviour filters that filter out investigated benign behaviours and keep malicious 
facilitates the analysis process. These experts driven behavioural filters provide 
higher confidence level when relying on filtering to reduce datasets that must be 
designed in an open and risk-averse way. It is hoped that the work presented in this 
thesis provide help to further analysis parties. One such party may include 
application of machine learning within the analysis of run-time log files that make use 
of the known sets of labelled behaviours to train their classifiers. Research in this 
field is highly active, especially within the application of machine learning in the 
detection of malicious behaviours. Within these works, the absence of annotated 
datasets has resulted in dependency on statistics and creation of training datasets. 
These data sets are unable to take into account the exploit potential on specific 
behaviours. The work in this thesis allows analysts to understand complex 
behavioural interactions and provide expert-lead labels for behavioural interactions in 
a behaviour analysis environment. These annotated datasets can be used to validate 
machine learning based clustering and classification of malicious webpages reliant 
on the dynamic analysis technique. Alternatively, the work presented could help 
future work based on Windows behaviour studies in both the creation of filters and 
the decision-making process at the design level of behaviour analysis environments 
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as Windows is one of the most popular operating system (OS) for end users (W3C, 
2014 & Net Market Share, 2016).   
1.2 Research goals 
The goals of this research are to facilitate the issues faced by dynamic analysis in 
the detection of malicious webpages. The specific goals of this research include:  
 Optimisation of the output from run-time analysis honeypots: One of the main 
limitations faced by an analyst using dynamic analysis is the volume and 
variation within behavioural data that is generated and stored upon execution. 
By optimising the output so only anomalies and unexpected behaviours are 
analysed, indicators of compromise or maliciousness can be identified sooner.  
 Detecting malicious webpages and understanding active malicious 
behaviours. Investigating malicious behaviours that are captured provides 
insight regarding the attack vectors which can be useful in the identification of 
remediation or prevention of client attacks.  
 Understanding behaviour analysis environment interactions: Classification of 
known behaviours and behaviour types into benign, malicious or grey allows 
the creation of labelled data sets. These can be particularly useful in the 
design aspect of a behaviour analysis environment as operating system, 
application and browser version choices can affect the output.    
 Application of correct, safe, transferrable and prudent framework to real-world 
cyber security experiments: In order for this research to reflect the real-world 
there is a need for the experiments to be correct, transferable and therefore a 
suitable experimental framework for design and implementation of cyber 




1.3.1 Methodology in developing the expert driven behavioural filters 
The main contribution of this work is the methodology proposed in the creation of the 
expert driven behavioural filters. These are filters that make use of the behavioural 
expertise of the behaviour analyst in reducing the noise and known benign behaviour 
in a log file. This is an alternative approach in the analysis of behavioural log files 
created during the run-time analysis of a potentially malicious web-age in a dynamic 
honeypot. This methodology’s core aspect includes: firstly, the stage where the 
behaviour analysis environment is defined and designed to simulate a chosen user 
type. This user type is defined as a honeypot actively attempting to be compromised 
and monitor attack vectors but can be also designed to simulate a type of client 
machine within a business network. Secondly, an exploration phase takes place 
where a behaviour analysis environment would be executed, and behaviours would 
be captured using a list of thoroughly (with high levels of conviction) assessed 
benign websites. Thirdly, the observed behaviours undergo assessment, and this 
determines the potential of a given behaviour ability to perform malicious 
interactions. The scientifically rigorous approach in the development of behavioural 
filters is justified as a false negative error would effectively mean potentially 
malicious behaviours being filtered out thus, avoiding detection. The methodology is 
applicable to other versions and alternative behaviour analysis environment setups. 
The approach is tested in the analysis of potentially malicious websites and it is 
found that the expert driven behaviour filter approach filters out 96.96% of known 
behaviours which are benign.  The approach showed that the application of the 
methodology in the real world resulted in the reduction of significant amounts of 
noise within dynamic analysis log files from an instance of Capture Behaviour 
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Analysis Tool (Capture-BAT) experimental setup. This is beneficial to the 
optimisation of the log file analysis process that is carried out by malware analysts as 
the sheer volume of events that can be recorded in log files as well as the number of 
false positives is drastically reduced.  
In addition to the concept of expert driven behaviour filtering, the thesis contributes 
to knowledge by providing sets of labelled behaviours which were created from the 
analysis of real-world potentially malicious webpages. These behaviours are 
classified as benign behaviour, grey behaviour and malicious behaviours.  The 
assessment and classification of behaviours were based on assessing behavioural 
interactions in terms of the potential risks to compromise a system and the frequency 
with which this behaviour is observed. This contribution has the potential to help 
future research that relies on Windows 7 malware that rely on dynamic analysis that 
filtering out noise or identifying key system behaviours that display inherent 
maliciousness. This artefact of the thesis can be applied directly to Windows 7 based 
operating systems when dynamic analysis of potentially malicious websites or 
samples is undertaken as the core operating system interactions are similar.  
1.3.2 Identification of differences in behavioural manifestations in different 
versions operating systems.  
As part of studying the behaviour of operating systems over the course of four years, 
evidence of behavioural drift was identified. Behavioural drift describes the changes 
in behavioural interactions that change over time in a behaviour analysis 
environment. This is an important concept that should not be overlooked when 
designing behaviour analysis systems. The justification here is that, over time 
alternate versions of known behaviours can be observed which should not be falsely 
classified as malicious behaviour. This discovery prompted the evaluation of different 
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versions of an operating system to identify the differences in observable behaviour 
and identify key behavioural difference. It was concluded that as a result of 
undertaking this investigation, there were several significantly different behavioural 
changes in patched and unpatched behavioural analysis environments. This 
suggests that careful consideration should be applied to the choice of operating 
systems for honeypots attempting to replicate client systems.  
1.3.3 Observed active exploits and malicious behaviours attacking honeypots 
A large volume of potentially malicious websites were analysed within the thesis’ 
experiments and data capture. From this a range of confirmed malicious log files 
were gathered. The malicious behaviours within log files that were observed during 
drive-by-download analysis were explored and evaluated. This provided knowledge 
in terms of popular attack vectors and exploits faced during the course of the study. 
The synthesised knowledge reinforces existing knowledge on a large numbers of 
web based attacks that target various aspects of a vulnerable operating system, 
browser and plugins.  This contribution is important as it is concluded that evidently a 
large number of exploits including browser injection and malicious file writes stay 
active long after they have initially been detected. This finding shows the importance 
of the application of security patches and browser safeguard methods within client 
systems post outbreaks of threats within cyber security as threats remain active.   
1.4 Thesis organisation 
This section discusses the structure of the thesis. This work is organised in 7 
chapters. Initially, chapters 1 and 2 present the introduction, background and context 
of the research area. Approaches to detecting drive-by-downloads and malware 
analysis are discussed, relevant parties involved within detection and intelligence 
gathering is explored. Literature within this field is reviewed and gaps are identified. 
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From this, the research questions are synthesised on a variety of gaps from creation 
of behavioural exclusion lists to investigating changes within operating system 
setups.  
Chapter 3 explores the experimental methodologies applicable to identified research 
questions. Within the chapter, malware experimentation framework with prudent 
experimental guidelines is adapted and applied to meet the research demands. The 
chapter evaluates and discusses sample sizes, resource acquisition and gathering 
required data. As part of chapter 3, two experiments are carried out which are 
presented in Appendix B.  A validation experiment of the experimental setup and 
analysis environment is carried out and finally Twitter is assessed as an avenue to 
gather potentially malicious Universal Resource Locators (URLs). It is concluded that 
while there are malicious URLs observed within tweets, the volume of detected 
maliciousness was relatively too low to merely apply dynamic filtering directly thus, 
unsuitable for this study.  
Chapter 4 presents the major findings in this study, and initially provides justification 
of the creation of behavioural exclusion lists within the Windows 7 behaviour analysis 
environment. Technical software behavioural manifestations are explored and 
labelled malicious, benign or grey. Discovered behaviours are compared with the 
predecessor operating system, Windows XP which results in knowledge of the key 
different processes and behaviours. Behavioural filter goals, proposed creation 
methodology and update strategies are proposed and implemented. The chapter 




Chapter 5 consists of two major experimental write-ups: Firstly, the created exclusion 
lists in the previous chapter is evaluated in the context of a real-world experiment 
within potentially malicious websites. It is concluded that the exclusion lists were able 
to filter a significant amount (96.96%) of known, benign behaviours.  Secondly an 
experiment is designed and created that was tasked in understanding how the 
behaviour manifestations in a behaviour analysis environment change over in 
patched and unpatched environments. There were significant changes in observable 
behaviours and these key differential behaviour manifestations are explored.  
Chapter 6 presents behavioural knowledge, pattern and common attack vectors that 
were identified in 5,132 log files. These were created in the interaction between 
client and 110,000 potentially malicious web servers by utilising Capture-BAT. The 
evidence of behavioural drift is introduced and discussed.  
Chapter 7 evaluates and concludes the work undertaken. Limitations and 
delimitations are discussed in light of the approach. Potential future research 




These papers were published at the time of the study.  
1. Puttaroo, M, Komisarczuk, P, Amorim, R., (2014). Challenges in developing 
Capture-HPC exclusion lists, In The 7th International Conference on Security 
of Information and Networks, (SINCONF), 9-11 September 2014, ACM. 
2. Puttaroo, M., Komisarczuk, P., Amorim, R., (2013). On Drive-by-Download 
Attacks and Malware Classification. Fifth International Conference on Internet 


















Chapter 2 – Literature review 
This chapter provides background and details regarding the research area. The 
detection of drive-by-download attacks and malware analysis are both highly active 
areas of research as seen by Amorim & Komisarczuk, (2012b), Bringer et al, (2012), 
and Egele et al.  (2012). The technical approaches, definitions and techniques 
therefore needed identification and critique.  Relevant detection and intelligence 
gathering parties involved and their contributions are identified. Drive-by-download 
area is then differentiated within the overall scope of malware analysis. Related work 
is critiqued leading to the identification of gaps within knowledge to be identified. 
Finally, research questions are formulated and scope of work is defined.  
2.1 Introduction to drive-by-download and research area 
2.1.1 Drive-by-download attacks 
A drive-by-download is an attack where a web browser or another web enabled 
application is hijacked by malicious content, which is typically delivered by a 
malicious website. Drive-by-download attacks exploit the operating system, the 
browser or vulnerabilities in the versions of installed plugins. Other applications 
within a given client computer system are also vulnerable to attack. Creation of drive-
by-downloads are fuelled by the motivation of black hats, also known as malware 
writers or hackers, targeting attacks on client systems as opposed to servers on the 
internet (Sherif et al., 2004). This is a highly desirable scenario as these attacks 
often provide complete control over the target, in turn resulting in monetary gains by 
underground economies from sensitive information ex-filtration, using a controlled 
host to launch attacks or provide dark web services (Cova et al.  2010; Provos et al. 




Figure 2.0: The drive-by-download problem and client side attacks illustrated 
based on knowledge provided by Dell'Aera & Seifert (2012).  
Initially in the basic drive-by-download attack, a malware developer creates 
malicious content that attacks a vulnerable client; the malware is deployed by a 
malicious entity, either a developer or a third party. This malicious content is then 
served to a client system when the client system interacts with a web server. This 
triggers delivery of malware, which is typically hosted on a network of servers.  The 
drive-by-download attack simply seeks to compromise a client system that visits a 
web server, which may have been compromised itself or may be delivering malicious 
content for example through advertising streams. This malicious delivery occurs 
without the client’s knowledge and user’s consent. The malicious code is 
downloaded and usually installed automatically. Even a single request from a client 
system visiting an infected website would result in vulnerabilities being targeted and 




Figure 2.1: Drive-by-download attacking client systems from poisoned 
advertisement streams (Dell'Aera, 2012).  
Drive-by-download attacks are not limited to malicious websites. Within the internet 
for example, benign websites that contain advertisement streams can contain 
malware from external sources. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, redirected requests from 
a seemingly benign website to the exploit and malware propagation servers can also 
be used to infect client systems. This type of drive-by-download can have amplified 
effects upon larger volumes of client systems as mainstream websites are often 
trusted by large numbers of users. Whilst exploring the exploitation process of a web 
server is not the purpose of this thesis, it is important to note that the exploit is often 
dependent on the web server security levels, ability for user contributed content to be 
shared, inclusion of advertising streams and ability for third-party widgets (Provos et 
al., 2007). More specifically to a cyber security perspective, legitimate web sites can 
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be compromised by a range of methods: Structured Query Language (SQL) injection 
attacks, search engine result redirections, cross-site scripting attacks or simply 
vulnerabilities in a web-server hosting software.   Le et al. (2012) suggests that 
increased drive-by-download attacks can also be due to the increased availability of 
exploit packs which require the attacker to have significantly less skill set to deploy. 
Typical drive-by-download attack vectors are explored further in Figure 2.2.  The 
exploit seeks to target a given vulnerability in software. The exploit delivery 
mechanism is the observable drive-by-download behaviour that is concerned with 
dropping malicious code or files onto a client machine. Obfuscation is used to hide 
exploits, delivery mechanisms or the insertion of JavaScript within code. This 
presents a challenge to detection methods that are not based on run-time analysis.  
 
Figure 2.2 Malicious webpage attack vectors.  
Compromising a client system can be highly damaging to the victim (Clemenson, 
2009; Cova et al., 2010; Provos et al., 2007). This is logical because a black hat 
would be able to access all of that client’s personal and confidential data as well as 
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any data stored on the network, which a client is given privilege to access. Some 
examples include credit card details, corporate files, login and password information, 
cookies, temporary files and saved passwords which are for example stored in a 
browser. Extortion through ransomware is also a growing trend as discussed by both 
O’Gorman & McDonald (2012) and the FBI (2016).  In order to compromise clients, 
malicious websites attempt to exploit vulnerabilities from the web browser (such as 
Internet Explorer), plug-ins (such as ActiveX and Adobe reader) or even the 
operating system’s built in features (such as exploiting privilege available in 
Command (Cmd) in Windows). Additionally, compromised client machines can be 
used to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and send spam 
messages around the internet. Khattab et al. (2004) presents work on mitigating 
denial of service attacks. These availability based attacks were predicted to be on 
the rise by Rivera (2013).  
It is important to present a high overview of the anatomy of a malware attack as this 
provides insight into how the thesis’ drive-by-download research fits into the overall 
picture. Le et al. (2013) presents the anatomy of a drive-by-download attack in 
stages and uses this framework to detect potential drive-by-download attacks.  
Figure 2.3 shows the timeline between a malware being created to the compromised 
state that is faced by client systems. Initially a malware writer would create a 
malware sample or download existing malicious scripts widely available on the world 
wide web and black hat communities. These are then used to compromise an 
existing web server or a new server is set up for the purpose of compromising 
clients. As client machines or users visit the web server and send Hypertext Mark-up 
Language (HTML) requests, the malicious content (either present on the web server 
itself or redirected from exploit servers) performs vulnerability exploitation aimed at 
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the application, the client operating system and plugins. This exploitation allows the 
drive-by-download to install malware. Malware on a client system may lead to the 
aforementioned damaging effects such as data exfiltration, malicious control over the 
computer system and using the compromised system to launch attacks or gain 
resources (Egele et al., 2009).  
 
 Figure 2.3: Anatomy of the creation and exploitation process. 
As the internet is a vast public network which is growing at a significant level, it is 
difficult to reliably estimate the actual number of malicious websites that are currently 
active at a given point in time. Internet Live Stats (2017) estimates that there are 1.1 
billion active websites. The sheer processing power required to analyse the entirety 
of the internet is simply far greater than that is currently available by any individual 
organisation and therefore sections of the internet are surveyed by different research 
groups.  Seifert (2010) estimated that in 2010 there were around 150 million 
malicious websites.   Newer statistics (Av-test, 2015) show that in the last 5 years 
the number of detected malware is on the rise: in 2015, there were around five times 
more detected malware in comparison to 2011. More specifically when considering 
web based malware and malicious web servers; Kaspersky (2012) reported that in 
2012 the number of browser-based attacks were nearly 1.6 billion and that 73.70% 
37 
 
of all attacks originated from malicious URLs. Malicious URLs as a percentage of all 
attacks observed by Kaspersky was shown to have increased to 75.76% in 2015 
(Kaspersky, 2015) and again to 77.26% in their 2016 report (Garnaeva et al., 2016).  
Symantec (2016) in their internet security threat report suggest over ‘one million web 
attacks against people each and every day.’ These statistics therefore illustrate the 
necessary requirement of reliable security mechanisms and continued research 
within detection and intelligence gathering to protect client and networks systems 
from the ever-growing sea of web-based threats.  
2.1.2 Detection, intelligence gathering parties and technologies 
In addition to the research discussed above, there are several different parties 
involved in the detection of malicious webpages and the gathering of intelligence 
within the area of drive-by-download research. In this thesis, these are divided 
between the government, commercial services, and research communities.  
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) are dedicated expert groups that 
handle computer security threats. CERT Polska (Poland) handles network security 
threats for the .pl web space and performs research into the detection of security 
incidents and analysis of malware. They have a joint venture with the National Cyber 
Security Centre (Netherlands) in the deployment of the HoneySpider network. This is 
a highly scalable system that uses multiple instruments including client honeypots 
and is aimed at the large-scale detection of malicious URLs. Their monitoring and 
early warning systems are tasked with improving awareness within the world wide 
web and focus primarily on ‘attacks against or involving the use of web browsers’ 
(HoneySpider, 2013).  
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In the United Kingdom (UK), Nominet provides a commercial ‘Domain Health’ service 
to help all UK-based domains that are managed by the Nominet service (Nominet, 
2017). This service focuses on collecting security information from compromised 
web servers under the .UK domain and categorises servers into several abuse 
categories; abuse, command and control, compromised, associated in malware or 
botnet attacks, phishing and spam.   
The Shadowserver Foundation (2017) is involved in the capture, analysis, monitoring 
and reporting of malware and botnet activity within the world wide web. 
Shadowserver uses the Nepenthes honeypot primarily to collect malware samples. 
The Honeynet project is a non-profit organisation that has been active within 
detection of malware and intelligence gathering for several years (Honeynet, 2014) 
and is a collection of nationally managed chapters. Members of the Honeynet project 
actively engage in a large number of research and development projects within 
malicious webpage discovery, and raise awareness of existing web-based threats, 
conduct data analysis approaches and develop of security tools.  
Anti-virus software vendors are also highly active within this area of research and 
regularly publish statistics reflecting their findings using their data gathering networks 
(Garnaeva et al. 2016; Kaspersky 2015; Symantec 2016; Akamai 2016). These often 
include a portion of data dedicated to online (web based, drive-by-download) attacks. 
For instance, Garnaeva et al. (2016) provides a list of Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE), country attack distribution charts, and observed exploit vectors 
(such as the browser, Adobe reader, Flash player, java, …etc).  
Historically, web based services such as Wepawet by Cova et al. (2010) have been 
made available to perform analysis of both URLs and malicious file format. Similarly, 
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Anubis (http://anubis.iseclab.org) performed URL analysis and provided a report 
based on operating system and browser interactions and behaviours that takes place 
when a given URL is submitted for analysis. The lists of behaviours provided by 
these online analysers displayed all system interaction that took place upon analysis 
of a website and did not differentiate malicious from benign behaviours.   
Virus Total (2016) is an online information aggregator service that uses anti-virus 
engines and website scanners to detect malicious content on files or malicious 
websites. This is a useful service that facilitates the identification of malware, and 
possible false positives. The ability to use multiple antivirus scanners and website 
scanners which are updated in real time facilitates detection. Virus Total also hosts a 
collection of malware hashes, malware binaries as well as malware analysis data 
from several anti-virus vendors such as Sophos, McAfee, Symantec and a lot more 
popular anti-virus. As an information aggregator, Virus Total provides a free un-
biased service on a given malware sample. This makes Virus Total ideal for research 
without any influences from any particular parties. Within this research, Virus Total is 
used extensively in two ways: first, Virus Total is used to verify collected malware 
samples. These malicious binaries are submitted to the multitude of anti-virus 
vendors supported by Virus Total and assigned signatures are requested. Second, 
Virus Total is used as a second step validation to ensure that a given website does 
not show signs of maliciousness when the use of benign websites are required. 
Some examples of the capability of Virus Total are provided in Appendix A.  
Client honeypots (or honeyclients) are security devices, which sole purpose are to be 
compromised and probed by malicious web servers. The intent behind this is to 
identify potentially malicious websites from those that are benign. These devices, 
unlike traditional defensive security systems such as Intrusion Detection Systems 
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(IDS), firewalls, anti-viruses or data encryption and backups are a more aggressive 
approach to client system defence. Client honeypots are at the forefront of 
intelligence gathering to initiatively protect against threats to the client network. 
Studies can then be conducted to understand the operations and intent of a malware 
writer by capturing malicious activity and analysing attack patterns. Additionally, this 
helps in identifying vulnerabilities in client systems (Seifert, Welch & Komisarczuk, 
2006). From reviewing the available literature and intelligence gathering parties, it is 
fair to conclude that the issue of drive-by-downloads is an active area of research 
within the context of cyber security.  
2.1.3 Collecting drive-by-download samples 
A drive-by-download can be viewed as an unintended artefact that is downloaded 
onto a computer after visiting a webpage. The unintended aspect of this definition 
usually applies to the unsuspecting client browsing a web site.  This attack usually 
takes place without the consent and knowledge of the client; therefore, it is typically 
classified as malicious.  The behavioural interaction between a client and a malicious 
web server can often be exploited to deliver malware by a drive-by-download. It is 
important to note that client honeypots are needed to collect drive-by-downloads. It is 
possible to crawl the World Wide Web to visit suspected malicious websites to 
attempt to collect malware samples as well as obtain behavioural information on the 
interaction on the client’s guest operating system and the applications running whilst 
the malware is being delivered. Recent research on the long-term studies of 
malicious URLs by Tanaka & Goto (2016) shows reliable evidence that some 
malicious URLs are found to survive for more than 500 days after first being 
detected. Long-lived malicious URLs that are either crafted by a malware writer or 
are parasitized from unpatched website vulnerabilities may deliver a particular exploit 
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which still contains the same exploit that they were originally designed or injected 
with.  This clearly has implications within cyber security research as long-lived 
malicious URLs, which target a specific vulnerability, are likely to have an impact on 
a created dataset for analysis. Newly collected datasets face the possibility of 
collecting slightly outdated exploits that were aimed at older operating system, 
application and browser vulnerabilities.  In addition to this, research using the 
internet to build data corpuses faces a large volume of available webpages which 
can mean that the collection of drive-by-download samples result in data that is out-
dated. Long-lived malware is not new within cyber security as samples such as 
research by Nazario (2006) showed samples seen in 2002 were still being 
distributed in 2006. More recently, Goodin (2016) discusses the Project Sauron 
malware which has been active for 5 years, proving the longevity of active malware. 
Therefore, when drive-by-downloads were being collected from the internet it is 
evident that there is a requirement for some sort of control to collect relevant 
malware within the context of the target client system utilised. Collection of malware 
samples can be filtered when building a data corpus based on malware that actively 
attack a type or version of O.S. This allowed the data corpus to exclude older 
websites that target older client systems although older client systems are still 
prevalent.  
2.2 Methods of analysing drive-by-downloads 
Drive-by-download analysis in the context of this work refers to the behavioural 
interaction that a client-honeypot would experience and record upon the visitation of 
a malicious website. This is different to a traditional malware sandbox which looks at 
environmental changes and system calls when a malicious Portable Executable is 
executed. Drive-by-download analysis is the analysis of environment changes whilst 
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a drive-by-download is attempting to exploit a system and does not assume that a 
given binary file has been downloaded or saved on the analysis environment. 
Typically, this involves using a client honeypot to simulate the real-world scenario of 
client accessing a malicious webpage scenario and logging system behaviours for 
drive-by-download analysis. This will provide information on attack vectors used by 
malware: these can either be exploited weaknesses and vulnerabilities from the web-
browser or web-browser plugins, as well as any applications being run. Typically, in 
the system life-cycle of a malware attack, drive-by-downloads would occur before a 
malicious binary is executed: behaviour of drive-by-downloads can be studied to 
understand how a given malware sample infiltrated a client environment. Thus, when 
referring to drive-by-download behaviours or drive-by-download analysis, the web 
exploit’s non-standard and malicious behaviours observed on a live system is what 
this thesis is referring to.  
Drive-by-download analysis is typically carried out using three types of approaches; 
low-interaction client honeypots, high-interaction client honeypot and hybrid client 
honeypots. These approaches are core to the thesis and therefore are discussed 
before a rational for choosing high-interaction is provided.  
2.2.1 Low-interaction 
Low-interaction client honeypots perform drive-by-download analysis without actually 
executing the malicious websites on live systems. Simulations of interactions are 
used to interact with a malicious website. Response from these web servers are then 
analysed to detect static presence of malicious content. An example of static content 
could be a set of strings contained within a HTML response. These lightweight 
solutions are effective at scanning large volumes of potentially malicious websites 
and are less likely to spread malware infections through a network due to the lack of 
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exploitable interaction with malicious websites. An example of widely used low-
interaction client honeypot is Thug by Dell'Aera (2012). Thug has a number of 
different browser versions and plugins. These are used in the analysis of web-based 
threats by emulating behavioural events. The analysis relies on attack signatures 
and the identification of interesting breakpoints. Yet Another Low-Interaction 
Honeyclient (YALIH) by Mansoori et al. (2014) is another example of a currently 
developed low-interaction client honeypot with capabilities to emulate virtual 
browsers and cookie redirection. However, low-interaction systems usually tend to 
be ineffective at detecting new and unknown malicious behaviours as they cannot 
provide full emulations of client systems and use simplistic rule-based or signature 
checking to detect attacks. Signature based systems face evasiveness from malware 
writers who use obfuscation and polymorphism techniques in creation of new 
malware samples. Additionally, there is therefore a requirement for an attack to be 
known prior to website analysis, which in the world of cyber security is challenging 
due to the nature of the cat and mouse game between malware writers and security 
professionals (Riden & Seifert, 2010). Additionally, low-interaction client honeypots 
would face the same limitations that static detection systems face. Such an example 
include: Obfuscated attacks which modify patterns, code, data and behaviours in 
avoiding detection. Both limitations discussed can be mitigated by incorporating 
dynamic analysis from high-interaction systems in purely native low-interaction 
systems.  
2.2.2 High-interaction 
High-interaction client honeypots perform runtime (dynamic) analysis of drive-by-
download interactions by running instances of guest O.S. that actively crawls the 
web with the goal of getting compromised by visiting malicious websites. These high-
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interaction systems can be comparable to real-world clients and can additionally be 
set up to simulate a certain type of user. Recorded attacks against such a client can 
then be analysed by studying malicious web-exploit manifestations from real-world 
malicious web servers in real-time. This behavioural analysis provides the benefit of 
identifying malware based on their behaviours as opposed to signatures, which can 
sometimes lead to the detection of 0-day attacks from malicious drive-by-downloads. 
It is imperative to state that high-interaction honeypots can provide a much deeper 
level of detail upon how an exploit compromises a client system in comparison to a 
low-interaction counterpart.  
High-interaction client honeypots have been around for a number of years some 
examples include: Capture-HPC by Seifert et al. (2007) and Shelia by Rocaspana 
(2009). The main drawback in terms of malware analysis of high-interaction client 
honeypot is the time and resource intensive nature of dynamic analysis. Additionally, 
due to the nature of running real-world malware tests on live systems there is the risk 
of the analysis client getting compromised and exploited to launch attacks against 
other networks or being exploited as a gateway into the network infrastructure. The 
benefits from obtaining behavioural information from real-world malicious websites 
outweigh the drawbacks faced as both aforementioned limitations can be mitigated. 
For instance, known domain names could be targeted to obtain a higher detection 
rate and the honeypot could be isolated from the main network. This can then run 
within a separate network connection and good security practices could be applied 
as well as limiting the time that a compromised client honeypot is allowed to be 
active. This is  an ideal choice for honeypot type for real-world research as it is not 
dependant on the limitations faced by low-interaction counterparts. Design limitations 
such as the usage of virtual machines to analyse maliciousness can be an issue 
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sometimes as these can be detected by malware which would likely not manifest full 
behaviour. High-interaction client honeypots are nevertheless, a good approach to 
capturing malicious behaviours. In line with this statement, Lau and Svajcer (2010) 
showed that only as little as 2% of malware sampled could detect the presence of 
virtual machines. This is a relatively low percentage but is likely to have increased at 
the time of writing. 
Typically, the output of a high-interaction client honeypot is recorded as a 
behavioural log file. These behavioural log files contain behavioural information that 
can be used to understand how different components of an analysis environment 
interact. It is in this way that malicious behaviour can be identified: the unexpected 
interactions can be investigated to understand how malware is downloaded on to the 
system and what plugins or environment features are targeted as part of malicious 
attacks. This is the focus of this thesis.  
2.2.3 Hybrid-interaction 
Hybrid client honeypots combine low and high interaction approaches usually in 
various stages to attempt to perform large scale studies of drive-by-downloads 
attacks. Low-interaction features such as interpreting java and web crawling is 
undertaken and from this the potentially malicious domains are sent for further 
analysis within the high-interaction component which would undergo dynamic 
analysis. Examples of a hybrid honeypot systems include Honeybird or Honey 
Spider 2. Hybrid honeypot systems are highly effective when there is a requirement 
for crawling the world wide web and analysing large volumes of unknown URLs. In 
this context, an estimated volume would be in the hundreds of thousands, possibly 
millions of URLs per day as new websites are discovered and analysed by numerous 
intelligence gathering parties aforementioned.  The rationale behind this claim lies 
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within the sortation process where initially the low-interaction component would 
analyse every webpage in the list. The webpages that provided unknown responses 
as well as potentially known malicious responses would then be forwarded to the 
slower high-interaction counterpart.  
The HoneySpider network 2 (2013) is highly scalable system of integrated honeypots 
for detecting malicious content on the web. Within the previous architecture of 
HoneySpider 1 integrated high and low-interaction client honeypots which were used 
in addition to Snort’s Intrusion detection system. However, the new HoneySpider 2 
includes a more complex detection framework using a number of exploit detection 
mechanisms such as JavaScript analyser, PDF analyser, and Flash analyser in 
addition to using Capture-HPC and anti-virus scanners. This integrated framework 
offers the possibility of a number of different exploits to be detected from a wide 
range of plugins, which users rely on daily. HoneySpider 2 is not simply a honeypot 
as it also provides a number of services. An example of this is the storing of data and 
analysing of honeypot data by using a number of nuggets. Therefore, HoneySpider 2 
could be described as a management platform that crawls the web in search of 
malicious webpages. Koo et al. (2013) also used hybrid honeypots in the detection of 
malicious webpages.  
Work related to this thesis by Seifert et al. (2008) performed hybrid analysis of 
webpage data in by combining static with dynamic analysis. A number of exploits 
were discovered which could be detected by looking at different static attributes of 
webpage data and provided a classification method based on assessment of 
attributes on an initial HTTP response. The decision trees technique was effectively 
used at the time by the author to determine whether a number of features, such as, 
an iFrame of very small size was either malicious or benign. Whilst this method of 
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analysing websites and determining whether a website is malicious or not is very 
efficient at scanning large numbers of webpages, an obvious limitation would be the 
number of false positives obtained. In terms of identification of malicious webpages, 
the authors admit that the method misses a number of attacks which is concerning, 
but the work was focused on attempting to deal with the ever-increasing large 
volumes of websites active on the world wide web.  
In addition to this, the methods used to identify malicious webpages are unlikely to 
be applicable in the current web era as behaviours and features change: the 
proposed decision trees would face a fairly high number of false positives which 
would miss a significant number of drive-by-download exploits. The decision tree 
proposed would require a number of updates to keep up with new exploits as the 
low-interaction aspect would likely require new signature updates.  Song et al. (2010) 
agrees and mentions that malicious webpages are short-lived before they are 
changed or removed by the malicious black hat. As the classification model is out of 
date and no longer applicable to the current World Wide Web it is fair to conclude 
that new classification models are required to identify malicious web servers.  
2.2.4 Chosen approach and rationale 
Low-interaction client honeypots did not provide real-world observable behaviours 
and rely on signatures beforehand. This meant that it would be unsuitable to apply 
low-interaction client honeypots to this research. The justification behind this is 
purely because the work undertaken in this thesis was focused on assessing 
behaviour manifestation within behaviour analysis environments and observable 
real-world malicious web exploits. High-interaction client honeypots or run-time 
analysis on the other hand provided the means to observe system calls of a 
behaviour analysis environment whilst also not being limited by the dependency of 
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an exploit being known beforehand. The limitations faced by low-interaction client 
honeypots and the interest within the observable web attacks within client systems 
drove this research into applying high interaction client honeypots within the study. 
This research used potentially malicious websites as the main resource in capturing 
malicious behaviour. This approach is different to Le et al. (2011) where the URLs 
used were unknown and required a low-interaction analyser to create a list of 
potentially malicious webpages.  It is therefore fair to conclude that the usage of 
hybrid systems would be unnecessary: the URLs utilised as input for the honeypot 
have been pre-filtered thereby rendering the initial low-interaction analysis 
redundant.  In addition to this, the number of potentially malicious websites retrieved 
from multiple black list and malware domain lists utilised in the study were not as 
numerous to justify the usage of hybrid client honeypots.  
2.3 Malware 
Malicious computer software with the intent to disrupt operation, deceive, extort, 
steal sensitive information, gain access to private systems, spy or advertise is known 
as malware. Malicious software has been on the rise and forefront of cybercrime with 
a vast variety of types including viruses, trojan Horses, rootkits, backdoors, spyware, 
worms and ransomware. Examples include:  ransomware trojan – CryptoLocker or 
Computer worm – Stuxnet. This section outlines some key definitions and work 
within malware analysis with the conclusion focused on differentiating the traditional 
malware analysis stage with drive-by-download analysis state in the anatomy of a 
malware attack.  
2.3.1 Malware analysis 
Malware analysis is the process of studying computer software which was created 
with intent to harm a host O.S. or steal data by violating confidentiality, integrity and 
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availability of the computer system. Malware analysis involves dissecting a number 
of different components of malicious software with the intent to study the possible 
malicious behaviour manifestation of software within a host O.S. Malware analysis 
techniques include two main approaches which are sometimes combined to provide 
better understanding of malicious intent. These approaches are static malware 
analysis and dynamic malware analysis.  
 
Figure 2.4:  Overview of malware analysis approaches including requirements 
based on Zeltser (2016).  
Malware analysis requires more effort and significant experience by the malware 
reverser as fine grain malware analysis is a very complicated task. This picture can 
be used to also represent the amount of time required for each task to conclude: 
static malware analysis would require the least amount of time for completion and 
reverse engineering would require the most. The approaches of static and dynamic 
malware analysis are shared within drive-by-download analysis, however different 
parts of the anatomy of an attack would need to be analysed. Code reversing for 
drive-by-download analysis would require the web server page code and any 
additional scripts attached to it.  
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Static malware analysis involves studying a given file, specifically Portable 
Executable (PE) files, in Windows and understanding the file’s functionality. This 
sometimes can indicate the maliciousness of a PE file without having to execute the 
file, bringing the benefit of fast malware analysis as well as requiring less hardware 
to analyse malware samples. Typical tasks in static analysis include searching the 
file for strings, checking if the file is obfuscated or packed and learning the content of 
file headers.  
In dynamic malware analysis, the malware analyst looks at a more in-depth set of 
properties of the malware through execution. Typically, an isolated environment is 
created where the file would be executed and behaviours recorded. Examples of 
these behaviours include: system calls, process created/deleted, files created, 
modified, deleted, registry entries and network traffic. These behavioural entries are 
crucial for a malware analyst to understand what a given program is attempting to do 
when executed. With this information, it is possible to classify a program analysed as 
benign, malicious or unknown depending on the behaviour. It is important to note 
that while dynamic malware analysis is a lot more labour intensive and time 
consuming than static analysis and requires the setup of a functioning malware 
analysis lab or sandbox; it is proven to be much more accurate in detecting 
maliciousness within programs than static malware analysis due to its thorough 
nature Zeltser (2016). An example solution of endpoint malware detection using 
dynamic analysis and AI to detect malware is Cylance (https://www.cylance.com). 
In order for malware to execute, the environment would require a degree of 
transparency that would prevent malware from detecting and stopping potential 
attacks. Additionally, the O.S. and applications installed on the isolated environment 
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would need to somewhat mimic popular real client systems on which the malware 
was intended to attack.  
Reverse engineering program code is often done manually by a malware analyst. 
This can be thought of as dissecting a malware sample to obtain valuable insight: 
data stored on the program, algorithms and logic used within the program and 
revelation of all functions and possible behaviours which are not always exhibited. 
Disassemblers, debuggers and decompilers are used in this process. This task is 
highly time and labour intensive, so much so that it is currently unable to cope with 
even a fraction the amount of malware released every day. Additionally, the malware 
analyst is required to have a very rare skill set which is why the vast majority of 
malware studies do not use this method Zeltser (2016).  
2.3.2 Research around malware analysis 
Malware analysis has been carried out by a large number of authors covering vast 
research scopes. Although the thesis is aimed at drive-by-download analysis, some 
of these issues and techniques translate over from the dynamic aspect of malware 
analysis and can thus be very applicable to the work presented. This section outlines 
some high impact work within malware analysis.  Willems et al. (2007) presented 
CWSandbox, which is an analysis environment that monitors system calls and 
created a report. They show that it is possible to automate binary analysis of current 
Win32 based Portable Executables for malware analysis using CWSandbox. 
However, this does not seem available as it seems to have evolved into a 
commercial solution. Detection of obfuscated malware is covered by Dinaburg et al. 
(2008), who address the issue of malware detecting the presence of analysers in the 
analysis component by applying hardware virtualisation technologies and extensions 
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that reside outside the analysis operating system environment that would otherwise 
be detected by some malware samples.  
Moser et al. (2007) explores single program execution issues that are observed with 
dynamic analysis tools. The effect of this prompts malware to only be triggered 
based on a number of specific or special circumstances: e.g. a specific day, with the 
inclusion of a specific file being present in the environment, or when a certain 
command is obtained from the malware writer. The authors propose a system that 
allows the exploration of multiple execution paths and identifies malicious actions 
that are only executed when certain conditions are met. The paper uses a number of 
different values that try to get the executable to execute and display malicious 
behaviour patterns. Their experiment shows that for a significant fraction of the 
malware sample used, multiple execution paths were being applied. 
Recent research by Vasilescu et al. (2014) utilised sandbox system, Cuckoo 
(Cuckoo, 2014) to run malicious executable in dedicated environments in order to 
capture malicious behaviours. These environments are emulated via the use of 
virtualisation software much like Capture-HPC clients. However, they do not only 
analyse the initial interaction between client and server when accessing a webpage, 
as they assume instead that the malicious executable sample is present in the 
sandbox and that the system was already compromised. The authors also carried 
out manual analysis of malware in a Windows XP environment with the use of 
WireShark DumpIt, Volatility and IDA. It is important to note that the authors used 
Windows XP in both the Cuckoo sand box instance as well as the manual malware 
analysis carried out. It is likely that some new exploits aimed at targeting Windows 7 
systems, which is currently the most popular operating system, are not able to attack 
older Windows based environments which would mean a number of malware not 
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being flagged up as false positives as the environment is unaffected by these 
specific Windows 7 attacks. The lack of focus in the most common operating system, 
namely Windows 7, are likely to have missed targeted attacks by only focusing on 
Windows 7 vulnerabilities specifically. Future research can therefore avoid this pitfall 
and detect more malicious behaviours by attempting to replicate common client 
applications and by usage of the most popular operating system. An extended 
discussion on the operating system’s applicability to research is undertaken later in 
the chapter. 
2.3.3 Malware packers 
A packer is a wrapper around software to encrypt and compress the contents of the 
software for efficient delivery and deployment. Packers can be used legitimately and 
without malicious intentions to minimise upload and download times when 
transferring files as well as protecting copyright code. Unfortunately, packers are 
routinely used in malware propagation to disguise malicious files or code and 
therefore evade detection from anti-malware scanners (Virus Bulletin, 2015). 
Runtime packers perform unpacking operations such as decrypting and 
decompressions on executable files. This is done in stages involving unwrapping the 
wrapped file, loading to memory and executed. From a malware perspective, 
malicious software could effectively be wrapped several times using different 
‘wrappers’ or packing methods and a malicious file itself could be changed in small 
insignificant ways. Consequently, the final packed file would appear as a new or 
undiscovered malware sample. This is a cheap, easy and highly effective way for 
malware writers to pack a previously detected or known sample and avoid detection 
from signature based detection utilised by anti-virus vendors. This method of 
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encrypting contents of a malicious file for detection avoidance is known as Malware 
code obfuscation.  
Packers which pack Microsoft Windows PE files support the executable format (.exe) 
and the Dynamic Link Libraries (.DLL) and can be written in a number of different 
programming languages (such as C++, Python, Visual Basic, JavaScript…etc.). It is 
therefore fair to state that the malware writers have a vast array of tools to pack and 
obfuscate their malicious scripts and original PE files should a version of a given 
malware be detected by an Anti-Virus vendor’s signature based approach. It is 
evident that in order for a malware sample to be inspected and analysed by a 
malware analyser, the sample needs to be stripped of packer layer(s) so that the 
original executables can be analysed. Malware writers utilise anti-unpacking 
techniques in order to avoid packed malware from being detected and Reverse 
Engineered (RE) (Wei et al., 2008);  
 Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) of a given packed file is used to check file 
patching.  
 Redundant and jargon code is inserted between actual malicious code in 
scripts to bypass static detection methods and decompilers.  
 Using trigger based approaches to prevent unpacking upon dynamic 
debugging detection.  
 Self-changing code (mutation) on the original executable to prevent detection 
by memory dumping based approaches.  
In the thesis, packets are not captured which makes identification of the initial packer 
used to deliver the malware difficult to identify. However, some behaviours of 
packers can be observed within the log files that Capture-BAT gathers. For instance, 
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it is possible to observe malicious Portable Executable files being delivered as the 
malware installs onto the client within the Capture-BAT log files. Examples of real 
and active samples are explored further in Chapter 6. Furthermore, captured drive-
by-download samples were analysed through Virus Total which provides packer 
information about known packers that the saved Portable Executables used.  
2.3.4  Differentiating drive-by-download and malware analysis 
Having discussed both malware analysis and drive-by-download analysis, it is 
important to reflect upon the anatomy of a system exploitation. Figure 2.3 
summarised the typical attack lifecycle which was in line with discussions by Le et al. 
(2011) and Cova et al. (2010). Differentiating  malware analysis with drive-by-
download analysis is therefore possible when using the anatomy of an attack. 
Figuratively, it is possible to observe that drive-by-download attacks typically take 
place before malware exploits: usually in terms of the attack pattern, a client system 
would first be compromised by an exploit server which would then deliver the drive-
by-download. This drive-by-download can then perform multiple vulnerability 
exploitations. A dynamic example of this may include hijacking the browser process 
into writing malicious files or the addition of malicious parameters in the registry 
controlling auto start files. In terms of drive-by-download analysis, the analysis 
aspect would be to observe what interactions and system calls are triggered upon 
visitation of a malicious webpage. On the other hand, malware analysis typically 
uses a potentially malicious file which is executed within a sandboxed environment. 
Often this malicious file is presumed to be already present in the analysis 
environment and is thus executed with the differential behaviours observed. The 
system calls triggered are then monitored in behaviour analysis to determine if the 
given file is performing malicious actions on a client system.   
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2.5 Instruments for drive-by-download collection and analysis 
Within high-interaction analysis, a behavioural analysis environment is a created 
operating system and set of applications in the environment that are used in the 
analysis of drive-by-downloads or malware samples. These environments can then 
be designed to replicate similar client systems that an organisation would have with 
the exception of real data being substituted with falsified data. The replication of 
client systems allows the researcher to understand the weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities of similar client system by actively allowing the behaviour analysis lab 
to be compromised. Observation of behavioural manifestation provides key 
information on attack vectors and triggered system calls. It is therefore imperative 
that behavioural analysis environments are either designed with the goals of 
replicating the client system which they were designed to originally protect or 
designed and implemented in such a way that captures as many malicious attacks 
as possible. This is achieved by omitting newer patches of software that would 
exclude some existing vulnerabilities from the platform. The concept of environment 
design is of utmost importance within behaviour analysis systems which rely upon 
applications, plugins and specific operating system vulnerabilities that malware 
exploit. Only observed manifestations of malicious and unexpected behaviour 
classify a given malware or website, malicious or unknown. This was found to be the 
rationale behind a lack of malicious detection in the particular type of analysis 
environment used in Cova et al. (2010).  
2.5.1 Capture-HPC 
Capture-HPC was created by Christian Seifert and was established in 2007. 
Capture-HPC is a high interaction client honeypot which performs dynamic analysis 
on malicious web servers to capture malicious behaviour in log file format and also 
57 
 
captures modified and created files. Within the thesis, as Capture-HPC forms an 
important aspect of this work, a thorough discussion is provided in chapters 3 and 4. 
In terms of real-world website analysis, analysis using Capture-HPC would be 
dependent on the website performing an attack against Capture’s Behaviour 
Analysis Tool (BAT) client in order to flag unexpected behaviour or malicious 
behaviour upon a web server. Capture is not dependent on knowing attacks and 
malware signatures beforehand, making this an ideal tool for detecting real-world, 
web-based malicious attacks.  
A key critical factor within detectability of malware by Capture-HPC is however 
dependent on the installation of plugins and software that would be used by malware 
in the behaviour analysis environment (known as Capture-BAT) as supported by 
Cova et al. (2010). This makes comparing Capture-HPC’s detection rate a 
challenging task when compared to different systems which do not face this 
limitation, for instance a low-interaction counterpart dependent on signatures.  In this 
thesis, in order to mitigate the impacts of this limitation within Capture-BAT, a 
number of applications, particularly those versions that were vulnerable to malware 
attacks, were installed in our behaviour analysis environment. Details of which can 
be viewed in the experimental setup in Chapter 4 (section 4.5.3.)  
Capture log files can be configured to capture behavioural interaction that takes 
place upon booting and loading of a website or to simply capture malicious, new and 
unknown behavioural interactions. The former configuration results in a large volume 
of redundant data which includes benign system calls that are observed at every 
boot up. In comparison, the latter configuration results in a more focused and filtered 
set of data which is of significantly less volume. The main drawbacks of the second 
approach are the requirement of a created and maintained tailored list of exclusions, 
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known as an exclusion list, that are implemented based on a given environment’s 
Operating System (O.S.), applications and plugins. Exclusion lists are explored in-
depth within Chapter 4, along with creation goals, typical native system behaviours, 
proposed development lifecycle and implementation.  
As outlined by Seifert’s (2010) thesis, there are substantial numbers of malicious 
webpages. Nowadays, only analysing half of the amount of webpages that was 
studied in the author’s research would be required to detect a number of threats, 
including zero-day threats. The clear limitation observed is the sheer amount of 
processing power required to scan these malicious webpages. Another possible 
limitation would be the current nature of malicious web servers which are short lived 
(Bringer et al. 2012).  
2.5.2 Cuckoo sandbox 
Cuckoo sandbox has been available since 2012 and performs dynamic analysis of 
malware. Cuckoo also has the ability to perform dynamic analysis of malicious 
websites, resulting in a log file output similar to Capture-HPC. An instance of Cuckoo 
sandbox is available on the web (malwr.com), offered by Guarnieri et al. (2012). 
Much like Capture-BAT, Cuckoo has the ability to monitor environment behaviour 
patterns but has been constantly re-developed to include a vast number of features. 
These include taking screenshots of malicious file executing, performing memory 
analysis of an infected system or dumping and analysing encrypted network traffic.  
Similar to Capture-HPC, it was identified that there was no filtration mechanism in 




2.6 Related work 
This section introduces some alternative work that is related to the work carried out 
in this thesis. In this section, gaps within the literature are identified and reviewed.  
2.6.1 Malicious Domain name servers 
Research by Seifert et al. (2008b) looked at a number of malicious web servers in 
New Zealand by observing underlying server relationships and the numbers of 
Domain Name Server (DNS) were counted. If a malicious web server had more than 
two domain name extensions and more than five unique DNS servers, it was 
considered malicious. This method was simple but unfortunately only tested in New 
Zealand in 2008. The main limitation to the current day and age is simply that the 
New Zealand study was limited to a country that had low levels of malicious activity. 
This is proven by the well-established anti-virus vendor, Kaspersky. In a threat report 
by Namestnikov (2011) New Zealand is revealed to be the 14th country in the world 
with the lowest percentage of infected computers. Evidently, research is required in 
countries such as the US and the Russian Federation that were marked as “high 
risk” due to having the highest number of attacks. More importantly, it is fair to state 
that the Internet provides global access to web users which are not limited to a 
particular country. This means client honeypot studies that seek to find current web 
threats should ideally contain a variety of websites to identify the current client 
exploits that are being targeted.  
2.6.2 Systems monitoring state change 
There are several proposed approaches applied in the detection of web based 
malware. State change tracking systems such as Capture-BAT is proposed by 
Seifert & Steenson (2009), Cuckoo sandbox by Guarnieri et al. (2012), 
HoneyMonkey by Microsoft Research (2007), Kim et al. (2011) and CWsandbox by 
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Willems et al. (2007).  These state monitoring approaches simply track system 
behaviours such as interactions between the file, process, registry and (sometimes) 
network. These behaviours can be assessed and anomalies within expected 
behaviour can be identified. Behavioural based changes that these systems monitor 
include: files created or deleted by malware, registry key modifications, creations and 
deletions, process creations, injections and terminations. These dynamic analysis 
systems are not perfect and thus do not report the way that a malware attack 
originating from the web or from a malicious executable is programmed but instead 
the observable behaviour manifestation within a system which is a viable approach 
in combating malicious software when researchers are unable to combat malware 
using ‘methods of disassembly or reverse engineering’ Willems et al. (2007). State 
change systems Capture-BAT, Cuckoo sandbox and CWsandbox all output a 
behaviour log file of the system interactions that were captured during the analysis 
process. The benefit of this approach is that from the detailed behaviours that a log 
file displays, it is possible to identify attack vectors, infected files and processes as 
well as changes to the environment that was compromised.    These systems were 
introduced in section 2.2.2 and are discussed in greater detail within Chapter 4 as 
state monitoring systems are used within the thesis’s major contributions. Well cited 
work by Provos et al. (2008) is concerned in identifying drive-by-downloads at a 
large scale from crawling the world wide web. Their focus was much like the work 
present in this thesis, where the behaviour of installed software (malicious Portable 
Executable dropped) is not investigated but the mechanisms used to introduce 
maliciousness in the system (drive-by-download analysis) are investigated.   
Combining fast analysis approaches with slower, run-time approaches in attempts to 
obtain the benefit from both has been covered by previous work as seen in section 
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2.2.3. Le et al. (2011) proposes a two-stage classifier model for detecting malicious 
webpages. This model comprises of analysing static features. These describe the 
website content without having fully executed the supposedly malicious website, and 
then the potentially malicious websites are analysed further. Run-time features then 
provide the second aspect of classification between benign or malicious. Their hybrid 
system functions by combining both these features: the benefits of low resource 
requirements from static detection is utilised to identify potentially malicious 
webpages. If a website is found to be potentially malicious is then passed on to the 
slow, resource intensive run-time feature. This is a good approach in limiting the 
enormous amounts of URLs that would be dynamically analysed but if malicious 
attacks evade the static component of the two-stage classifier it is likely that they 
would evade detection all together. An alternative research approach to gathering 
malicious drive-by-download might be to make use of known malicious domains 
instead of relying on the static aspect of the hybrid system and instead use the 
dynamic analyser directly on a large sample of known malicious websites. One gap 
identified within literature reviewed showed little focus on work that is focused on 
identifying the behavioural impact and differences that is resulted from using different 
versions of environments in state-monitoring research. The design decisions behind 
what operating system is chosen for a honeypot are often left to the defence teams. 
It is reasonable to choose similar environments to live systems (such as same base 
operating system). However, when identifying differences between behaviour 
analysis environments with varying versions of the same operating system such as a 
patched operating system against the same base operating system unpatched, 
remained an area to be explored and was thus a gap within research.  
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2.6.3 JavaScript research 
Web based malware research has also been approached from the JavaScript 
aspect: It is possible for malicious code to be concealed in JavaScript and avoid 
detection. Egele et al. (2009) studied memory based malicious code which is often 
found to be saved for later execution. These heap-spraying methods are common in 
the exploitation of client systems by targeting web browsers. The authors propose 
techniques to identify shell code based drive-by-downloads in a browser and 
implement this solution in the Mozilla Firefox browser. This run-time approach 
proved to be very successful at detecting JavaScript based malware when assessed 
as no false positives were identified.  
Johns (2008) explores JavaScript malware and proposes relevant protection and 
approaches for research in JavaScript. Curtsinger et al. (2011) presents ZOZZLE 
which provides a rapid solution to detecting malware from analysing malicious 
JavaScript attacks. The analysis of webpage carried out by ZOZZLE is mostly static 
detection, making it possible for run-time (dynamic) attacks to avoid detection. 
However, the evaluation of ZOZZLE shows an extremely low false positive rate of 
0.0003% and high performance due to its lightweight nature. Likarish et al. (2009) 
used machine learning classifiers which detect malicious JavaScript with a deliberate 
set of features to detect malicious JavaScript. The difficulties in dealing with 
JavaScript code are still an issue in 2017. Mogren (2017) reviews machine learning 
approaches in the detection of malicious JavaScript code and identifies some issues 
in the currently available JavaScript research such as the lack of availability in 
datasets used by machine learning.  
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2.6.4 Current trends in client honeypot research 
Within this field of study, research is highly active and diverse. Akiyama et al. 
(2017a) presents HoneyCirculator which is based on the use of bait credentials 
leaked by malware and malicious web content. This research used a honeypot to 
successfully evade detection by malware and thus, was able to monitor malicious 
infrastructures and activities. Due to this decoy system being difficult for malware to 
detect, Akiyama et al. (2017a) was able to collect niche data sets which weren’t part 
of public blacklists. This suggests that a number of blacklist sites are detectable by 
malware and thus, future research could look at using alternative ways in finding 
URL datasets or use systems that are not detected such as HoneyCirculator. 
Akiyama et al. (2017b) performs studies in the ecosystem of malicious URL 
redirections. These re-directions attacks have been active for a long time and can 
still be observed frequently. The findings of this work show further evidence that 
click-fraud is the main motivation behind malware writers using URL re-direction to 
compromise clients. This is yet further evidence that drive-by-download attacks 
remains as one of the principle attack vectors used to compromise client systems. 
Mansoori (2017) presents a thesis on the geo-localisation of attacks targeting the 
browser. Within the work presented, the focus was on characterising the nature of 
attacks in terms of economical and legal reasons for an attacker to target a given 
group of users. Social factors are taken into account and a number of economic 
conditions of a country may lead to various types of attacks being used. This study is 
able to answer a number of research questions on the types of attacks faced by 
specific geographical locations which brings insight into geo-location trends within 
drive-by-download research. The issues of Internet Protocol (IP) tracking and 
cloaking is explored by Mansoori et al. (2017). The authors apply the HAZOP 
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methodology in designing experiments aimed at assessing the extent of 
aforementioned issues within their dataset. Mansoori et al. (2017) concludes with the 
fact that IP tracking is used in only a small subset of domains within their datasets 
and that there is no strong indication of network tracking is observed. This therefore 
shows evidence of a low level of tracking within malware domains present on the 
world wide web.  
Work within honeypot research has also been optimised to enhance deception 
capability of honeypots using network service fingerprinting. This is a recurring issue 
in both the general cyber security landscape and intrusion detection: detection 
mechanisms require systems and methods which does not reveal their intentions 
when attempting to analyse potentially compromised systems.  Dahbul et al. (2017) 
proposes threat modelling to identify potential threats that reveal the existence of 
honeypots. The author discusses various countermeasures which are tested and 
proven effective in the enhancement of deception capabilities of honeypots.  
2.6.5 Applicability of machine learning 
As seen in work focusing on malicious content detection within JavaScript above, 
machine learning is often applied within the cyber security research field.  The 
application of machine learning is often done in both drive-by-download and malware 
analysis to aid in the detection of malicious content and these are often used by the 
detection and intelligence gathering parties discussed in section 2.1.2.  Machine 
learning’s applicability to the facilitation of anomaly detection is a vast field of 
knowledge and previous work. It is important to note that the focus of the thesis is 
purely based on the filtration of log files stage for dynamic behaviour analysis. Within 
the applicability of machine learning to the detection and intelligence gathering 
spectrum, there is a limitation; this is the dependency on statistics to make decisions 
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on benign and maliciousness. It is hoped that the results of this work is used to help 
machine learning with the decision making process of unique client behaviours as 
decisions are made with context to specific behaviours and their ability to undertake 
malicious activities. It is nevertheless important to have a discussion on the next 
steps of analysis within drive-by-download studies to provide perspective and 
comparison to the proposed approach as some studies perform varying levels of 
data transformation prior to analysis within cybercrime.   
2.6.6 Clustering approaches 
Behavioural clustering of malware is an extensively researched topic (Bailey et al., 
2007; Bayer et al., 2009; Perdisci et al., 2010). These works use a number of 
different clustering algorithms; however, it’s important to note that these are mostly 
based on hierarchical clustering. The hierarchical clustering method builds a 
hierarchy of clusters to represent data using either a top-down or bottom-up 
approach. A top-down approach, sometimes called Divisive clustering simply works 
by splitting a cluster in two parts starting from the cluster containing all entities. A 
bottom-up approach, known as Agglomerative clustering simply merges two of the 
nearest clusters at each step of clustering (Rokach and Maimon, 2005; Mirkin, 
2011).  
In terms of malware research, the application of hierarchical clustering is useful as 
inter-relationships can be viewed between clusters: similar malicious behaviours 
from different clusters can be used to link clusters and similarities between malware 
families observed.   The work by Bayer et al. (2009) and Perdisci et al. (2010) differ 
to the work undertaken in the thesis as they are aimed at the malware analysis stage 
of the anatomy of an attack and assume that the utilised malicious executable has 
already been dropped into the analysis environment whereas in this thesis the area 
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of focus is one step before, on the drive-by-download stage. The main drawback of 
hierarchical clustering is to do with the performance issues: Amorim & Komisarczuk 
(2014) suggests that these hierarchical algorithms operate at a complexity of at least 
O(n2). This is problematic as multiple sources (Seifert, 2010; Shadowserver 2013; 
Av-test, 2015) show that the quantity of malware released daily is increasingly 
growing. Furthermore, when applied to the behavioural malware data sets obtained 
from high-interaction client honeypots; the volumes of data in malicious log files are 
high. A gap within literature is identified as the issues faced with malicious detection 
research justify the need for faster performing algorithms within malware clustering 
and classification or alternative approaches to filtering datasets and reducing 
volumes of noise data. Either approach would allow a means to improve detection 
mechanisms in processing the enormous numbers of malicious websites.  
2.6.7 Classification approaches 
Rieck et al. (2008) proposes classification of malware based on behaviour. Malware 
behaviour is monitored in a sandboxed environment; the learning stage is based on 
labels of the anti-virus engine Avira while ranks are assigned to discriminative 
features of malware. The results of their experiment seemed very promising at the 
time and it would be interesting to replicate the experiment with a number of different 
anti-virus software instead of only using Avira, which had one of the best detection 
rates at the time. It is fair to state that in the paper, even though labels from Avira 
anti-virus provided imperfect labels, classification of malware on behaviour was 
successful almost 70% of the time when tested with 3,000 unique samples of 
malware. Furthermore, detecting malicious executables in the wild and performing 
classification using several algorithms such as n-grams, naïve Bayes, decision trees 
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and support vector machines to detect malicious Portable Executables from benign 
Portable Executables by Kolter & Maloof (2004).  
The real time classification of malicious URLs shared on Twitter was addressed by 
Burnap et al. (2015). This work utilised Capture-HPC undertake dynamic analysis of 
potentially malicious URLs that were shared on Twitter using event-specific hash 
tags in posts that contained a URL. The approach utilised machine learning 
classifiers to classify URLs as benign or malicious in real-time, seconds after a link is 
clicked. Their deciding factors included network traffic, CPU usage and network 
connection statistics, which seemed to provide 66 - 72% efficiency in the worst and 
best information availability scenarios. An interesting finding in their work was that 
‘malicious activity is probably occurring within the first 60 seconds of the interaction’ 
which is encouraging due to the copious amounts of potentially malicious website 
that is widely active and indicative markers such as this may be used in future 
research to identify known exploit vectors sooner. An investigation of this nature is 
covered in chapter 3. Burnap et al. (2015) concluded that capturing packets entering 
and leaving the network proved to be the key indicator of their predictive activity 
metric. This is in line with current knowledge as monitoring packets provides an 
alternate view of devices that could be affected within detection of malware or traces 
of anomalies. The evidence provided in their work shows that twitter is being used 
for malware propagation; the applicability to gathering malware domains on twitter 
for this work is also explored in chapter 3. It is clear that classification approaches for 
vastly different areas of research within cyber security can be varied and are 
therefore acknowledged.  
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2.6.8 Closely related work 
Work that is more related to the work undertaken in this thesis, Amorim & 
Komisarczuk (2012) propose a method to cluster Capture-HPC behavioural log files 
of 17,000 malicious websites in less than 2 minutes. The authors have moreover 
upgraded Capture-HPC to address an issue: Capture-HPC had difficulties detecting 
malware contained in ActiveX components. Their clustering method is based on K-
Means, which is one of the most popular Partitional clustering algorithm (Jain, 2010; 
Wagstaff et al, 2001; Chiang & Mirkin 2009). However, this is a non-deterministic 
algorithm and therefore may provide numerous different clusters should the 
algorithm be run more than once on the same data set. The authors avoided this 
issue by initialising K-Means with centroids generated by Mirkin’s anomalous pattern 
method (Mirkin, 2011). K-means tends to be mainstream in the clustering 
approaches (Chiang & Mirkin 2009, Mirkin, 2011, Amorim & Komikarczuk 2012).  
Work dependant on unsupervised learning approaches such as Amorim & 
Komisarczuk (2011) and Bailey et al. (2007), face difficulties that are derived from 
their unsupervised nature: the lack of external information utilised to guide the 
analysis of data. Therefore, it is argued that the skills processed by a malware 
analyst or from the set of known behavioural entries in identifying benign from 
malicious behaviours created log file dataset is not utilised within these approaches. 
Whilst performing drive-by-download analysis within the context of the anatomy of an 
attack, Amorim & Komisarczuk (2012) did not discuss the contents of the utilised 
Capture’s exclusion list or the methodology used to create these behavioural filters. 
The usage of engineered exclusion lists can be an alternative method to filtering 
noise in log files as opposed to applying AI feature reducing techniques. In some 
cases, log file used in malware studies have sought to apply machine learning and 
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feature-reducing techniques to separate goodware (benign software) and malware 
behaviour and work by Amorim & Komisarczuk (2012) have done just that prior to 
clustering their malicious website dataset. In some cases, a combination of these 
machine learning techniques are used to are used to analyse data (Belkin, 2004). 
However, feature reducing methods can sometimes prove to be problematic when 
some features are extracted such as the file path in behavioural log files as often 
these can offer key indication on behavioural maliciousness. A gap is identified here 
as it may be possible to include these key indications in an alternative approach that 
performs expert driven filtering from a list of known behavioural entries prior to 
performing further analysis. This is very different to the unsupervised approach and 
the feature weighing and selecting done in previous research as it would involve 
confirmation of each benign behavioural entry.   
The problem within drive-by-download and malware analysis of distinguishing 
between detecting malicious and benign has been around for a while. Within 
malware analysis, Tian et al. (2010) performs behavioural analysis and differentiates 
between 456 goodware and 1368 malware samples. This work used dynamic 
features as opposed to previous Application Programming Interface (API) monitoring 
research that used static features from Portable Executables as seen by Ye. et al. 
(2010). Tian et al. (2010) execute binary files within a virtual machine environment 
with the behavioural manifestations is observed and a report is written. Features are 
extracted and their work provides distinguished goodware or malware classification 
with an accuracy of 97% at the time.  This study however focuses purely on 
differentiating Portable Executable files and not behavioural log file events from 
drive-by-download interactions. Consequently, it is not focused on individual 
observable behaviours but on the entirety of the goodware behaviour observed by 
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executing the 456 samples. By focusing on the behaviours manifested in a behaviour 
analysis environment it may be possible to build knowledge tables of expected 
behaviour that visiting a benign website would trigger.   Their work therefore does 
not seem to include the other components of an analysis environment such as the 
operating system or commonly installed application behaviour.  Wagener et al. 
(2008) also carry out dynamic analysis but their experiment does not include benign 
or goodware which does not provide verification of expected, non-malicious system 
calls or the ability to create correct datasets. Within the context of dynamic analysis, 
an operating system running can often mean that large volumes of goodware 
behavioural entries as agreed by Burnap et al. (2015). If these are taken into account 
within analysis, It may be possible to alter the overall result. Furthermore, it is line 
with the prudent malware experimentation by Rossow et al. (2012) to remove 
goodware data from dataset. In both cases a list of known goodware and expected 
behaviour is not provided which makes replicability of experiments carried out 
difficult. An adaptive yet alternative approach to Tian et al. (2010) method of 
distinguishing between goodware and malware is simply to run large number of 
benign tests on the environment and understand the core behavioural calls that 
undergo while a system is active. From this an understanding of the benign system 
calls could be synthesised and creation of behaviour based filters could be used 
scalability in the search for unknown and malicious behaviours. This is the approach 
that the thesis intends to take in the reduction and expert driven filtering of log file 
based datasets.  
2.7 Gap identification and research questions 
Addressing some of the gaps identified in section 2.6 is the basis of the thesis. This 
section discusses relevant gaps and formulates research questions. The main 
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problems that are addressed include: behaviour filtering, the creation of effective 
behavioural filters using real-world intelligence and the impact from a behavioural 
perspective of using different operating systems in performing dynamic analysis of 
potentially malicious webpages.  
2.7.1 Behaviour filtering in behaviour analysis environments 
Behaviour filtering is the concept of filtering known benign behaviours, unknown 
behaviours and malicious behaviours. When an analysis environment performs 
dynamic analysis, a large amount of behaviours and system call interactions are 
created as a result of the system performing scheduled tasks, loading boot up scripts 
and process and file manipulations that are required for the operation system to load 
critical files and processes. During a malicious website or file analysis, these normal 
and benign system behaviours are also recorded in log files from dynamic analysis. 
It is evident that the effect of recording all behaviour increases the size and 
complexity of given log files and hides malicious behaviour. Performing behaviour 
filtering can result in datasets which contain less noise which benign behaviours add 
and countering the complexity issue. Filtering these behaviours also results in 
significantly smaller log files. An example is explored in Chapter 4, section 4.2.3 
where the size and complexity of real-world benign log file is recorded post analysis 
and further rationale is provided for filtering behaviour. Work that does not apply or 
mention expert driven filtering of benign behaviour from malicious behaviour is likely 
to perform analysis with a large volume of benign noise behaviour and thus may 
result in different outcomes. This is a gap in published knowledge as seen in 
Wagener et al. (2008), Amorim & Komisarczuk (2012). Furthermore, research on the 
effectiveness of malware experimentation by Rossow et al. (2012) showed that 
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around half of paper surveyed did not separate goodware from malware datasets. 
The thesis fills this gap in knowledge by answering the research question:  
 What are the key benign system behaviours observed in a Windows 7 
operating system that can be filtered in a created behaviour analysis 
environment?  
Understanding benign and normal system behaviours in behaviour analysis 
environments is a complex process. Often it is observed that operating systems do 
not always perform the exact same behavioural interactions at every boot despite the 
state of the operating system being kept constant. This was tested and showed 
variations even when the additional protection of configuring the hard drive to be in 
an immutable state. To overcome this limitation, it is often required to have multiple 
tests of an operating system using benign and goodware datasets to be able to 
explore and learn as much of the unknown and semi-frequently observed 
behavioural interactions and system calls. Within this thesis, the concept of 
behaviour filtering was applied through the exclusion list of the chosen behaviour 
analysis tool, Capture-BAT. In addition to this, within the utilised Windows 7 
environment, typical observed behaviours are labelled as benign or grey (unknown). 
Typical observed drive-by-download behaviours are discussed and labelled in 
Chapter 6 from the analysis of 5,132 potentially malicious websites.  
2.7.2 Expert driven filtering and exclusion lists 
It was found that research within drive-by-download analysis often did not include 
expert driven filtering mechanisms. Expert driven filtering mechanisms are defined 
as filtering behaviour from dynamic analysis log file data that includes the expertise 
of the malware analyst and excluding known behavioural entries within the filtration 
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process. This method could serve an as alternative way to understand behavioural 
entries in a log file and filtering the known behaviour that is often created as a result 
of a behaviour analysis environment being booted. Therefore, the aims of this activity 
are identified as an alternative approach to optimising datasets within behaviour-
based drive-by-download studies. These aims include:  
 A methodology that would address the sheer volume of data and reduce large 
volumes of noise as this reduces the amount of processing required to 
understand key behavioural entries. 
 A behaviour filtration system designed in a risk-averse way. This would seek 
to not compromise detection mechanisms by filtering out possible malicious 
behaviours.  
 An expert driven filter that includes the expertise of actual behavioural entries 
from behaviour studies in the decision-making process. 
In terms of implementation of these expert driven filters within this thesis, Capture-
BAT’s exclusion lists are used to build, test and assess the concept of behaviour 
filtering. An exclusion list is a list of known environment   behavioural   events   that   
Capture-BAT   will   include or exclude in the generation of a Capture log file. Thus, 
exclusion lists can be viewed as the behavioural filters of Capture-BAT as they 
attempt to filter out expected and known behaviours. This is an alternative method to 
filtering out large amounts of noise within log files by separating goodware behaviour 
from malicious and unknown behaviours. At the time of writing, it is still observable 
that available exclusion lists are out of date. The original exclusion lists by the 
creator of Capture-BAT, Seifert & Steenson, (2006) were designed and released in 
2006. The second set of exclusion lists that can be found on the web have not been 
updated for the last 9 years and designed on an older version of Windows XP by 
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Kindlund (2008). The utilised version of Capture, Capture-HPC_NG was also 
shipped with default exclusion lists that were based on Windows XP and the 
exclusion lists released by Seifert & Steenson (2006). Each set of exclusion list 
mentioned were tested to verify the output of Capture-BAT log files. This confirmed 
the out-of-date claim when tested upon Windows XP and 7 setups as every 
evaluation (which included a large number of confirmed benign URLs) resulted in a 
malicious classification by Capture-BAT.  
Upon log file inspection, it was clear that Capture-BAT log files was successfully 
capturing system calls and interactions taking place upon boot however, within 
behavioural log file analysis this proved to be problematic: goodware behaviour was 
mixed with potentially malicious interaction. The inclusion of benign behaviours 
within log files increased the log files considerably as shown in Chapter 4. In terms of 
behavioural analysis, this was a major issue as exclusion lists within Capture-HPC 
are at the forefront of behaviour filtering. When Capture-BAT perform analysis of a 
given website, all behavioural interactions are recorded that are not present in an 
exclusion list. Within malware research this can prove to be problematic as 
aforementioned, large volumes of benign behaviours that would occur naturally from 
the booting and loading process of an operating system. These behaviours would be 
observed and picked up in Capture log files. Separating known goodware samples 
from malicious samples in datasets before analysis is a prudent experimentation 
recommendation supported by Rossow et al. (2012). When applied to drive-by-
download behavioural analysis, it is fair to conclude false positives and noise data 
within log files could potentially lead to a larger margin of error if this is not labelled 
and removed prior to the analysis process using an approach that applies 
behavioural knowledge and critique before filtering.  
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As a result of the limited research focus towards creating exclusion list and adapting 
these lists to different operating systems, creation of exclusion lists was initially 
undertaken to determine process and issues. There are three parts to the research 
focus: The initial creation methodology, the good practice and requirements from a 
cyber security perspective and finally the evaluation of created exclusion lists. These 
form the core research questions: 
 How can behavioural filters (exclusion lists) for a new operating system be 
created to reduce output of data in log files without losing relevant behaviours 
that aid in the detection of anomalies?  
 What are the requirements and good practices needed in the development of 
behavioural exclusion lists? 
 To what extent are the created exclusion lists effective at blocking (filtering 
out) benign system behaviours?  
It is fair to state that the desirable outcome from using behavioural filters would be a 
high percentage of known benign behaviours being blocked whilst utmost caution is 
applied within the design and implementation stage to safeguard the filter from false 
negatives (filtering out malicious behaviour).  
In the initial work, the challenges in developing Capture-HPC exclusion lists were 
explored and published, Puttaroo et al. (2014). These challenges included: 
 The client specific nature of behaviours manifested within created analysis 
environments.  
o Different operating systems and different applications that run within 
the analysis environment display different manifestations thus, 
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exclusion lists should be customised for the behaviour analysis 
environment that they are filtering. 
 The need to constantly amend and modify existing behavioural entries upon 
installation of new applications, patches or operating system versions.  
o As systems change new behaviours are often observed as proven in 
chapter 5. 
 Each type of recorded behaviour would require an exclusion list 
o Within Capture-HPC exclusion lists are needed for processes, file 
system and registry interactions respectively.  
A methodology for creating expert driven behaviour filters is proposed in section 
4.5.2 of Chapter 4. This methodology is applied in the creation of our Windows 7 
exclusion lists and then tested in chapter 5 in the contribution to knowledge.  
2.7.3 Windows 7 applicability and operating system behaviours 
In the initial process of creating exclusion lists it was identified that behavioural filters 
for the Windows 7 operating system were a new area of research and thus 
development within this particular operating system was focused. There was an 
aspect of pragmatism for usage of Windows 7 as operating system for behaviour 
analysis environments used in the thesis. This is justified as Windows 7 has been 
the most popular operating system and there is a lack of research focus within client 
honeypot research applied to Windows 7.  As Windows 7 is the most popular 
operating system in use within the period of 2013 - 2016 (W3C, 2014 & Net Market 
Share, 2016) it should theoretically be one of the most popular environments for 
behaviour analysis environments used in drive-by-download and malware analysis 
as the majority of desktop client systems in use are deployed on Windows 7. 
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It is concluded that this is however not the case and the vast majority of research 
published focuses on Windows XP as their behaviour analysis environment Cova et 
al. (2010), Alosefer & Rana (2010), Amorim & Komisarczuk (2012), Seifert et al. 
(2008). This finding emphasises the importance of future research to utilise newer 
versions of operating systems or at least some more focus towards the most popular 
versions of operating systems.  Furthermore, it is believed that this lack of focus on 
environment behaviour studies and usage of Windows 7 contributes to the lack of 
knowledge available in creating behaviour filters that can reduce the substantial 
amounts of redundant data present in behavioural log files. From the work on the 
challenges in developing Capture-HPC exclusion lists (Puttaroo et al., 2014) it was 
shown that changing environment variables would result in differently observed 
environment behaviours. This is logical and can be controlled by numerous factors 
such as the operating system used or the applications that are fired up during boot-
up. However, this leads to another research question:  
 What are the key differential behaviours that an updated Windows 7 
displays when executed in comparison to a stock and an unpatched 
version? 
 Capture-BAT was originally designed for Windows XP: how does 
Windows 7 benign system behaviours differ from Windows XP? 
Both of these were identified as another aspect which has not seen research 
consideration. Answering these research questions also forms part of this thesis. 
2.7.4 Research scope and summary 
The work attempts to build on previous work within drive-by-download analysis and 
explores several key areas. The scope of the work is now summarised. 
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 Understanding typical benign behaviours and performing behaviour filtering 
from a drive-by-download analysis environment. 
o What are typical, expected and non-malicious background behaviours 
within an analysis environment that can be labelled benign behaviour? 
 Applying behaviour filtering in real-world context: Creating, testing and 
evaluating Capture-BAT exclusion lists. 
o Methodologies in the creation of Capture-BAT exclusion lists 
 Development cycle of exclusion lists. 
 Methodology used for picking benign websites required 
o Assessing implemented exclusion lists in real-world context. 
 Efficiency of exclusion lists  
 Assessing differences in operating system behaviour 
o Differences between behaviour analysis environment behaviours in 
patched and unpatched operating systems.  
o Observed differences between behaviour analysis environment 
behaviours in predecessor Windows XP and Windows 7.  
 Analysing observed malicious web exploits attacking Windows 7 client 
honeypot.  
o Typical attack vectors, drive-by-download exploits and malicious 
behaviours observed from analysing malicious webpages.  
For the purposes of facilitating understanding of the research scope, an overview of 
the drive-by-download analysis process is presented and the area of focus is 




Figure 2.5:  An overview of drive-by-download and malware analysis process 
detailing the behaviour filtering of log file data approach.  
This research presents an alternative approach to deal with the problem often faced 
within cyber security research: processing large volumes of log file data which is 
required as the number of web servers available and the short-lived nature of 
malicious webpages are still increasing thus requiring effective detection 
mechanisms. Run-time analyses applied in the detection of malicious webpages are 
resilient to the limitations that static analysis face from code obfuscation and do not 
require the exploits to be known beforehand. There are two aspects to the limitations 
faced by run-time analysis: yielded behaviour analysis log files from drive-by-
download analysis contains huge volumes of behavioural data. A large amount of 
this data is generated from the operating system booting and running normal or 
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benign system interactions, which are flagged up and reported within behaviour 
monitoring log files. Behaviour monitoring is a sensitive process as system 
behaviours within operating systems can sometimes change with simple variables 
such as a change in the environment state.  
Additionally, differences within behaviour analysis environments design principles 
such as the operating system is not reported. In line with the sensitivity of operating 
system generated system calls, knowing the difference in observed behaviour may 
lead to different versions of created filters to be created based on the choice a client 
system difference organisation makes in the design of honeypots or behaviour 
analysis environments. The final aspect regarding observed malicious behaviour 
within the Windows 7 filtered honeypot presents a section from the perspective that 
utilised systems captured in the analysis of potentially malicious websites. It is 
therefore by no means, a complete picture as the internet and its vast nature makes 
this task impossible. This would still provide intelligence on the types of attacks that 
were active during the duration of this work. More importantly it has the potential to 
identify active threats which is invaluable to the detection and intelligence gathering 













Chapter 3 – Methodology and experiment design 
This chapter initially discusses the appropriate methodology applied to relevant 
research questions. The discussion then explores the importance of successful 
malware experimentation with a particular focus on prudent experimental design. A 
set of malware experimentation prudence and guidelines by Rossow et al. (2012) is 
adapted and then used as the primary experimental framework. The applicability of 
the framework to the research and experiments are then analysed and presented. 
Scientific research methods in computer science are discussed by Dodig-Crnkovic 
(2002), Sjoberg et al. (2007) and Freitas (2009). The chapter then evolves into a 
discussion regarding data gathering, sample size evaluation and resource 
acquisition. Part of the methodology involved verification of the experimental setup. 
Validation of the experimental setup and environment is explored and thoroughly 
tested. This can be seen in the Appendix B. Lastly, the use of URLs from Twitter is 
evaluated as another source for gathering malicious website interactions. This can 
also be found in Appendix B as these were not experiments that directly answered 
the research questions.  
A discussion on research questions and applicable methodology is undertaken, 
which is organised in the thesis by grouping similar methodologies applied to the 
relevant research questions. The two relevant types of research approach taken in 
this work include the use of both deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. The 
thesis questions are:  
1. Adapting Capture-BAT exclusion lists to Windows 7. 
83 
 
a. What are the key benign system behaviours observed in a Windows 7 
operating system that can be filtered in a created behaviour analysis 
environment?  
b. How can behavioural filters (exclusion lists) for a new operating system 
be created to reduce output of data in log files without losing relevant 
behaviours that aid in the detection of anomalies?  
c. What are the requirements and good practices needed in the 
development of behavioural exclusion lists? 
d. To what extent are the created exclusion lists effective at blocking 
(filtering out) benign system behaviours?  
2. Observed malicious behaviour analysis from drive-by-downloads targeting 
Windows 7 honeypots. 
a. What are typical observed malicious behaviours in an unpatched 
Windows 7 honeypot? 
3. Understanding the sensitivity of behaviours triggered between different 
versions of operating systems. 
a. What are the key differential behaviours that an updated Windows 7 
displays when executed in comparison to a stock and an unpatched 
version? 
b. Capture-BAT was originally designed for Windows XP: how does 
Windows 7 benign system behaviours differ from Windows XP? 
For the research questions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e and 2.a, deductive reasoning is the 
considered approach. The top-down approach of using theory to create hypothesis 
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and the testing of these hypotheses with the use of created experiments provides 
confirmation of whether the theory is correct or not. In some cases, the experiments 
confirm to what level the hypothesis is the theory correct.  
The deductive reasoning approach is applied to the knowledge in unfiltered log files. 
Using data from benign website analysis, knowledge is then deduced between 
known behaviours, regular system behaviours and unknown behaviours. The known 
and confirmed benign behaviours with no trace of maliciousness are then added into 
the exclusion list. After each iteration, an exclusion list becomes richer with 
confirmed benign behaviour. This is because exclusion lists are created with the 
exclusions of observed behaviours where theory regarding a specific process and its 
interaction within the behaviour analysis lab is studied, hypothesised and then 
observed. Details from observing behavioural interaction provide an indication of the 
maliciousness of that particular interaction. Furthermore, deductive reasoning is then 
applied to testing the validity of the created Capture-BAT instrument created. This 
disproves the initially applied theory that despite running behind advanced university 
cyber defence mechanisms, the level of attacks faced by the honeypot is unaffected.   
In order to find observable differences between Windows 7 and XP, observations of 
Windows XP and Windows 7 processes and their default paths are studied. This 
leads to behavioural comparison where similar processes and interactions containing 
the same file path and system call are removed. The resulting leftover behaviours 
once filtered allow the creation of a more accurate conclusion. They can be 
respectively marked as native behaviours if a given system call interaction is present 
only in a single dataset, or if the default pathway of the executed process differs from 
one O.S. to another.  Finally, deductive reasoning is thoroughly applied in the 
assessment of an exclusion list’s success rate. Hypothesis assessment measuring 
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output of Capture-BAT after filtration provides indications regarding the efficiency of 
created exclusion lists. This experiment observed and quantified behaviours 
between two systems: one with exclusion list and one without exclusion lists in order 
to assess the efficiency of exclusion lists. The deductive reasoning seeks to quantify 
how much the filter system has been able to block benign behaviours in the filtered 
log file dataset as opposed to the unfiltered dataset, in order to provide quantifiable 
knowledge on the efficiency of the filters.  
Inductive reasoning, the bottom up research approach, is applied to answer the 
research questions 3.a and 3.b. Thorough observation between differences in 
datasets lead to the discovery of behavioural patterns and manifestations. These 
datasets are created by running tests within benign analysis environments: Windows 
7 unpatched, Windows 7 Patched and Windows XP. The outputs were then used to 
formulate theory. This is done by using observed unique and native behaviours in a 
patched Windows 7 system, where the presence and frequency of unique 
behaviours that are manifested are used to identify knowledge. The synthesised 
knowledge allows an analyst to identify of how system behaviours of an analysis 
environment differ if the system is patched. This is also applied to the predecessor 
operating system, Windows XP and compared to Windows 7. The knowledge 
synthesised can be applied the Windows based operating system. The methodology 
of studying observed behavioural interactions and comparing the output of log files in 
different versions of the operating systems is however applicable in any behaviour 
analysis environment whereby processes and system calls are grouped and the 
typical observed behaviour is classified as differential, anomalies and similar. This 
method effectively allowed this work to identify the key differential behaviours in 
different versions of a given operating system.  
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Having identified key relevant methodologies applicable to the research questions, it 
is important to note that the experiments created to facilitate knowledge creation 
should be designed appropriately.  
3.1 Safe, prudent and valid malware experimentation 
In order to perform this research, it was important to identify and apply a suitable 
framework. Research is cyber can be sub-categorised in a two areas: Theoretical 
cyber and Experimental cyber Maxion et al. (2010).  This research is driven by the 
latter and relied on the use of scientific methods to observe (in controlled 
environments) changes within behaviour analysis environments. In order to facilitate 
this, an experimental framework was adapted and used in experiment design. 
Rossow et al. (2012) proposes prudent practices when designing malware 
experiments. The definitions of prudent as the authors propose within malware 
experiments are: 
1. Experiments designed using the correct datasets,  
2. Providing transparency to facilitate experimental replicability,  
3. Adapting realism mechanisms within the malware experiments to reflect real-
world context,  
4. Conducting experiments that do not harm existing network systems.  
These malware experimentation guidelines form the basis of the framework utilised 
within the malware experiments and the malware capture undertaken in the thesis. 
The framework utilised is also divided into four sections:  
1. Correctness of the dataset,  
2. Transparency of experiment,  
3. Realism in terms of real-world context,  
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4. Safety.  
These sections all contain a number of guidelines that vary in their significance. 
Usage of this framework provides a malware analyst with some guidelines that would 
allow experiments that are run to be reported in a manner that produces a 
reasonably high level of transparency thereby facilitating replicability. Additionally, 
the guidelines are aimed at also conducting successful malware experiments. 
Moreover, since these practices were developed based on the evaluation of high-
impact journal and conference papers that specifically used malware 
experimentation such as Bayer et al. (2009), Perdisci et al. (2010) and Rieck et al. 
(2011). Furthermore, the work by Rossow et al. (2012) is reasonably cited within the 
malware experimentation community and has grown considerably over the course of 
the study. It is fair to say that this is a set of reasonably good guidelines to apply in 
the context of this thesis.  
The guidelines provided by Rossow et al. (2012) are provided in table 3.1. Rossow 
et al. pointed out that these guidelines cannot be reasonably applied to all malware 
experiments, including the experiments that are carried out within this thesis. This is 
specifically due to the nature and variance within the investigations. For instance, 
when analysing a large amount of potentially malicious websites using a client 
honeypot, the URLs that are analysed are not typically classified as a given 
distinctive malware family. The reasoning here is because drive-by-download 
analysis within the real-world is at the forefront of malware detection and therefore 
faces the detection of new and unseen malware behaviours: mainly due to malware 
writers having the potential to update a given malicious web server, moments before 
behavioural analysis takes place.   Relevant and applicable aspects of each of the 
core guidelines will now be explored.   
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Table 3.1: Prudent practices for designing malware experiment framework 
(Rossow et al., 2012). 
 
3.1.1 Correctness in malware experimentation 
One of the main requirements of the research involved the need of creating filter 
mechanisms from log files to reduce the instance of known goodware and non-
malicious behaviour. Typically removing the false alarms within log files should 
naturally reduce the noise that a malware analyst would have to go through and 
incorporate during behavioural analysis. This is certainly the case as reported by Li 
et al. (2010): within malware clustering they concluded that using balanced and well-
designed datasets have significant effects on evaluation results. Within this research, 
analysing malicious drive-by-download behaviours from filtered log files should 
produce significantly ‘correct’ datasets for analysis.  
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Within this research, virtual machines are used to build the malware analysis 
environment: this may cause some variations when compared to using physical, 
bare metal machines when analysing real-world malicious websites. In order to 
mitigate some detection mechanics used by malware, the Virtual box based analysis 
environment will exclude the installation of Guest Additions software. The rationale 
here is that guest additions include a registry key entry within the 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Oracle\VirtualBox Guest Additions within the Windows registry. 
This can easily be detected and cause malware behaviours to supress triggering. 
In addition to this, observed malicious behaviours are verified in light of expected 
and regularly observed benign system behaviours to provide a higher level of 
correctness within the dataset as an additional step towards correctness. In line with 
the prudent guidelines, core components of Capture-BAT’s behavioural monitor such 
as the Process Monitor, Registry Monitor and the File Monitor operate in the 
Windows kernel mode. The kernel mode is a more privileged mode than observed 
and captured malware running in user mode. This is important as malware operating 
within the user mode should ideally not detect the monitoring components as this is 
likely to lead to malware not manifesting malicious behaviours to avoid detection or 
perhaps even trigger logging functionality and reporting the presence of a honeypot.  
It is needless to state that balancing datasets over malware families and ensuring 
the dataset contains distinct families as proposed by the guidelines is not applicable 
to this type of malware analysis. This is because the analysis comprises of web-
exploits and drive-by-download behaviours and in comparison with malicious 
Portable Executables that are analysed within sandboxes. Web-based malware from 
honeypot research can sometimes include malicious file modifications and file writes. 
These can often be Portable Executable files as part of the attack, but it is important 
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to note that this is not always the case. Signatures for malware families are created 
upon analysis of sample and within real-world honeypot research signatures are not 
always available at the time of analysis, thus making this particular guideline 
inapplicable.  
 As a final point, the only identified experiment artefact that may be created and 
represented differently in the analysis system would include the Windows 7 user 
name utilised: ‘mp’.  This would be different depending on the assigned user name in 
a different analysis system. Consequently, this affects the output of behaviours that 
store files in the Windows 7 user folder. For instance, a malicious iexplore.exe was 
written in the user temp folder: C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\Iexplore.exe would 
be the path an observed behaviour would point towards but in a different analysis 
environment it could be stored in: 
 C:\Users\UserName\AppData\Local\Temp\Iexplore.exe.  
3.1.2 Realism in malware experimentation 
Realism within cyber security is a critical aspect: in order to provide accurate views 
of real-world malware analysis, which is the main driving force behind malware 
research, datasets that are created should represent an accurate overview of the 
analysis target. Furthermore, it is common knowledge as pointed out by Rossow et 
al. (2012), that lab experiments perform much worse in real-world evaluations. This 
emphasises the need for malware experiments to be designed to operate on non-lab 
evaluations, as this reflects the limitations faced by the industry and avoids sources 
that may adversely affect results. Key aspects of realism are required for this 
research as accurate insights on observed behaviours is required when analysing 
real-world and possibly unknown malicious websites. The aspect of ‘currently active’ 
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that provides observable and realistic behaviours is filtered naturally within the 
experimental approach as the datasets will be gathered and is not dependant on 
non-active malicious web site datasets. This natural filtration is justified as the use of 
dynamic drive-by-download analysis uses no emulation and relies on observed 
manifestations of malware within Windows 7. Additionally, in a real-world setup, 
client systems would have access to the internet: this means that access to the 
internet post visitation of a website is required to reflect the nature of real-world 
compromised clients. Despite allowing internet access throughout the duration of the 
website analysis being a relatively risky task as this essentially allows potential 
exploitation by malware writers, it is important that this aspect is reflected. This is 
because, often drive-by-downloads and web based exploits require additional access 
time to the internet to probe and request the downloading of additional malicious 
files.  Crist, (2007) discusses some web-server vulnerabilities and prevention 
methods.  
This study focuses on Windows 7: prudent and realistic practices exercises caution 
within the context of generalisation. Whilst it is likely that file, registry and processes 
that are shared within Windows 7 and alternative versions of Windows could 
theoretically display similar behaviour if process operations are not changed from 
version to version, no claim is made that created artefacts can be applied to 
alternative versions of Windows. However, as a part of testing, a few system 
behaviours shared between Windows XP and Windows 7 were found and discussed 
in Chapter 4. Moreover, malicious drive-by-download and web exploit behaviours 
that are discussed in this thesis are limited to only a small fraction of the analysed 
websites that are potentially available in the world wide web and does not include 
any dark web examples. It is therefore imperative to state that the malware samples 
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captured, and web-exploits discovered by Capture-BAT are indeed applicable to the 
Windows 7 analysis environment that was utilised.  
3.1.3 Transparency in malware experimentation 
At the heart of transparency within malware experiments is providing the means for 
the replicability of data collection. Reproduction of experiments and within cyber 
security is often a challenge in this field as stated by Mansoori et al. (2016) and 
Maxion et al. (2010).  URL lists, time of analysis for a given interaction and malware 
sample, behavioural environment and configuration settings utilised in the malware 
analysis environment are provided to increase the level of transparency. These are 
provided within the thesis when required in individual experiment sections. The 
network connectivity of the analysis environment was reliant upon a virtual bridge 
from the host to the ‘guest’ virtual machine and internet access was provided at all 
times during each analysis process. It is important to note that within real-world 
malware analysis, replicability of results that are dependent on observed behavioural 
interactions face a critical limitation.  Malicious behaviours and exploits that were 
once observed on a given date may significantly differ if the same URL is analysed 
on a different date. These can be due to a range of factors such as: malicious 
behaviour could be inactive at certain points: exploits could also be updated and 
significantly modified or dependant on specific IP ranges or simply that compromised 
servers could have been cleaned and had their vulnerabilities patched. Clearly these 
are out of the control of the malware experiments as there is no control over the 
content and exploits used on public web sites.  
Other than making datasets available to provide transparency on the analysis 
process, there are no known additional steps that can be undertaken to facilitate this 
aspect of transparency.  In terms of stating family names to provide transparency, 
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the captured malware samples in Capture-BAT post drive-by-download analysis that 
involved the dropping of a Windows Portable Executable have been analysed by 
Virus Total to provide various signatures. Analysis for finding out potential causes 
behind observed false positives behaviours is undertaken and some aspects of how 
behaviours change over time (environmental behaviour drift) is discussed within the 
log file dataset.  Finally, section 3.2.2 - 3.2.3 discuss the malware sample selection 
process and evaluation process which is required by the guidelines proposed by 
Rossow et al. (2012).  
3.1.4 Safety in malware experimentation 
Within the context of this research, real-world malicious websites are visited. These 
interactions potentially have the ability to compromise the network infrastructure in 
place as successful propagation from malware attacks can breach the analysis 
systems. Compromised devices could then be exploited by malware writers as they 
see fit: the devices may be used for example as part of distributed denial of service 
attacks, used in the mining of bitcoin, host malicious code, steal user sensitive data 
and passwords and send spam. Therefore, adequate security systems needed to be 
in place to mitigate the impact of a potential malware breach. The nature of 
honeypots has some contradiction to the safety requirements as client honeypots 
actively seek to be compromised in order to observe drive-by-download and malware 
manifestations within a live environment that requires access to the internet for 
interaction. This is inherently a risky process as traffic that a given drive-by-download 
samples creates upon execution have the potential to cause harm on both the Local 
Area Network (LAN) and across the Internet. It is however possible to observe 
malicious behaviour within a controlled environment should suitable security 
practices be in place. (Alwabel et al., 2014). The framework proposed by Rossow et 
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al. (2012) focuses purely on containment policies. Thus, the safety undertaken in the 
malware experiments performed within the thesis was expanded to include safe 
design.  
The deployed containment policy and safe design relied upon a number of 
deployment practices: 
1. The malware analysis client, Capture-BAT runs within a virtualised instance of 
Debian Squeeze within the Capture-HPC server. This is illustrated in Figure 
4.2a in Chapter 4. Virtualisation, as with a large number of security practices 
does not provide absolute security. However, this offers the possibility of 
isolating the analysis network from the physical network. Isolation from the 
physical network infrastructure provides another layer that malware would 
have to compromise in the event of a network attack. Additionally, the use of 
Network Address Translation (NAT) masks the internal IP address of devices 
on the network. The virtual network diagram is provided in figure 4.1 of 
section 4.4.1 of the thesis. 
2. This Capture-HPC server is run on a university network protected by Defence 
in Depth measures undertaken by the university. While this practice effectively 
may be seen as defeating the purpose of running a client honeypot, the risks 
associated by running a client honeypot on a live university network which 
contains a large number of sensitive operations is likely to outweigh the 
drawbacks of running malware and drive-by-download analysis on an 
unprotected network.  The validity of this analysis lab under this particular 
variable is tested in the methodology and experiment design chapter.  
3. There are no other devices other than the Capture-HPC server and the 
Capture-BAT clients running on the same Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN) 
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which is all interconnected via a bridged interface. While this does not 
inherently make the Capture VLAN secure from attacks, it would mitigate the 
risks associated with the compromising of other devices on the network.  
4. After every analysis, Capture-HPC resets the Capture-BAT clients into the 
state that the machine was prior to the analysis process. The revert script 
does not innately protect the networked devices but it does secure a smaller 
window of opportunity for an attack to take place as a compromised device 
will only be compromised for the duration of the analysis.  
5. As an added security measure, the Virtual Disk Images (VDI) that are used 
within drive-by-download analysis are running in an immutable mode. This 
means any changes to the hard-drive state is deleted after the analysis 
process as the instance of analysis that is undertaken is left only to execute 
during the analysis process.  
6. The time setting in which a Capture-BAT client is vulnerable and 
compromised is minimised to use a low time setting (75 - 90 seconds). This 
time period refers to the interaction time that a Capture-BAT is analysing a 
given webpage.  This minimisation of the analysis time leaves a small gap 
(less than 2 minutes) which a compromised client is able to cause harm to 
devices on the WAN and LAN. After this time period, the virtual machine state 
is reverted. Consequently, downloaded and executed web-exploits are erased 
and replaced, effectively preventing further exploitation.  
3.1.5 Conclusion 
In order to perform correct, real, transparent and safe malware experimentation, it 
was important to apply each of the relevant criterion to the undertaken experiments. 
Overall, the vast majority of the malware experimentation framework was applicable 
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and thus included in implementations of the experiments.  To conclude the 
applicability of the framework presented by Rossow et al. (2012) to the undertaken 
malware experiments, a summary table is created below which highlights actions 
undertaken to meet the prudent practices identified. 
Table 3.2: Applicability of the prudent experimentation framework.  
Keys: 
Green – applicable to research.  
Red – not applicable to research.  
Prudent 
Code Description of prudent practice Summary of application to research.  
A. Correct 
Datasets   
A. 1) 
Check if goodware samples should 
be removed from datasets. Exclusion lists filter goodware. 
A. 2) 
Balance datasets over malware 
families. Various sources of malicious URLS used. 
A. 3) 
Check whether training and 
evaluation datasets should have 
distinct families. 
Evaluation dataset has distinct families -confirmed by 
Virus Total. 
A. 4) 
Perform analysis with higher 
privileges than the malware's. 
Capture-BAT operates at the low-level kernel which is 
higher than the malware. 
A. 5) 
Discuss and if necessary mitigate 
analysis artefacts and biases. 
Identified Biases identified, and sources of potential bias 
discussed. 
A. 6) 
Use caution when blending malware 
activity traces into benign background 
activity. 
Exclusion lists filter background activity so that only 





State family names of employed 
malware samples. Virus Total used to identify known malware samples. 
B. 2) 
List which malware was analysed 
when. 
Date/time of analysis recorded. This applies for both 
captured malware samples and web exploit log file. 
B. 3) 
Explain the malware sample 
selection. Discussed in section 3.2.2 - 3.2.3. 
B. 4) 
Mention the system used during 
execution. 
Full system details available in Chapter 4 and discussed 
in different experiment set-ups. 
B. 5) 
Describe the network connectivity of 
the analysis environment. Described in section 3.1.3. 
B. 6) 
Analyse the reasons for false 
positives and false negatives. 
Reasons for system behaviours that occur and are 
classified as false negatives is an area of study in itself 
and requires a complex study which is out of the scope 
of this research.  
B. 7) 
Analyse the nature/diversity of true 
positives. 
 This is not inherently applicable to the research question 
but as the research captures a number of malicious 
samples in the wild, behaviours are investigated in 
chapter 6.  
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C. Realism     
C. 1) Evaluate relevant malware families. 
Dataset analysed is relevant as they were gathered from 
real-world evaluations and current web exploits. 
C. 2) Perform real-world evaluations. 
Analysis undertaken comprises of real-world websites -  
including malicious websites. 
C. 3) 
Exercise caution generalizing from a 
single O.S. version, such as Windows 
XP. 
Discussions are limited to observed behaviours in a 
Windows 7 O.S.  
C. 4) Choose appropriate malware stimuli. 
Web-rich content requirements such as flash player have 
been installed on analysis environment but Capture-BAT 
lacks features that perform stimuli such as clicking on 
links on webpages and displaying signs of real user 
interaction (such as typing) which modern malware can 
sometime require before manifesting.  The focus of this 
work is on the opiminisation of the analysis process of 
behavioural log file analysis and not primarily triggering 
malicious behaviour.  
C. 5) 
Consider allowing Internet access to 
malware. Internet access is available during malware analysis. 
D. Safety     
D. 1) 
Deploy and describe containment 
policies. 
Described containment policy and security measures in 
place in section 3.14. The framework did not offer much 
insight in the safety precautions and only focused on the 
disaster-recovery aspect of malware analysis. It was felt 
that focus on the prevention of malware propagation 
within the university network was of utmost importance 
which justifies the discussion in 3.1.4.  
 
3.2 Drive-by-download resource gathering 
The largest contributor to the URL bank came from a wide range of ‘potentially’ 
malicious domain lists available on the World Wide Web. These websites contain 
lists of URLs that were found to exhibit malicious behaviour at a certain point. 
Clearly, malicious webpages are highly dynamic in their nature of delivering web 
exploits: a given malicious website might only be active at certain times or only 
active towards a particular geo-location which are easily enabled by services such as 
GeoIP (http://www.geoip.co.uk/) which are widely available on the net. Multiple freely 
available databases were used in order to obtain a balanced dataset that attempted 
to include as many different families as possible – as long as they exploited 
Windows 7 systems. Examples include: 
 Malware domain list (https://www.malwaredomainlist.com/mdl.php ) 
 The malc0de database(http://malc0de.com/database/) 
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 hpHosts (https://www.hosts-file.net/) 
 Malware Domains (http://www.malwaredomains.com/ ) 
 ZeusTracker (https://zeustracker.abuse.ch/blocklist.php)  
Duplicated URLs were checked and removed before the analysis process using a 
simple string match function built in Capture-HPC_NG. 
Additionally, lists of potentially malicious, but mostly unknown URLs were gathered 
on Twitter, targeting tweets which contained a URL and the hashtag ‘world cup’ 
during the 2014 world cup. While this source proved to be vast and potentially highly 
scalable in terms of having much more URLs than the single Capture-HPC server 
could handle, it was later found to be a fairly poor source in terms of gathering 
malicious behavioural data and malware binaries due to the larger number of found 
benign URLs.  
The third source of URLs was supplied by a large organisation (unnamed as 
protected by a non-disclosure agreement): the URL lists supplied contained a mix of 
both malicious and potentially benign URLs that was generated based on the usage 
of the employees of that large organisation.  
These sources contained a mix of known malicious web sites, potentially malicious 
websites and benign websites. It was important to attempt to have varied categories 
as these would allow a finer diversity in behaviours that could be captured, evaluated 
and included in behavioural filter lists. Malicious websites that are newly active and 
analysed can often contain samples of malware that is unknown or have not yet 
been detected. These samples could additionally be polymorphic variants of known 
malware.  Realistically, unless these websites have been analysed and the malware 
exploit is known, it is difficult to claim that the dataset contains a good variety of 
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malware families. This is thus an example of the limitations that research in malware 
analysis and experimentation faces when using real-time and real-world malware 
datasets.  
3.2.1 Creation of the data corpus 
In order to understand malicious drive-by-download behaviours and web-based 
exploits, a specialised data set was required. Additionally, non-malicious datasets 
were also required for various experiments that were carried out because they would 
be required to build the body of knowledge that expert driven behaviour filtering 
required. This section starts by identifying the underlying reasons for creating these 
datasets and evaluates the sample size that was used in the creation of the data 
sets. Finally, the resources used in the creation of the malicious behavioural bank 
are discussed and the sources evaluated to identify degrees of realism and to avoid 
generalisation.  
A major requirement for the experiments was to identify a large number of known 
malicious URLs that would need to be analysed. The number of potentially malicious 
websites scanned is 110,000 over the course of three years. This large number of 
malicious URLs is required because within drive-by-download analysis the trend for 
malware writers follows a pattern which would minimise detection. The nature of 
short-lived malicious websites reflects that, as often a malicious website which is 
found to be malicious when initially analysed could no longer be malicious upon 
secondary analysis a few hours or days later. To overcome this issue, a large 
number of websites (110,000) were scanned in the hope that a high number of 
malicious behaviours are captured, and a real-world centric view is observed.  With 
the availability of Web services (such as Amazon’s web services) it is becoming 
increasingly cheap for malware writers to rent out cloud-based servers which are 
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then used as malicious servers to infect client systems with drive-by-downloads 
which is yet more reasons for dynamic analysis output to be more focused on the 
known malicious and anomalies.   
Consequently, the affordability and availability of rented web servers indirectly allows 
the nature of short-lived malicious websites which are then abused by malware 
writers to avoid detection. In order to obtain an accurate overview of malware and 
drive-by-download behaviours, a reasonably high sample size would be required to 
counter the limitations faced by behaviour based analysis.  By having a high sample 
size, a larger amount of ‘currently malicious’ websites would be analysed which 
would provide a deeper and arguably more accurate insight into malicious drive-by-
download behaviour.  
Other experiments which do not seek to identify malicious behaviour and malware 
patterns. Such experiments include attempting to evaluate performance of exclusion 
lists or identify changes between benign system behaviours that are generally static. 
These experiments require significantly fewer experimental runs to understand the 
system behaviour. It is reasonable to assume that the majority of benign system calls 
were identified after running 500 samples and seeing no new behaviour 
manifestation by the honeypot. This is a reasonable assumption as no new benign 
system calls were observed suggesting that the vast majority of benign behaviours 
were captured. In terms of experiments requiring the use of purely benign behaviour, 
the sample sizes used throughout this work varied from 800 - 3,011 URLs analyses. 
This number was chosen to have a higher assurance level that the observed 
behaviour are in fact expected system calls by the O.S. and applications installed. It 
was important to ensure that the majority of expected system calls were experienced 
as one of the problems that is being solved was filtering out the expected benign 
101 
 
behaviours and allowing false positives to be undiscovered would only result in a 
lesser amount of filtered data.  
3.2.2 Justification for the creation of the malware data corpus 
Within malware analysis, there are several datasets available on websites such as 
Virus Total, Malwr.com and malware ‘dump’ websites (e.g.:  
http://contagiodump.blogspot.co.uk/) which contain labelled samples (in the form of 
binary files or executables) from different periods of time. Unfortunately, these did 
not contain behavioural information regarding the drive-by-download itself or 
behavioural information about the web exploit as typically these datasets were 
generated by creating a sandbox environment and then executing the malware 
sample. Binary analysis assumes the malware sample has been delivered onto the 
system and relies on actively executing the file to observe behaviours. The 
behaviour that can be observed within an O.S. as a malicious website interacts with 
the system can provide information on attack and infection vectors.  Work specifically 
on drive-by-download behaviours within Windows 7 were found to be scarce and 
typically did not include discussions on behaviour filtering, thus the topic was 
relatively unexplored. It was imperative that this type of dataset was created if insight 
about studies within Windows 7 web exploits and behaviours was to be conducted. 
In addition to this data type, there are a large number of malicious websites URL 
hosting which contain large volumes of regularly updated malicious websites. 
However, those malicious domain lists are typically aimed at providing blacklists 
domains and thus do not provide observed behaviours during the initial interaction 
between the client system and a website. Some of these domains are found to be 
malicious at some point but the behavioural characteristics that would suggest 
maliciousness are not provided.  Furthermore, following prudent practices of 
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malware experimentation by Rossow et al. (2012), there was a requirement to put 
measures in place that would limit malware samples used in a study, so that it does 
not generalise over multiple and inactive variants that attack different versions of 
operating systems. In the study’s case, malware that are proven to actively attack a 
Windows 7 client environment are of key interest as the research focuses on 
Windows 7 behaviours in the creation of the behavioural filters and observed 
malicious behaviours within the Windows 7 operating system. This is logical as 
within the world of malware, if datasets are not filtered to at least a given operating 
system, it is likely that conclusions may be based on more general malicious 
behaviour. Within this industry, cross platform malware can often be observed as 
discussed by Stange (2015) and Upguard (2016). It is therefore important that the 
study commits to detection on a specific operating system throughout experiments 
as opposed to multiple operating systems which would face detecting cross platform 
malware repeatedly. The limitations in available datasets and the aspiration to 
capture different malware samples that are not cross platform justifies the creation of 
a specific malicious behavioural log file data corpus. 
The main dataset is inclusive of .log (log file) data based on the interactions that 
occur during runtime of a web browser visiting a malicious webpage. Additionally, 
Capture-BAT provides the ability to capture the modified and deleted files during the 
interaction.  
3.2.3 Sample size evaluation 
URLs are the main resource required by drive-by-download behaviour analysis. 
5,132 log files were marked as malicious out of a total possible of 110,000 analysed 
URLs. These consisted of malicious, potentially malicious, inactive (short-lived 
malicious webpage) and reactive (malicious webpage detects Capture-BAT or the 
103 
 
virtualised environment and prohibits execution) URLs from a fairly diverse range of 
real-world sources. Previous malware studies that are relevant in terms of using 
malicious URLs have a tendency to utilise a wide range of malware samples: 
Amorim & Komisarczuk (2012) cluster 17,000 behavioural log files from Capture-
HPC. Cova et al. (2010) uses 823 malicious samples and a benign URL dataset of 
11,215 URLs. More recent studies by Tanaka & Goto (2016) utilise 43,000 URLs 
over the course of 18 months.  Song et al. (2010) used 119 cached ‘in the wild’ 
samples.  These malware studies show the wide range of malware samples used in 
different studies and are in line with the sample sizes created for this study. 
Rieck et al. (2011) analysed 3133 reports of malicious behaviours. Rossow et al. 
(2012) performed dynamic malware execution by analysing a sample of 10,670 files 
with different MD5 hash values. Whilst these were not inherently malicious URLs 
being analysed and focused at malicious files, it is fair to conclude that the larger the 
sample size for malicious behaviours, the more likely a large variety of malicious 
behaviour is to be observed. Unlike malware binary analysis where having a large 
number of unique MD5 files in the analysis could be derived from polymorphic 
variants of the same family, the process of capturing drive-by-downloads for 
behavioural analysis, requires a reasonably large sample of data to identify as many 
unique behaviours as possible.  It is therefore concluded that the sample size of over 
110,000 potentially malicious websites analysed yielding 5,132 malicious log files is 
reasonable considering the amount of ever increasing malicious web servers.  
The sample of 3,011 potentially malicious URLs analysed for the purposes of 
calculating filter efficiency for filtering benign behaviour within created exclusion list 
was determined experimentally. This is because benign behaviour tends to be rather 
static and it was observed that it was highly unlikely (no new benign behaviour found 
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after analysing 1500 URLs) to find significantly new behaviours by analysing URLs.  
It was shown in the experiment that the created exclusion lists were also filtering the 
vast majority (96.96%) of benign behaviours nearly over two years after their 
creation. This sample was more than sufficient to determine benign behaviours.  
However, it is important to note that this sample is likely limited in terms of analysing 
malicious data due to the limitations on behaviour analysis environments that 
Capture-BAT faces and the large amount of potentially malicious websites that are 
not active at the time of analysis.  
3.3 Experimental setup 
This section depicts the main Capture-HPC client honeypot setup which is altered 
accordingly in different experiments.  The main source of data gathering is 
undertaken by the use of a client honeypot, Capture-HPC. The type of data that is 
gathered are system behavioural files in the log (.log) file format. Additionally, if a 
new file is created or modified during the analysis process, the new or changed file 
would be available in zip format. As often observed within drive-by-download attacks, 
the creation of a malicious Portable Executable within the Windows O.S. can be 
seen. An overview of the methodology is provided below and the detailed 
experimental setup can be viewed in section 4.5.1 – 4.5.2 of Chapter 4.  
1. Virtualised Windows clients are setup to be as vulnerable as possible by 
containing aspects of an un-secure Windows system. 
a. These include:  disabling User Access Control (UAC), disabled 
Microsoft defender and ensuring that anti-viruses were not running on 
the analysis client.  
b. Running Windows 7 with no critical and security updates. 
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c. The installation of applications that allow for web browsing exploits yet 
enrich the user experience by allowing application dependant features 
(such as Flash player).  
d. Run Internet Explorer 8. According to Rahul (2014), this is the most 
vulnerable web browser at the time of the study and is likely to face 
most attacks in the client honeypot environment.  
2. Vulnerable clients visit a given website and record behavioural interactions 
which are then sent back to a server for storage before being reverted back to 
a clean state, ready for the next behavioural URL analysis. This is controlled 
by two main mechanisms: first, the revert script used by Capture-BAT. 
Second, the immutable state of the virtual hard-drives which prevents 
permanent changes saved to disk.  
a. The outputs here are the log and zip files aforementioned.  
3. Behavioural log files are then analysed. 
a. Unique behaviours are counted and the creation of a behavioural table 
is undertaken. 
b. Behaviours are evaluated and classified between benign, unknown or 
malicious. 
3.3.1 Experimental methodology justification 
The need for experiments to be carried out in this research is gathered from the 
initial requirement of measuring the effectiveness of the testbed. Additionally, 
throughout the development, there is a need to assess created artefacts such as: 
measuring the effectiveness of exclusions lists introduced in Chapter 4. 
Experimentation is ideal for this particular task as an observed number of behaviours 
can suggest the amount of raw unique behaviours that are blocked by exclusion lists. 
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This provides quantifiable evidence within the context of efficiency testing.  In order 
to do this, measurements of the usual unfiltered data would need to be compared 
with data that the created artefacts filtered out.   
Furthermore, validating gathered data to ensure that the honeypot setup is facing 
malware attacks behind a level of protective services in a university network is 
crucial. If observed behaviours do not contain malicious behaviours due to an 
internal defence mechanism or resource preventing malicious code being delivered 
and executed, it would have been futile to continue data gathering over the course of 
the study.  The primary goal of running experiments is to observe benign system 
behaviours within a Windows 7 environment that is visiting a benign webpage.  
These then allow behavioural profiles and behavioural tables to be built based on 
recorded interactions. These can be used in similar Windows 7 based run-time 
analysis environments to filter out results or other instances of Capture-BAT with the 
same set of applications and versions.  
3.3.2 Capture-BAT 
Capture-BAT is a behaviour analysis tool developed by Seifert et al. (2007) and is 
the main tool used within this research to capture both benign system and potentially 
malicious behaviour. Capture has been around for many years and was originally 
designed to operate on the Win32 operating system, Windows XP. A behaviour 
analysis tool seeks to analyse the behavioural interactions that are generated as a 
result of system calls within an analysis environment. This means that the state of a 
system can be monitored by monitoring application and operating system 
behaviours. Capturing these behavioural interactions allows the malware analyst to 
view log files which offers a large amount of insight into how programs and the 
operating systems interact without the need for the source code or reverse 
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engineering. Capture-BAT operates at low level kernel which is a higher privileged 
level than malware operating in user level. This is important because one of the 
highly desirable goals of malware analysis is to execute the analysis with higher 
privilege than malware to reduce risks of the analysis environment being detected by 
malware.    
This dynamic analysis technique has been well established for a long time. However, 
adaptations to understand operating system behaviours and applicability to the most 
popular operating system Windows 7 was an area that was not being reported 
academically.  This is the area of focus targeted by the thesis. In order to ensure 
certainty that malicious behaviour is being detected with the created set-up of 
Capture-BAT, it is of crucial importance that the setup itself is tested.  
3.3.3 Duration of malicious webpage analysis 
This experiment looked at the effect of client honeypot analysis duration. The 
purpose of this investigation was to see if there was a difference between the 
behavioural log files if the duration of the analysis for a webpage was allocated a 
different number of seconds. It is not uncommon for malware to have been set ‘sleep 
timers’ by a malware author and actual execution would occur upon some user 
activity or timer expiration. However due to the vast number of potentially malicious 
URLS there are to analyse (110,000 URLs in the case of this study), the decision for 
execution duration per webpage should factor in the high volume of tests required. 
Figure 3.1 below shows the full activity sequence required by each website analysis. 
Table 3.3 below also shows the required analysis time at different amounts of 




Figure 3.1: Events and required time upon Capture-BAT boot up.  
Table 3.3: Tests for required time for website analysis in seconds. The chosen 
settings for Capture-BAT is provided in Chapter 4.  
Action Required time per activity (seconds).   
Turn virtual Machine on 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Boot Windows 7 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Load browser and webpage 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Analysis of webpage 30 60 90 120 150 180 
Save log files, revert and 
shut down 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Total required time 165 195 225 255 285 315 
 
A Sample of 140 URLs were chosen (these contained a mix of known malicious and 
benign URLs) and the test was executed multiple times with different duration 
variables of 30 seconds, 60 seconds, 90 seconds, 120 seconds, 150 seconds and 
180 seconds. From the results gathered, log files for 60 second tests were displaying 
a few less behaviours than log files running for 90 or more seconds.  At the 90 
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second threshold compared with 120, 150 and 180 respectively there were no further 
additional differences between observed behaviours. In terms of the dataset created, 
the decision was made to allow 90 seconds per URL to execute excluding virtual 
machine load up, revert and shutdown times. This is because from the results 
gathered, there were no visible benefits from letting an analysis run for a longer time. 
Therefore, a maximum of 5 minute per total webpage analysis was decided to be 
allocated which included the to the 90 seconds found to be required as it was 
observed that if two virtual Capture-BAT clients were being run simultaneously, the 
boot up and web browser analysis would take up to 30 seconds longer.  This allowed 
sufficient time for all the required activities to take place and had a buffer of a few 
seconds extra per page should extra time had been required by Capture-BAT. The 
time of 5 minute per page was used in a similar setup by Burnap et al. (2015) and 
this work also assumes that a degree of malicious activity will be triggered within the 
first few minutes of analysis. It was concluded from log file analysis that increasing 
the duration of website analysis by the factors considered in table 3.3 did not affect 
the sample set of 140 URLs yet this was necessary to limit the amount of time per 
webpage as there were a large sample of potentially malicious URLs to visit. The 
issue faced by sandbox analysis where some malware samples are given sleep 
timers to bypass detection by run-time analysis is beyond the scope of this research 
but it may be likely that future research may detect more drive-by-download attacks if 
honeypots accommodate this limitation or are simply allowed to run for long periods 
of time.  
Additionally, Long term studies may help in providing insight on how compromised 
machines are exploited and used by malware writers and what further malicious 
behaviours can be observed from the large number of malicious executables that 
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remain un-executed. Long term studies have been quite rare within this field but 
recently, (Tanaka and Goto, 2016) show that some malicious websites (10% of their 
43,000 dataset) stay active for a long time with several revival periods. These 
findings show that malicious URLs can be studied further by performing interactions 
and allowing the compromised system to be used long term to further understand the 
malware behaviour. However, the authors’ research does not focus on the long-term 
behaviour analysis of how compromised clients are used by malware writers. The 
long-term behaviour analysis of a particular malicious URL is out of the scope of this 
research due to the possible associated consequences of leaving a compromised 
machine running for extended periods of time. This compromised client could for 
example launch attacks, steal data or mine Bitcoin. It is identified that this may be a 
direction for future research within drive-by-download analysis. 
As a result of the methodology applied, these datasets were created for the study: 
Table 3.5: Datasets created for experiments carried out in the thesis. 
Dataset  Description 
5,132 dataset  This malicious log file dataset was created by analysing 110,000 
potentially malicious websites gathered from malware domain 
lists aforementioned. This dataset is analysed in Chapter 6. 
30,11 dataset This dataset is created as part of an experiment in Chapter 5 
which measures the behavioural filter efficiency. The dataset is 
created using unverified webpages and seeks to identify the 
extend of which the benign filters work. This dataset contains two 
sets of 3011 log files; one created with exclusion lists and the 
other created without exclusion lists.  
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800 dataset This dataset is used in Chapter 5 to identify if there are changes 
in behavioural interactions that differ if the behaviour analysis 
environments has different versions of the same operating 
system. The dataset contains two sets of 800 log files created 
using Capture-BAT on patched and unpatched operating 
systems. 
 
3.4 Testing the validity of experimental setup 
Having implemented and configured the behaviour analysis environment, there was 
a requirement to test the setup in the real-world to ensure attacks against the client 
systems were actually taking place. This is done as part of an experiment and can 
be viewed in Appendix B, section 3.4.  
3.5 Alternate resource gathering evaluations 
URL lists of potentially malicious websites are the crucial resource for this study. It 
was therefore crucial to explore alternative ways of obtaining active potentially 
malicious URLs. As part of this requirement, the social network Twitter was 
assessed as a potential for obtaining malicious URLs. This is presented Appendix B 
section 3.5.  
3.6 Roundup 
This chapter identified and explored the undertaken research methods and their 
applicability within the thesis. Both deductive and inductive reasoning were applied 
to various research questions. Additionally, the adaptation of prudent malware 
experiment guidelines provided by Rossow et al. (2012) was applied to the thesis. 
This discussion identified key concepts of the guidelines that would be applicable to 
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experiments that were undertaken. Non-applicable guidelines were identified and 
justified. The extension of the safety guideline in the adapted framework to include 
safe practices that was missing was undertaken. This was a requirement in the case 
of this research due to honey clients predominantly being run alongside existing 
university network infrastructure which would require additional safety practices that 
were not present in the guidelines by Rossow et al. (2012). The final artefact was a 
table with the adapted guidelines and how each guideline was applied within the 
study. 
The chapter discussed the creation of data corpus which included sample size 
evaluations and URL resource management. Generic experimental setup and the 
chosen apparatus, Capture-BAT was discussed. This provided means to depict an 
overview of the main experimental setup which would have variations in different 
experiments. These variations are discussed in the respective experiment sections 
within the thesis. Finally, two experiments are carried out (presented in Appendix B): 
firstly, a validation test is undertaken on the experimental setup which proves that 
the setup is suited for purpose despite being placed on a university network and 
defence system. Secondly in line with the resource gathering discussion, an 
experiment using social media to gather possible resources for analysis is 
undertaken. In this experiment the conclusion was that Twitter is not a viable source 
for URL gathering when applied to this work as the URLs that are shared in tweets 
are far too rarely found to contain malicious behaviours that attacked the Capture-
BAT client honeypots.  
The findings of this chapter did conclude that the experiment setup is designed in 
accordance to prudent guidelines and was valid in the real-world scenario. As it is 
imperative that Windows 7 system behaviours is not an area of research that has 
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been thoroughly reported, there is a need to explore benign system behaviours 
within this operating system. This is an important aspect of drive-by-download 
research as it is important to separate known benign and normal system behaviours 
from malicious behaviours. Undertaking this activity allows a malware analyst to filter 
datasets which would typically contain a large volume of known benign behavioural 
interactions. This concept is supported by the theoretical framework in the context of 
malware analysis as Rossow et al. (2012) depicts the importance of separating 
goodware data from malware data. In the context of this thesis, goodware data 
would be the benign system interactions that take place upon each bootup of a 
Windows analysis environment. Therefore, the next chapter seeks to provide 
understanding of the benign behaviours in the creation of expert driven behaviour 
filters. This will explore the main research question related to the expert driven 
behavioural filters.   As a last point, it is possible that filtering benign behaviours 
could lead to more positive outcomes in terms of malicious behaviour classification 
and clustering.  
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Expert driven behaviour filter development 




Chapter 4 – Expert driven behaviour filter development 
This chapter introduces and discusses expert driven behavioural filters which seek to 
filter out known behaviour using behaviour knowledge. The behaviour filters are 
adapted into exclusion lists when these are used in the Capture-BAT software. This 
is because the software is able to use the knowledge resent in exclusion lists to filter 
out exclusions.  Within the thesis, references to created exclusion lists refer to the 
expert driven behavioural filters that were created.  
Initially the importance of working exclusion lists in order to gather a Windows 7 
malware data corpus is explored as well as the challenge of determining complex 
software behaviours even when a given operating system is left running idle. 
Operating system behaviours are explored and labelled accordingly between 
malicious, benign or unknown (grey) behaviours in the aim of helping classify 
behaviour in future behavioural studies utilising dynamic analysis within malicious 
binary sandboxes and Web exploit analysers. System behaviours are compared 
between Windows 7 and Windows XP which results in a number of discoveries 
within benign system behaviours.  Exclusion list goals are explored and a 
methodology in the creation of behavioural exclusion lists is proposed. The chapter 
then evolves into the lab set-up used to create and update exclusion lists, which 
minimises the output of malicious log files in addition to providing insight on labelling 
real-world benign and grey behaviours. It is important to note that behavioural 
interactions that suggest malicious activities in malicious log files are not lost if the 
behavioural filter is designed using the expertise of a behavioural analyst and in a 
risk-averse manner. Shortcomings and possible solutions of exclusion lists are 




Dynamic behaviour analysis is the process of understanding the inner workings of 
software or process by observing omitted behaviours and interactions with programs 
when these are executed in real environments. Dynamic behaviour analysis can be 
performed without directly reverse engineering: this overcomes the need for potential 
malware source code which is not available in the majority of malware exposures. 
Typically, this approach tends to be more accurate but also much more 
computationally intensive than the static analysis approach as dynamic analysis 
relies on execution of service in real, non-emulated systems.  Behaviour analysis is 
typically undertaken in sandboxed environments with the aim of protecting malware 
from propagating and infecting networked systems.  Automated malware analysis in 
sandbox environment has been carried out by Willems et al. (2007) (CW Sandbox) 
and more recently by Cuckoo sandbox (Cuckoo, 2014) as well as several Anti-Virus 
vendors. The typical output of the analysis is in report format detailing system calls.  
These system calls can then be used by a malware analyst to determine whether 
omitted behaviours are benign or malicious.  
Similarly, Capture Behaviour Analysis Tool (Capture-BAT) has been around for a 
number of years Seifert et al. (2008). Progressively within the years since Capture-
BAT was originally released, hundreds of patches for Operating Systems (O.S.), 
browsers and applications have been released.  When these new versions of O.S., 
browser and applications are installed within an environment, they manifest as large 
numbers of propagating behaviour changes. Furthermore, the majority of research 
undertaken, which used Capture-BAT for drive-by-download capture were done 
using Capture-BAT on Windows XP with various service packs as can be seen by 
Aval et al. (2008), Seifert (2010), Seifert et al. (2008), Lin et al. (2010), Van et al. 
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(2011) and Amorim & Komisarczuk (2012a). Windows 7 however, has been a 
predominantly untouched area within system behaviour studies despite being one of 
the most popular O.S. as the literature review identified.  
A useful yet critical component of Capture-BAT is a list of a system’s behavioural 
exclusion list Seifert (2008). These behavioural exclusion lists allow Capture-BAT to 
understand and classify a given behaviour as malicious or benign. Malicious 
behaviours are reported while benign behaviours are ignored. This can be thought of 
as a fairly low-level filter for system behaviours as every event that takes place on a 
machine is logged by Capture-BAT. Similarly, the exclusion lists developed for 
Capture-BAT could be used as the basis for filtering logged events from sandboxes 
such as Cuckoo. Prior to this work, it was not found that Windows 7 behaviour 
studies to understand the new operating system’s behaviours and interactions were 
studied and classified. Furthermore, adaptations within Capture-BAT to run on 
Windows 7 have not been identified or attempted and thus remains a particularly 
unknown area of knowledge despite being actively used to identify malicious 
behaviour.  
4.2 Research requirements 
A critical part of the research involved the need of filtering the vast amount of 
malware available into malware that actively seeks to infect and compromise 
Windows 7 environments through drive-by-downloads. This is reflected in the first 
research question. At the start of the study, Windows 7 held a higher percentage of 
the O.S. usage platform but even today according to WC3 School’s O.S. Platform 
statistics, it is still the most widely used operating system (38.7% August 2016) 
followed by Windows 10 (26.10%).  Therefore, in the development of our malware 
capture environment the primary aim was to identify and design an environment 
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where a large amount of malware that targets Windows 7 systems can exploit and 
manifest. The behavioural manifestations of these drive-by-download attacks would 
form part of answering identified research questions on what do Windows 7 malware 
typically target and exploit.  The required environment would need to be using a 
number of widely used applications such as Flash Player, Java and Real Player, 
Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer with fairly vulnerable and default settings. The 
rationale here is to provide the test bed with a respectable number of exploitation 
vectors for malware to exploit and compromise whilst providing the maximum 
possible knowledge of the attacker’s techniques (Peter & Schiller, 2011).  
4.2.1 Limitations of Capture-BAT within the Windows 7 environment 
Capture-BAT is a primary behavioural detection tool created originally for the 
Windows O.S. with primary deployment on Windows XP. Originally Capture-BAT 
would run predominantly on the virtualisation software, VMware. In this research, the 
aim was to focus on malware behaviour within the Windows 7 environment. This 
meant that adaptation of Capture-BAT from Windows XP to Windows 7 was an initial 
requirement. As mentioned in the background section of Chapter 4, the vast majority 
of previous research focused on Windows XP as their analysis environment. 
Running Capture-BAT on a different O.S., would not provide filtered behavioural log 
files as Capture-BAT was not designed on Windows 7. The new O.S. would 
inherently have a large number of new system behaviours that would be benign and 
a large number of unknown behaviour. By default, any new behaviour that is not 
present in the exclusion list is marked as malicious Seifert et al. (2007). 
It is evident that should Capture-BAT with unmodified exclusion lists be run in 
Windows, all the URLs would be marked as malicious. The reasoning behind this is 
simply because Windows 7 which in comparison to Windows XP has a number of 
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different behaviours and system calls due to the new file system changes, and 
increased number of services available in Windows 7. Additionally, this meant 
existing processes between both operating systems would have different default 
directories that would cause a large number of false-positive malicious behaviour 
entries in the behavioural reports.  To prove this was the case, the output report of a 
Windows 7 Capture-BAT with a benign web server interaction is provided in the 
Appendix B and can be partly viewed in Figure 4.0a.  After a substantial number 
(>~2100) of benign websites were set for behavioural analysis it was noticed that a 
large amount of similar behaviours was observed. The observed behaviours were 
concluded to be ‘normal’ O.S. or benign behaviours subsequent to log file 
investigations. Investigated log files were cluttered and made the process of 
behavioural malware analysis for a malware analyst much more time consuming 
than if the log file would only contain known malicious behaviours or unknown and 
new behaviours. 
This process was hindered by the way Capture-BAT works: Initially the Capture 
server, also known as Capture-HPC would send a list of behaviours to the Capture 
client, Capture-BAT. This list of acceptable behaviours as introduced in section 4 is 
known as an exclusion list and would contain behaviours which are either benign or 
malicious. Post adaptation, all the analysis resulted in the malicious classification by 
Capture-BAT: but this made sense, as there were no working exclusion lists for 
Windows 7.  
4.2.2 Identification of behavioural vectors within Windows 7 
In addition to the lack of O.S. behaviour filtering for Windows 7, each of the installed 
applications within the created behaviour analysing environment displayed an 
additional large number of benign behaviours. Clearly these mean that there was a 
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requirement for several more entries into the exclusion lists as there are significant 
numbers of benign behavioural interaction that are generated as a result of 
applications being installed and executed on the analysis environment. Examples 
include the creating and saving of log files or running at start-up. Within Capture-
BAT, the development of exclusion lists to filter behaviours for three major 
behavioural vectors were required: Windows 7 O.S. behaviours, the web browser 
behaviour and the installed applications within the environment which caused system 
calls upon each boot. These were therefore prioritised and required the inclusion of 
benign behaviours. Section 4.5 explores exclusion list development.  
Typical system calls and interactions that are generated by an idle Windows 7 
behaviour analysis environment designed to replicate a Windows 7 client can be 
observed in section 4.4.1 - 4.4.4. 
4.2.3 Exclusion list creation rationale 
The necessity for the creation of exclusion lists is justified as there is an apparent 
lack of focus on exclusion lists development or even guidance on the development of 
good practices at the creation stage as identified in the literature review. In practice, 
this lack of focus is highly problematic as exclusion lists are the main components 
involved with the decision-making process when using Capture-HPC in drive-by-
download behaviour analysis on the interaction between client and web server at the 
point where a web server is requested to provide website content. Being at the 
forefront of the classification of potential drive-by-download attacks, it is therefore 
imperative that developed exclusion lists are created with the goal to provide the 
least possible benign behaviours in the output log files. Redundant and normal 
behaviours should be excluded from log files to allow instances of Capture-BAT 
running in the Windows 7 O.S. so that Capture-BAT only flags malicious behaviours 
121 
 
as malicious. Naturally the amount of noise from behaviours gathered was limited.   
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that forming malware groups based on 
particular malware behaviour are more likely to be successful absent the streams of 
regular and confirmed benign behavioural data.  
To reinforce the scale of this issue, Figure 4.0a below shows an example 
behavioural log file where regular and non-malicious system behaviours and 
interactions are taking place. These log file entries are recorded upon a system 
starting up, loading a web browser and idling for about 2 minutes. 
 Note: the website was verified using the proposed methodology in section, 4.5.2 
prior to the investigation).  
As can be seen from the log file above, the sheer volume of system interaction for a 
single website is indeed quite overwhelming to a behaviour analyst with over 300 
behavioural interactions in a single Capture-BAT instance. The full log file for this 
particular analysis is available in Appendix B to outline the sheer volume of data from 
a single analysis. 
This website (at the time of testing) was benign but Capture-BAT within the Windows 
7 environment marks it as malicious, along with recording all the usual / benign O.S., 
web browser and application behaviours just as we hypothesised in section 4.2.  





"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:8.948","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:8.958","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:8.968","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:8.968","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:8.968","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:8.968","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:8.988","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:9.58","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:9.108","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 







"registry","18/8/2016 17:33:46.766","C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe","SetValueKey","HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WBEM\CIMOM\List of event-active namespaces","-1" 










Table 4.0a: behavioural log file upon visiting a benign website initially before 
the creation of exclusion list. This is a snippet of the log files and the rest has 
been excluded from the thesis as it is over 100 entries long. 
4.2.4 Aims and goals of exclusion lists 
The aims of creating successful behavioural exclusion lists are explored: 
1. Benign and normal O.S. system calls should be ignored and not present in a 
log file to avoid a benign interaction from being flagged as malicious.  
 As explored in the background and literature section, the sheer volume 
of malicious web server released on a daily basis is much more than 
dynamic analysis can cope with. Consequently, within the cyber 
security industry, there’s always been a need for sorting rapidly and 
effectively between malicious and benign behaviours so appropriate 
attention can be better spent on the unknown and the malicious. A 
successful behavioural exclusion list should therefore be able to filter 
known benign behaviours to facilitate this requirement and reduce the 
amount of log files that need analysing altogether. 
2. Within a malicious log file, known and confirmed benign behaviours should 
not be present as this would add unnecessary noise to the log file which 
would decrease accuracies in analysis.   
 It is fair to state that within a data set where a large number of noise is 
present, analysis would be hindered similar the curse of dimensionality 
in machine learning.  




 It would defeat the purpose of drive-by-download and malicious 
behaviour analysis if malicious behaviours are not flagged up. 
Correspondingly, if unknown behaviours are present, they should be 
analysed and verified by an analyst to ensure they do not provide clues 
that suggest maliciousness.  
4.3 Methodology used in developing expert driven behavioural filters 
The methodology used is adaptable to any other versions of operating systems that 
are used in behaviour analysis environments. While the methodology implemented 
within this thesis used Windows 7 and Capture-BAT exclusion lists, the overall 
methodology is applicable and adaptable to other versions of both environment and 
behaviour capture tools.  It is important to follow the methodology precisely as a 
mistake here could lead to the undesirable outcome of a malicious behaviour being 
wrongly flagged as benign.  
1. The development of behaviour filters should be done on the same 
environment that would be used to analyse potentially malicious webpages (or 
binaries). This is justified as it is likely that different versions of operating 
systems may behave significantly differently which could lead to potentially 
malicious behaviour being wrongly flagged as non-malicious.   
2. Run either the latest version of O.S., browser and applications in the run-time 
analysis client or a highly vulnerable version of the O.S., browser and 
applications if the goal is to capture a large amount of malware. Once updated 
disable all auto-update functions and set hard drive to immutable mode to 
prevent changes.  
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3. Determine O.S., browser, and application activities by running the run-time 
analysis software on start-up and learning regular system changes. Unknown 
changes should be investigated thoroughly before being included in the 
behavioural filter. Investigations can be carried out using a software vendor’s 
manual or frequently asked question where a given behaviour captured by the 
run-time analysis client is verified with the expectations of the given 
application or software.  
4. Follow the steps for choosing benign webpages described in Figure 4.3 
below. At least 1 low-interaction client honeypot in addition to a URL scanning 
service such as VirusTotal.com or wepawet.iseclab.org. The reasoning behind 
this is purely to have high certainty that the benign webpages are actually 
non-malicious or don’t have links to malicious webpages in their 
advertisement streams. It’s promising to exclude websites that host external 
ads to avoid any possible exploits from poisoned advertisement streams as 
these may contain malicious behaviour and at this stage only sanitised 
behaviour should be included in the filter design stage.  
5. Run a high number of tests on benign webpages and develop exclusion lists 
based on constant and regular O.S., browser, application behaviour. While in 
this context a desirable definition of a high number would be as much as 
possible, a practical number of benign websites that can be ran during the 
development of an exclusion list is suggested in the low thousands.  
6. Investigate the potential for malware in behaviours. Some parts of the 
operating system such the start-up sections of the registry or file system are 
more susceptible to attacks as scripts there would trigger at next re-boot. 
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Unless a behaviour is constantly observed (in a clean system) interacting with 
these high-risk file or registry paths, it should be excluded from the filter. 
 
Figure 4.3: Methodology used for picking benign websites to identify benign 
behaviour. 
 
Figure 4.4: example Capture-BAT log file which includes malicious behaviour 
(drive-by-download being saved to temp Internet Files folder). 
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4.3.1 Decision making process behind classifications of behaviour  
In order or the expert driven system to be a success, there is a need to understand 
behaviours before flagging them as benign. As a rule of thumb, it is important to 
ensure that any behaviour that is either not well documented or has limited 
information should not be marked as benign. Murdoch (2016) discusses the steps 
within intrusion detection systems. These steps can be applied to the design of 
expert lead behavioural filters. Within this work a number of resources are used to 
verify the actual behavioural entries. There are three main steps which are followed:  
Firstly, as discussed in Section 4.3, there is a need to develop and build a benign 
behaviour analysis environment and analyse confirmed benign webpages. This is 
something that is often seen within intrusion detection systems as initially a system is 
observed and scanned to determine regular and expected traffic. The same method 
is applied to the design of the expert lead behavioural filter.  
Secondly, when a behaviour is observed, the log file should be inspected initially to 
determine if the behaviour was triggered by another, potentially malicious process. 
Here, the analyst should analyse the log file and look for any signs that suggest code 
injection has taken place. The signs can sometimes be obvious and a regularly seen 
occurrence can be to analyse browser interactions with a given particular process. 
An example may be: did iexplore.exe open another browser instance? If so, is there 
any reason for this to have taken place? Inspecting previous behaviour in a log file 
can often answer these questions which help suggest whether or not an interaction 
has indicators of maliciousness.  
Thirdly, a range of resources are used to identify ‘expected’ behaviour within an 
operating system. Windows internals book, the Operating System help pages called 
the Technet.microsoft.com are excellent resources to look up specific processes and 
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specific files. Within these documentations, expected functions are often defined and 
mapping these within behaviour observed in a behaviour analysis environment can 
often provide solid evidence in the identification of benign behaviours.  These are 
covered in depth within section 4.4.2-4.4.4 within the thesis.  
4.3.2 Processing behavioural log files to synthesise expert driven behavioural 
filters 
Log files gathered using the methodology above were processed using a series of 
steps.  These were used in the creation of the expert lead system. These steps in 
processing the log files are included to allow for reproducibility: 
1. Initially all behavioural log file data are combined for the behaviour 
understanding purpose.  
2. An excel document was used, using comma-separated variables to break 
down behavioural entries. 
3. As part of data transformation: metadata and time-tags from the raw log files 
are removed. 
4. Behavioural entries are then created from the remaining fields. These fields 
include of triggering process, the behaviour type and the affected 
file/registry/process.  
An example of this is provided:  
Table 4.1a. Example of how a single behaviour changes after processing 















It is possible to reduce the volume of data that needs to be analysed by grouping 
identical behavioural entities in log files. Behavioural entries that are fully identical 
with the only exception being the time it was triggered in the analysis process are 
essentially the same behaviour triggered at different time. By grouping these 
behaviours it’s possible to significantly reduce the log file data that needs to be 
processed in the learning behaviour stage. In practice, actual reduction observed as 
part of the experiment shows a significant reduction in the number of behaviours that 
need to be analysed to create expert lead behavioural systems. Stats from an 
experiment in section 5.1 of Chapter 5 show this:  
 In 3,011 log files it was observed that there were 696,000 total behaviours 
which can be reduced to 3,173 entries if they were grouped into unique 
behaviours. This mass reduction shows that a significant number of 
behavioural entries in the log files are re-occurring system events that are 
generated at different times and once a particular behaviour is studied. 
 In a sample of 112 log files, 17,018 total behavioural entries were gathered. 
Out of this there were only 209 unique behaviours.  
Analysing unique only behaviours for the development of an expert lead system is a 
viable approach which does not exclude any behaviours. To create the unique lists, 
an identical string matching function is used; if all strings in a behavioural entry 
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matches another fully; then they are grouped as a unique behaviour and a +1 count 
is assigned in the log file datasets.  
4.4 Inside an exclusion list 
As mentioned above, the key part of Capture-BAT is exclusion lists: these exclusion 
lists allow Capture to filter whether a behaviour is benign or malicious. Unexpected 
state changes are recorded in Capture log files (Qassrawi & Zhang, 2010). In total 
Capture-HPC provided 3 exclusion lists for Windows XP: ProcessMonitor, 
RegistryMonitor, and FilesMonitor (Honeynet Project Polish Chapter, 2012).  As 
shown below in Figure 4.0b, an exclusion list can be quite complex looking.  
 
Figure 4.0b: Example ‘stock’ process monitor exclusion list for Windows XP 
SP2, IE6. 
Capture exclusion lists can be configured to either: 
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1. Exclude certain events in the log files: in which case, the events will be benign and 
not flag the log file analysis as malicious. This is noted as a ‘+’ in the exclusion list in 
Figure 4.0b. 
2. Include certain events in the log files which will be classified as malicious 
behaviour. This is noted as a ‘-‘ in the exclusion list in Figure 4.0b. If there are 
conflicting behaviour within and exclusion list, the inclusion of a behaviour would 
take priority over the exclusion.  
There are 3 parts to each exclusion list: O.S., browser and applications behaviours. 
Each part of the exclusion list directs events which are either included or excluded. 
Exemplification is revealed in Table 4.1b and figure 4.0b: the first event (which is part 
of the O.S. activities) allows wuauclt.exe (Windows updater process) to write log files 
in C:\windows\WindowsUpdate.log. The second and third entries shown in the table 
is saying if any (:*) process creates any file name with the file extension .bat or .exe 
flag this behaviour as malicious. Full exclusion lists used are available in section B of 
the Appendix.  
Table 4.1b. Snippet example of FileMonitor exclusion list. The full exclusion 
list available in Appendix B.  





- Write :* .+\.bat 




Capture-HPC is shipped with default exclusions lists for Windows XP. It is important 
to note that these exclusion lists were created at the time with the release of 
Capture-HPC (2007), this means the default exclusion lists take into account the 
specific operating system, browser as well as applications installed on the system 
that was used in the creation of these exclusion lists. Any change in version would 
likely require amendments to the exclusion list as there would be different 
application, O.S. and web browser behaviours logged by Capture. Therefore, using 
unaltered or default exclusion lists to tailor Capture client’s O.S. version, browser 
version and application specific versions would result in a number of false positives 
and negatives.  
In order to develop accurate exclusion lists, a fairly high number of ‘benign’ tests 
should be run on Capture-BAT to identify benign behaviour. It is important to 
remember that significant tests should be carried out on the chosen benign websites 
to certify the non-malicious nature requirement as false positives here would mean 
allowing malicious behaviour to be classified as benign when Capture-BAT attempts 
to analyse malicious webpages. It is recommended that to keep Capture-BAT clients 
within a production environment as up-to-date as possible (assuming the other 
clients on the network are also up-to-date) to reflect good detectability of current 
malicious activities despite not having updated components of the Operating System 
to maximise capturing as many Windows 7 potential attacks. However, if the purpose 
of the analysis is simply to capture as many malware samples as possible, it is 
recommended to use a chosen O.S., browser and applications that is out of date 
with unpatched security vulnerabilities. Clearly, changing the environment requires 
testing of system behaviour and re-updating Capture-BAT exclusion lists post 
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updating or the installation of a new O.S., browser and applications running on a 
Capture-BAT client.  
4.4.1 Typical Windows 7 native system calls 
The adaptation to a new O.S., Windows 7 from Windows XP introduces the 
challenges of new file structure and newly created behaviours for new and existing 
interactions within the environment. For example:  according to Microsoft 
Documentation (2016), the %SystemDrive%\ProgramData folder Windows 7 is used 
for application data that is not limited to user specific. In the older version of 
Windows, Windows XP: this path was %SystemDrive%\Documents and Settings\All 
Users\Application Data. This change in folder location however meant that when the 
task of system behaviour analysis was required, a number of entries would be 
observed that show the behavioural interaction of the file system using the 
ProgramData folder to save and delete files. To elaborate further: we run Capture-
BAT and look at some benign system behaviours. Table 4.0c below are snippets of 
the resulting behavioural log file. In the figure, we can see that 
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe (which is the default location for a clean 
Svchost.exe) is writing a log file in the C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows 
Defender\Support\MPLog-07132009-211939.log support folder. Similarly, in the log 
file, the process C:\Windows\System32\sppsvc.exe, is writing a log file in 
C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM.LOG1. Sppsvc.exe is a Windows service 
that enables download, installation and enforcement of digital licences (Bleeping 
computer, 2016). It is evident that the writing of log files by an executable that is in its 
default Windows 7 location, within a clean, unmodified, unused test environment and 
has an unmodified binary file size is highly unlikely to be malicious. Some of these 
‘idle’ system behaviours did not exist in previous versions of Windows and since 
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these now form part of the non-malicious behaviours there is a requirement to add 














Table 4.0c: A benign Windows 7 behavioural activity log, without exclusion 
lists and without malicious behaviours and interactions. Only a snippet of the 
log file is shown. 
Note: System behaviours are explored in section 4.4.2-4.4.4. 
Live system behaviours will now be explored based on behaviour type (file system, 
process or registry) in consideration with the creation of behaviour lists. System 
behaviours will be classified and colour coded as either Benign, Malicious or ‘Grey’ 
which essentially means inconsistent or unknown behaviours.  Whilst the intention of 
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this work is intended to assist behavioural analysis, it is possible that knowledge on 
behaviours provided may lead to new target vectors from malware based on what 
malware writers may observe within our exclusion lists. Therefore, it is imperative 
that behavioural exclusions are reviewed on a system and as least as possible 
generalisations are used within the creation of behavioural exclusion lists to minimise 
the amount of exclusions whilst not allowing for potential malware to exploit 
generalisations in exclusions to bypass detection.   For example, if a given proves 
such as wuauclt.exe is observed to write .log files in the 
C:\WINDOWS\WindowsUpdate.log directory, the written exclusion should reflect all 
aspects of this knowledge:  
1. Only wuauclt.exe from the default system directory 
%SystemDrive%:\WINDOWS\system32\wuauclt.exe should be allowed to 
write. 
 Default path for system processes matter: From our data set, it is 
evident that malicious behaviours tend to run similarly named 
executable files from different directories (often the user or temp folder 
directory). 
Note: default pathway list was created and is available in the Appendix 
Section B.   
2. Only .log files should be excluded from behaviour filtering if they are 
written in the C:\WINDOWS\WindowsUpdate.log directory.  
 Wildcards such as .* in Capture-BAT should not be used in this 
instance as we have only observed .log files being written. By using a 
wild card, we would potentially allow other file types to be written and 
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not be prompted about them. The intention of a successful exclusion 
list is to minimise known benign behaviours and not minimise irregular 
and unknown behaviours.  
It is important to note that the behaviours listed in the next three sections assume 
that a system is being run and left idle with the only action taking place being the 
web browser opening a webpage. System behaviours that use the user folder would 
have slight variations, for example: the user we used Within Windows 7 is ‘mp’ – but 
within behaviour lists this user name can be modified as required.  
4.4.2 System behaviours: The Windows 7 file system behaviours 
The file system within a given environment refers to the way that data is stored, 
modified or deleted. This looks at the flows of data within a storage device (typically 
but not limited to a hard drive). File systems form part of the core storage of data 
used by an operating system: examples include storage of drivers for hardware or 
core data required for execution at the boot-time of an operating system Wirzenius et 
al. (2000). From a cyber security perspective, the behaviours of a file system refer to 
how a given process is modifying (writing or deleting) a given file which is stored in a 
directory (e.g.:C:/Windows means the Windows folder on the C:/ drive). This file 
system definition will be the definition intended within the thesis.  Perceptibly a file 
system monitor forms part of the core system used in the behavioural monitoring of a 
behaviour analysis lab as the interactions between process and file can indicate the 
maliciousness of the given task. Within Windows 7, interactions contained by the file 
system proves to be one of the most active behavioural component in terms of 
generating idle and regular system behaviours.  
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Section 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 are written mostly in tabular form displaying behaviour 
and providing behavioural evaluation. These behavioural tables can be used in the 
creation of behavioural filters or can be used in behavioural identification for 
classification if the intended analysis environment is Windows 7.   
The provided behavioural analysis tables below are colour coded: 
 Green: Benign behavioural interaction between a given process and 
the affected directory and file. 
 Grey/Black: Unknown or inconsistent behaviour that can quite little is 
known about or behaviour that is not often triggered but in every case, 
does not inherently display maliciousness. 
 Red: Typical confirmed malicious behaviour that should always be 
flagged up in analysis log file.  
Keys 
 W= Write 
 D = Delete   
 .*= All  
 System = The System Kernel 
Table 4.2: Typical benign Windows 7 File system behavioural interactions. 
 Process  Affected directories 
and file types 















Capture creates log files in both .zip and 
.log format. These zips containing modified 
files are saved to the capture logs 
directory. The zip is created using 7za.exe 
(7 zip) which in the main capture folder 
which means the process in capture’s 
directory will require both write and delete 









Delete file access is also required as 
capture deletes any newly created log file 
after sending logs to the Capture-HPC 
Server. Therefore, if either the 
Captureclient.exe process or the f7a 
process from their known default install 
directories are writing these file types; this 







Prefetch in Windows 7 shares the same 
directory as Windows XP. SVChost.exe 
and System writing files to the Prefetch 
directory is a regularly observed benign 
























Multiple processes write log files for 
Windows system. These are benign 
provided the executables are kept with 
integrity from a clean install of Windows 
and patching. Writing .log files is benign 
behaviours and can be included in 
exclusion list. Note: in comparison to 
Windows XP, Windows 7 specific log files 
are not stored in the documents and 
settings directory but instead.  If previous 
versions of exclusion lists are being 
developed it is highly recommended to 
remove behavioural entries that are no 
longer required to avoid the possibility of 





















Performance information for Windows 
Management Instrumentation (WMI). 
Benign as long as process’s that write it 
originate from System32 directory. These 
behaviours can be observed frequently 











HomeGroup features are Windows 7 
native- this exclusion is required; it writes 
log files in the HomeGroup provider 





















Isass.exe was observed to perform 
multiple writes of log files in numerous 
directories. These are benign providing 
Isass.exe is from the system32 directory 
and the files being written are in .log and 




















It is observed that Windows update writes 
and deletes files in three main directories 
even when windows update is disabled. 
The majority of the files written are .log 
and .edb which are safe file types and are 
















System events are recorded by 
Services.exe. The file format that is 
observed is limited to .evt. These files 
store logs and errors on a system and are 
used in trouble shooting.  Therefore, any 
behaviour from services.exe that is writing 
an .evt file in the listed directories are 
benign. These are frequently observed on 










Search indexer.exe is Windows 7 native, it 
creates Index files created by search 
indexer to quickly locate files. The service 
was known as the index service in 
Windows XP. Additionally, it creates a 











ProgramData directory which is not 

























Windows 7 introduced IE 8 which had a 
number of file system changes from the 
Windows XP file system. The documents 
and settings folder was removed and 
instead browser files such as Internet 
cache, cookies, history were stored into 
the C:\\users\\NAMEOFUSER\\AppData 
folder. It is important to note that if the 
provided exclusion lists are being used for 
other Capture-BAT setups or behavioural 
setups; the username mp should be 
changed according to the current user that 
will run the browser.  
 
It’s evident that saving and deleting 
cookies, history and cached data are usual 
and benign system behaviours and thus 
must be included in the exclusion lists for 
the relevant browsers. Exclusion list data 
for Firefox is available in  Appendix B 
within the contributed exclusion lists.  
 
Table 4.3: Observed grey/situational Windows 7 file system behavioural 
interactions. 
 Process File Path(s) 
edits 
Grey behaviour overview 









NTFS is the Microsoft’s propriety file 
system, periodically meta data is written in 
the listed directories. The files written are 
not windows 32 binaries which mean they 
can be viewed as benign. This is however 
marked as grey behaviour as the use of 
.*means any process can write it and that 






















Potentially Svchost storing RSA keys – this 
behaviour occurred quite rarely within the 
Windows 7 Capture-BAT and therefore 
doesn’t really need to be included in an 
exclusion list by default.  
 
Table 4.4: Typical malicious Windows 7 file system behavioural interactions. 
 Process File Path(s) edits Malicious behaviour overview 
W Any Anywhere.exe Any writing of executables from visiting a 
web server is malicious: capture does not 
consent to downloading and saving files 
automatically therefore any write of this type 
is against user consent (and likely 
knowledge) thus highly malicious.  
W Any Anywhere.bat Similar to .exe file, writing of .bat files from 
visiting a web server is malicious: capture 
does not consent to downloading and 
saving files automatically therefore any 
write of this type is against user consent 
(and likely knowledge) thus highly 
malicious. The .bat files can essentially 
provide a large number of functionality to an 
attacker and form part of a large number of 
known malware.  
W Any Anywhere.cmd The .cmd files can be thought of as the 
newer version of the old .bat format and is 
largely similar. Any interaction writing these 
files should be flagged up as those files 
have the potential of causing numerous 
malicious behaviour. 




4.4.3 System behaviours: The Windows 7 processes’ behaviours 
A process is the executing (opening and running) of a program (series of instructions 
that a computer’s central processing unit understands). These programs, often 
known as executable files or binary files are stored within the storage and file 
system. (The Linux information project, 2006). Process monitoring can be thought of 
as the monitoring of the intermediary bridge between a given behaviour as it is a 
process that performs a (file system behaviour) file write/delete or a (registry 
behaviour) Set Value Key/ Delete Value Key. Monitoring the execution of a process’s 
path can indicate if an executed process is benign or malicious. If the process 
performs the execution of a new file written in a non-system reserved directory: it can 
be assumed safely to be malicious if not otherwise intended by the user. On the 
other hand, if the process file is written in a known default directory, it is an indication 
that the process is safe however this does not innately mean that the process is 
performing non-malicious behaviours as processes can be injected with malicious 
code.  
It is an assumption that a clean and unmodified Windows is running on the 
behavioural process monitor environment. We used the default C:\ drive but 
knowledge from this table is transferrable to any %SystemDrive% utilised within any 
created behaviour analysis lab. Care must be taken upon setup to ensure core 
processes and application in default locations are not replaced with malicious 
applications or injected prior to the creation of the behavioural test lab. File size 
verification of processes can be done on some core Windows applications to add an 
additional step of certitude. Once core Capture-BAT components are installed, 
additional protection is taken such as making the virtual hard drive immutable. This 
in addition to the built-in Capture-HPC revert script would ensure that during 
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experimentation no binary files which are changed and kept that way.  Windows 7 
processes are now evaluated and classified between benign, inconsistent /grey. Due 
to the fairly static nature of process creation and termination, any processes that are 
executed and are not within the benign or grey list should be marked as malicious. It 
is reasonable to assume that the process is quite likely malicious and undoubtedly 
worth supplementary investigation due to the nature of processes and their ability to 
undertake a large number of file, registry or other process interaction which can be 
highly malicious. Russinovich & Solomon, (2009) discusses the internals and 








Path within Windows 
7 






Capture-HPC’s executable will be 
launched automatically for each 











7Zip software used by Capture-BAT to 




Windows update auto update client. 
This runs even if Windows update is 
disabled. Benign.  
savedump.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\syste
m32\\savedump\.exe 
Standard process that appears if 
windows is not shut down properly or if 
crashes happens. Benign.  
logon.scr  C:\\WINDOWS\\syste
m32\\logon\.scr 












Updates performance information 
within Windows Management 






instrumentation undergoes process 
monitoring applications that alert users 









VMWare tools bundle: used to 
increase performance and interaction 
from VM to host machines. Non-




Critical system process that host a 
number of other services and 
processes. Benign.  
dllhost.exe C:\\Windows\\System3
2\\dllhost\.exe 
Stock process for every Windows 
version. Performs a number of 
services for COM: provides object 
oriented programming architecture 
and runs registry event that handles 







Acts as a host for all DLL services that 




Windows 7 task scheduler: Benign  
but if executed by malware it’s likely to 
add malicious events in the scheduler 






Windows 7 Search processes, 
performs indexing for faster searches 






Windows 7 process: contacts 
Microsoft for network activity and 
performs data download. Can be 





Windows 7 Search processes, 
performs indexing for faster searches 





This core process performs interactive 
user login and logout features.  
userinit.exe C:\\Windows\\System3
2\\userinit\.exe 
Specifies the processes that auto run 
when a given user logs on. 
Establishes network connection.  
csrss.exe  C:\\Windows\\System3
2\\csrss\.exe 
Client Server Runtime Process that 
performs critical tasks, required as 
long as directory is as follows and only 
one instance observed. According to 
Russinovich & Solomon, (2009) this 
loads three Dynamic-link libraries 
(DLLs) that support the creating and 
deleting of processes and threads.  
conhost.exe C:\\Windows\\System3
2\\conhost\.exe 
Fixes theme bugs introduced in 
Windows Vista. Safe as long as 
running within system 32 folder.  
mobsync.exe C:\\Windows\\System3
2\\mobsync\.exe 
Performs syncing, present if syncing 
feature enabled in windows.  
SPPSVC.exe C:\\Windows\\System3
2\\sppsvc\.exe 
This process hosts a number of 
services of windows and is core 






Windows customer improvement 
process- sends usage data to 




Windows backup system process.  
sc.exe  C:\\Windows\\System3
2\\sc\.exe 
Retrieves information and set values 
with other windows services 
drvinst.exe C:\\Windows\\System3
2\\drvinst\.exe 
Used in Highpoint RAID Management 





Windows error reporting service – 
which allows users to send reports to 
Microsoft based on faced errors. This 
checks contents of the AeDebug 




Internet explorer web browser; as this 
was our chosen browser launching 
this application from its default 
directory is benign.  
agentsvr.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\msag
ent\\agentsvr.exe 
ActiveX control that starts upon 
displaying multimedia content. 
Required for browsers.  
rundll32.exe  C:\\WINDOWS\\syste
m32\\rundll32.exe 
Runs DLL files and places them in 
libraries within Windows.  
imapi.exe c:\\WINDOWS\\system
32\\imapi\.exe 
Image API used to provide Image 
burning services in windows.  
 
Table 4.6: Typical grey / situational Windows 7 processes with their default 
pathways. 
Process created Process’s 
Path  




Decision to not include this in exclusion list can 
be justified: this process was inconsistent in its 
appearance within our environment.  
Furthermore, this process was triggered by 
‘UNKNOWN’ within our data set which suggests 
it’s call operators are not required upon every 
boot up and website analysis. The process itself 
is a legit process however as it’s a Windows 
process and as long as it’s executing from the 
System32 directory, it’s likely to not have been 
tampered with. It is known from the file monitor 
that Services.exe writes event log files which is 
a benign behaviour. The inconsistency however 





Firefox browser - use as exclusion list if Firefox 
is desired over Internet Explorer. Firefox or any 
other browsers should not self-execute however 
if the chosen browser is IE upon visitation of 






Google update service if any google service 
running. Might need to add as a UNKNOWN if 
executed by google service. This is a grey 
behaviour as it will be present on machines 
which have applications running this service. 
This should not be in an exclusion list if there 
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are no Google services (such as Google 
Chrome) running on the machine. 
 
Table 4.7: Typical malicious Windows 7 processes based on real attacks in our 
dataset.  
Process initiating the  
creation 










Internet explorer’s process is 
not in the user temp folder 
(it’s in the program files 
directory), this means another 
application is attempting to 
disguise itself as Internet 
Explorer after having 
compromised the actual 
browser. This is an example 
of a benign process executing 






Both these executables are 
malicious and not present 
within a clean Windows 7 
O.S.. This is a real example 
of a malicious process 
executing another malicious 
process based on one of the 
findings within the dataset. 
Any executables that are 
executing other executables 
which are not regular system 
behaviour or use the default 
pathway given at installation 






This may seem as a regular 
system behaviour as a 
perfectly benign cmd.exe is 
being executed by 
wscript.exe with both 
process’s having their default 
parent directory. However, 
this behaviour is seen once: 
anomalies especially within 
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process monitoring should be 
investigated. Upon 
investigation we concluded 
that the (a known Visual 
Basic Script) attack was 
exploiting Wscript.exe to 
launch scripts that wrote 
malicious executables in 
other directories which self-
executed. 
Note: A more extensive malicious process analysis is undertaken in Chapter 6. 
4.4.4 System behaviours: The Windows 7 registry behaviours 
The registry can be thought of as a large database that saves a large number of 
settings, information, values and keys for the Windows operating system as well as 
the applications that are installed on the machine. Khanse (2011) states that the 
registry is the centralised configuration database for the Windows operating system 
and for the applications installed. This contains a set of files namely hives which 
makes the registry and are stored in the Windows\System 32\config directory. 
Registry keys can be entered and deleted and these form part of the registry monitor 
aspect of behavioural analysis. A registry key set is typically done by a process on a 
system: much like the file system it is process that writes a file, or in the case of the 
registry sets or deletes a value in the registry database. Unlike the file system 
however, the registry behaviours can sometimes be relatively difficult to classify as 
benign, malicious or grey. In order to identify malicious behaviour, firstly a malware 
analyst would have to check the pathway of the process writing values: if the process 
seems to be from the default location within the O.S. then that would signify a benign 
change.  
Secondly when attempting to classify behaviours maliciously: some known sections 
of the registry allow for a greater level of exploitation than others and therefore areas 
that are known to offer a greater level of control upon being compromised should be 
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approached with care. The sections that would control what start when a system 
reboots for instance can allow malware to add malicious scripts which would execute 
upon boot which is highly malicious behaviour. Thirdly, registry behaviours that are 
incredibly rare within a given dataset and show little to no similarity to known 
behaviours of the same nature should by default be marked malicious or grey. The 
reasoning here is that a malware analyst attempting to understand registry 
behaviours is more likely to benefit from a curious and risk-averse approach in order 
to allow for more occasions for the malware to manifest within the system.  
Moreover, registry behaviours tend to have a level of ambiguity within them as 
looking up what each section of the registry is for what purpose can sometimes yield 
more questions than answers. This is due to the fact that not every process and 
registry interaction is documented by the O.S..  Consequently, it is recommended 
that a large amount of testing and observation is required on a wide range of URLs 
to attempt to classify the unknown into possible malicious or possible benign.  In 
terms of using Capture-BAT, one limitation faced is that the behaviour analysing tool 
was unable to pick up the value of the key that was added or removed by a given 
process. Provided in the table below are some evaluations of registry behaviours. 
The full lists have been provided in the form of Capture-BAT exclusion list in the 
Appendix section B. In the tables created below, only the process name is given to 
improve readability, the genuine default path for a given process has been explored 
in the previous section and can additionally be viewed in section 4 of the Appendix in 
Table 4E: ‘Process and default path table’.  
One of the limitations of Capture-BAT is its inability to pick the value of the changed 
key. This means that some behaviours would be more difficult to classify as the 
values can indicate whether a particular set value behaviour is malicious or not. 
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However, by analysing the behaviours from visiting benign webpages, it is also 
possible to identify acceptable, normal and benign system behaviours which show 
no maliciousness. This in turn would allow an analyst to identify irregular and 
potentially malicious behaviour and overcome the limitations of Capture-BAT’s 
registry monitor.  
Keys: 
Set = SetValueKey behaviour 
Del=DeleteValueKey behaviour.  
.+ = Wildcard: any file name. 
Table 4.8: Examples of benign registry behaviours that can be filtered in 
behavioural exclusion lists.  
 Process Registry Path(s) edits Behaviour evaluation 
























Our chosen browser, Internet 
Explorer 8 was observed to 
have a large number of 
interactions within the registry 
ranging from system 
interactions such as setting 
language, new DOM cookies 
and if an application has 
recently used Direct3D, the key 
of that app will be included in 
the Direct3D section. Internet 
explorer also regularly interacts 
with the installed version of 
Flash Player. 
 
Internet Explorer 8 also saved 
recently searched words and 
addressed in the ItemCache 






Set mobsync.exe 1. HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\Software\\
Microsoft\\Windows 
Mobsync is a windows process 
to keep components updated 
and requires writes keys within 
the registry pathway. This was 
frequently observed within the 
Windows 7 environment whilst 
the system was relatively idle 
as visiting benign webpages 











































This registry path is used to 
store information about devices 
on the system. IT was observed 
that the pathway contains a 
folder that sometimes gets 
changed into a different set of 
string. This is highlighted and it 
is possible to use a wildcard in 
behavioural lists to exclude that 
particular folder. Enum tree 
within the registry is used by the 
Windows O.S. to change 
drivers and device installation 
components.  The full lists of 
these similar behaviour 
changes are far too long for this 
table but can be viewed in our 
created registry exclusion list 
situated in Appendix B. 
Wildcard examples are also 
used there due to the high 
volume of unique registry 
behavioural entries created 












Svchost.exe performs a wide 
range of operating system 
(benign) entries within the 
registry. Examples include 
managing (adding and deleting) 
certificates within the certificate 
store and the use of the 
ControlSet001 system 
configuration system containing 
information on services and 
device drivers (this is also done 
by services.exe).  















Windows 7’s Explorer.exe adds 
values in the three registry 
pathways. MuiCache and 
HomeGroup are functions 
native to the newer Windows 
and not seen in Windows XP. 
As long as Explorer.exe has not 
been compromised prior to 
observing set value keys, there 
is no evidence of the potential 
for maliciousness within these 
behaviours.  














It is acceptable and benign for 
Isass.exe which is the process 
that enforces the security policy 
on Windows to set keys the 
security files within the registry 
that store information on 
administrative user. (Non admin 
users typically have this section 
of the registry empty).  
 
It is reasonable to assume that 
Protected storage system 
provider can be written by a 
genuine isass.exe process as 
Isass.exe manages security 
policies.  
 
MuiCache is used as storage 
for application names and their 
versions. It was observed that 
isass.exe performs multiple set 
value keys in the multiple 
MuiCache directories.  (see 
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Windows 7 registry exclusion 
list in Appendix B for full list). 
These occurred frequently and 
were subjected to a wide range 
of variation.  
 
 









Benign process observed, in 
the second registry pathway, 
use of a wildcard is 
recommended as the folder 
after WPA inconsistently 







Windows 7 native process 
SearchProtocolHost is 
observed to regularly set 
registry keys in the local 
settings folder.  This does not 
seem risky or inherently 
malicious and therefore can be 













Thiese behaviours are very 
frequent similar to 
SearchProtocolHost -  Windows 





Table 4.9: Examples of registry grey, unknown and inconsistent behaviours 
that should within Windows 7.  














































This process is seen very 
frequently in Windows 7 
and whilst it’s genuine and 
relatively benign it is 
observed that these registry 
entries perform a large 
number of SetValueKey 
behaviours within the 
registry despite having no 
printer or fax connected or 
active within our analysis 
environment. The full list of 
registry pathways is 
available in the registry 
exclusion list within the 
Appendix. We chose to 
exclude this behaviour due 
to the large volume of data 
created in each log file. An 
example benign log file 
provided in parts of table 
4.0a and the Appendix B 
show these volumes. It is 
questionable however as to 
why is there so many 
behavioural activities 
triggered within this section 
of the registry upon each 
boot when there is no 
printer and fax connected or 













This behaviour occurred on 
our machine which runs 
capture. There is not much 
detail available on this 
particular behaviour. To 
make matters even more 
abstract, we observed this 
behaviour only 13 times in 
over 2 years of malware 
analysing, it was 
inconsistent with no 
apparent trigger. Whilst it 
does not seem malicious, 
the fact that it’s rather rare 





















The analysis machine 
contained real player 
however these behaviours 
with a large number of 
variants triggered way to 
inconsistently and incredibly 
rarely (twice for each 
registry pathway) which 
suggests anomalies. These 
behaviours should not 
manifest in machines which 




Registry keys that manage auto run each time a user is logged on a client machine. 
(Run once are deleted before the next run time, run contains entries that will always 
start upon login).  
Table 4.10: Examples of registry malicious behaviours that should be flagged 
up and investigated within Windows 7. 


















Similar to Windows XP, 
these file paths within the 
Windows 7 registry allow for 
the addition of start-up 
scripts and programs. 
Within a behavioural 
environment these settings 
should have been initially 
set and whilst web browsing 
these settings should not be 
altered. Therefore, any 
changes to the Run and 
Run Once directories are 
likely to be malicious and 









Changes in the Userinit 
section are highly 
undesirable as the Userinit 
controls actions that occur 
upon the machine log-on. 
This could be exploited to 
allow malicious scripts to 
run each time a machine is 
logged on for instance and 
thus all changes to the 
userinit section, similar to 
the run sections need to be 












Similar to the Run and 
RunOnce entries above, 
these control have the 
potential to exploit policy 
settings in order to allow 





run. Any changes here is 
likely to be malicious and 
should be reported and 










Values in this are executed 
by the explorer.exe process 
upon start up. Changes 
here therefore has the 
possibility of undesired 
scripts and programs being 
called by explorer.exe 
which is exploitable.  
Note: A more extensive malicious behaviour analysis for the registry is undertaken in 
Chapter 6. 
4.4.5 Differences between Windows 7 with Windows XP system calls 
Having explored a large number of benign behaviours and interactions that were 
observed on a Windows 7 environment, it is possible to explore differences in 
behaviour from Windows XP and Windows 7. This section will discuss and analyse 
the differences in behaviour between the two operating systems. This is an 
unexplored aspect of research within cyber security and may help security analysts 
and threat hunters in the decision making process of the  behaviour analysis 
environment design stage. Redstone et al. (2000) has analysed operating system 
behaviour on a simultaneous multithreaded architecture but their work focuses on 
modified Unix operating systems and do not provide insights on how different 
operating systems provide similar or different system calls. Stange (2015) discusses 
the detection of malware across operating systems but do not provide an expert-lead 
insight into operating system behaviours. 
The file system displayed the greatest amount of difference between Windows 7 and 
Windows XP. As discussed in section 4.4.1, Windows 7 (and above versions), 
introduced a few new directories. Firstly, the %SystemDrive%\ProgramData directory 
which can store data for any applications running within the system without the need 
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of administrative rights. In addition to the data stored by applications on the 
environment, Svchost.exe regularly write RSA keys in the ProgramData directory. 
Furthermore, SearchIndexer.exe saves a large amount of files ranging from .log, 
.gthr, .crwl, .chk and  .edb in that same folder. The effect of these additions 
increases the amount of behavioural interactions for file writes and being benign they 
subsequently would need to form part of an exclusion list.     
Comparatively within Windows XP, the application data was stored in 
%SystemDrive%\Documents and Settings\User’sName\Application Data\. This has 
an impact on a large number of behavioural writes and deletes: from the browser 
perspective, Internet Explorer (6) in Windows XP performs a large number of file 
writes and deletes for temporary files, history, cookies, user data, plugins, digital 
rights management which are stored within the ‘Document and Settings directory’. 
Any changes to the file system in another Operating System (or browser) would 
expectedly cause a system to generate a large amount of (benign) behavioural 
entries. Moreover, the system kernel (Known as ‘System’ in log files and exclusion 
lists) writes .log files and user data (.dat) within the same folder periodically. In 
comparison to Windows XP, Windows 7 web browser data is stored and manipulated 
within the user folder: 
%SystemDrive%:\Users\USER’sNAME\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\. This is 
also shared by other system services such as: CryptnetUrlCache meta data, content, 
temporary files and Windows defender logs. Naturally the inclusion of newer 
directories within Windows 7 resulted in even more behavioural interactions.   
Correspondingly, Firefox’s data within Windows 7 is stored in the 
%SystemDrive%:\Users\USER’sNAME\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\ 
folder. Patently, the migration to the user folder caused file writes and deletions for 
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the benign browser activities to be migrated over to the new user directory from the 
old document and settings directory in Windows XP. The user folder used in 
Windows 7 and above, also hosts additional files for applications such as 
Macromedia flash player. Windows XP lacked the HomeGroup function that is 
offered by Windows 7 which results in a few behavioural file writes by a Windows 7 
Svchost.exe in the user’s home group classifier folder. In conclusion, the differences 
between the respective file system’s default directories and the addition of multiple 
new storage folders causes a large amount of newer behavioural functions (file 
writes mostly but additionally a few file deletions) to be generated from a file 
system’s perspective.  
In terms of processes, Windows 7 had significantly more concurrently run processes. 
Exemplifications include: Windows 7 search processes (SearchProtocolHost.exe, 
SearchFilterHost.exe, SearchIndexer.exe) were being called from their respective 
default directories at idle. These indexing services immediately added at least three 
behavioural entries as they were ‘created’ upon boot up but should any of these 
process crash or are instructed to be closed by another running process, more 
behavioural interactions would be generated as the process was ‘terminated’ as 
labelled by Capture-BAT. 
Within both Operating systems, similarity in behaviour could be observed if the 
process location was kept within the same default directory. Services that manage 
.dll files in Windows such as dllhost.exe and taskhost.exe are called and executed at 
runtime in the background. This creates a behavioural entry on both O.S. i.e.: 
(taskhost.exe created C:\Windows\System 32\taskhost.exe) Task scheduler 
(tasking.exe), user processes (winlogon.exe and userinit.exe) were also executed 
upon boot-up as required by the O.S.. Some Windows 7 processes such as sdclt.exe 
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(Window’s 7 backup) and WerFault.exe (responsible for Windows error reporting) 
was observed to be triggering occasionally within Windows 7 and we did not observe 
any of these occasional behaviours in Windows XP.  To conclude, Windows 7 was 
calling more processes from their default start up location in each investigation. 
Visibly so, processes tend to be a lot less frequent in volume than file writes and 
deletes as it is often a single process that undertakes a large number of interaction 
with the file or registry system. They can be thought of as the bridges between either 
a file system or registry behaviour. As a final point, the older and retired service, 
namely Windows messenger (%SystemDrive%:\Program 
Files\Messenger\msmsgs.exe) is no longer present by default in Windows 7 
environments and it’s write and delete behaviours should be removed or excluded 
from Windows 7 exclusion lists to avoid malware masquerading.   
As explored in the registry’s behaviours, MuiCache stores executable names and 
versions. However, within the Windows XP environment, MuiCache is stored under 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache 
and within a Windows 7 environment (Vista onwards) the new registry directory is 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\LocalSettings\Software\Microsoft\Windo
ws\Shell\MuiCache.  Changes in registry locations from both XP and Windows 7 
means that any registry ‘Set Value Key’ and ‘Delete Value Key’ behaviours require 
migrating. In terms of system behaviour analysis, it was observed that there were a 
lot more MuiCache behaviours in the Windows 7 environment as opposed to the 
Windows XP environment which suggests that newer systems would benefit from 
having the range of exclusions required to avoid unnecessary behaviours. The 
introduction of the HomeGroup function in Windows 7 did add the recurring 
behaviour that a clean explorer.exe was adding cache values to the registry. Other 
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native Windows 7 processes which are not present in Windows XP, such as 
SearchProtocolHost.exe, SearchIndexer.exe are observed to frequently perform set 
key behaviours in the registry. Due to the sheer occurrence of this behaviour and 
lack of inherent maliciousness, the decision was made to flag this as benign within 
Windows 7.  
When compared the Windows 7’s Internet Explorer 8.0 were showing a small 
number of newer behaviours which the Windows XP’s Internet Explorer 6.0 registry 
browser activity were lacking. The introduction of MuiCache in the previous 
paragraph is one such difference. Furthermore, it was observed that mobsync.exe in 
Windows 7 environments was frequently performing Set Value Key behaviours within 
the SyncMgr directories within the registry. Document Object Model (DOM) storage 
was a new cookie storage feature in Internet Explorer 8 that was not present in the 
older version of Internet Explorer. Consequently, these behaviours would require 
further exclusions in a Windows 7 exclusion list that are inclusive mostly of setting 
value but there are additionally several deletions.  It is important to note that a large 
proportion of the registry behaviours from the two versions of Internet Explorer were 
similar as the default executable location for the browser was identical in both cases, 
(C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe).  
4.5 The development cycle of exclusion lists 
In order to create fresh exclusion lists for a new O.S., we needed Capture-BAT 
running on the given client. This would allow us to run tests on the client and these 
tests provided full, unsorted and unclassified lists of system behaviours. It is 
important to note at this stage that while at the time of the research Capture-BAT 
seemed suited to create behaviour filters due to being free, widely available and well 
established. The methodology and creation process for exclusion lists can be applied 
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to the more recently endorsed and popular dynamic behaviour analysing tools that 
support drive-by-download behaviour analysis such as Cuckoo sandbox 
(https://www.cuckoosandbox.org/).  
Figure 4.1 below shows the setup used to create the lab environment. The Capture-
BAT clients were used to visit real benign websites which were thoroughly tested in 
line with the proposed benign website choice methodology (Figure 4.3) and in our 
paper, Puttaroo et al. (2014). 
4.5.1 Environment set up 
In the two instances of Capture operating on a university network, Capture-BAT on 
Windows 7 was executed using Firefox and IE as browsers for the virtual machines. 
The data currently obtained from Capture-BAT is divided between process, registry 
and file system as log files. The current limitations of the systems running include: no 
network API monitoring and the inability to detect and capture ActiveX exploits as we 
don’t have the ActiveX components installed. The capture clients are set up to 
resemble client systems but by default have auto-updates on O.S., browser and 
applications turned off: this is to increase performance as the client systems would 
revert to their original state and be required to re-perform updates at every malicious 
webpage analysis tests. Figure 4.1 shows this setup.  
Using different versions of the O.S. has several implications with regards to the data 
obtained by Capture-BAT: over time a number of new behaviours would found as 
existing applications and operating system patches are applied. This is logical as it is 
reasonable to expect that with new patches and versions of applications new 
features are added and existing behaviours are sometimes changed. Additionally, 
software occasionally releases security fixes to patch vulnerabilities in programs and 
plugins which would mean after patching a number of exploits may no longer be 
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observed or malicious manifestations may differ. In terms of gathering data from a 
honeypot, it is recommended that automated updates are disabled.  
 
Figure 4.1: Capture-BAT experimental setup used to gather benign log files.  
Another issue with not disabling auto-update on applications, browser and O.S. 
would be:  Capture’s log files might flag updates of software as malicious if not well 
defined in exclusion lists resulting in possible false negatives. This would mean the 
requirement for a larger number of entries in an exclusion list’s application behaviour 
section which would require a long set-up time due to the nature of developing valid 
and accurate exclusion lists.   
In terms of the hardware and O.S. setup that was used in the research, a Dell 
Precision T1600 with 16 GB ram, i7 six core processor. This would run the Capture-
HPC server in Debian Squeeze. The Capture-BAT clients were run within 
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virtualisation, allocated 1 Ghz of processor power,1 GB ram (Oracle Virtual Box 7.0) 
and ran ‘clean’ copies of licenced Windows 7 ‘n edition’ Service Pack 1. In terms of 
Windows 7 updates installed in our Capture-BAT, Hotfix for windows (KB2534111) 
and update for Microsoft Windows (KB976902) was pre-installed on the system upon 
clean O.S. installation.  
 
 
Figure 4.2a: Interactions between Capture-HPC server and Capture-BAT 
clients.  
As shown in Figure 4.2a, the Capture-HPC server has the task of managing the 
capture clients: this involves a number of inputs and some automated outputs. Inputs 
would include a set of exclusion lists to be used by Capture-BAT clients when the 
Behaviour Analysis Tool (BAT) performs dynamic malware analysis, a set of URLs 
which are sent to Capture-HPC clients for analysis, as well as server controls such 
165 
 
as start, pause and stop. The server receives behavioural data in the form of log files 
and a copy of all modified or created files from capture BAT which is stored.  
It is important to note that the version of Capture we are using is a modified version 
by HoneySpider Network called Capture-HPC_NG. There are a few differences to 
the original version of Capture most notably, the ability for VirtualBox and KVM to be 
used as opposed to VMWare. There were some (unmentioned) changes to logging 
format as well (Honeynet Project Polish Chapter, 2012). 
Finally, In the interest of experiment replicability and malware experiment 
transparency: the utilised Capture-BAT settings are provided:  
 
Figure 4.2b: Capture-HPC’s configuration file (config.xml) for Capture-BAT. 
Internet Explorer 8 is utilised as the browser in Capture-BAT that visits potentially 
malicious websites. Google chrome may have been a better choice since it is 
currently the most widely used internet browser but we experienced issues with 
having Capture-BAT launch the URL using chrome despite using the correct 
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settings. Capture-BAT was configured with 90 seconds to visit a given webpage. The 
time of 90 second per URL was found ideal as tests in the next chapter found. 
Reasoning here was simply that there were no new behaviours found after 90 
seconds per page. This is tested in Chapter 3, where evidence is gathered from a 
small sample of data that suggests increases in intervals of 30 seconds do not affect 
the actual recorded gathered log file behaviour past the 90 second timer. The sheer 
volume of web pages that would undergo analysis would also justify this time choice. 
4.5.3 Created exclusion lists within a Windows 7 application profile 
Capture-HPC_NG comes with blank exclusion lists: exclusion lists have been 
developed and implemented from scratch for Windows 7 ‘n edition’ Service Pack 1, 
for both IE 8.0 and Firefox 29.01 on a clean O.S. running the following applications: 
Flash Player 12, Shockwave player 12, Java 7. Figure 4.3 shows the decision-
making process to determine benign behaviour. Benign behaviour here refers to the 
system events that occur to browser, O.S. and applications installed as a result of 
running a tested benign webpage.  
It is important to note that these tests should be carried out just before a chosen URL 
is run though Capture-BAT as there could be updates on a given website which 
could include new and poisoned advertisement streams. Any websites which arise 
uncertainty should be avoided at this stage as allowing malicious behaviours to be 
marked as benign would defeat the purpose of the exclusion list and allow similar 
malicious behaviours in subsequent analysis to be undetected. The methodology 
used is fairly self-explanatory: A sample of reasonably trustworthy websites are 
picked (the more behavioural analysis would mean more likely that the majority of 
system behaviours would be observed), analysed through multiple type of 
established malware analysers and the decision is made whether to use this as a 
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basis for understanding benign system behaviours when a client visits a website. It is 
recommended that a good range of websites should be picked specifically to include 
websites rich in web features. These can include videos, java and flash applications. 
The rationale behind this is simply to ensure that these rich features which 
undoubtedly would trigger file writes and possibly creation of relevant processes 
display their behaviour. These usual behaviours are expected behaviours and can 
be added in the exclusion lists as benign behaviours. A peer-reviewed paper was 
written and published on the development of Capture-BAT exclusion lists which 
included challenges and solutions. A copy of our cited paper can be viewed in the 
Appendix A.  
4.5.4 Limitations of behavioural filters 
The creation of behavioural filters can sometimes be quite subjective as a lot of 
behavioural exclusions are still unknown. These unknown exclusions refer to 
behavioural changes that occur in a system and limited knowledge is available as to 
what the effects of such changes are. An example of this would be: Internet Explorer 
adding registry entries but all that is given by a log file is a series of strings and 
numbers. Deciphering how a system was modified as a result of this change can 
often result in inconclusive results. This is often the case if the occurred change is 
not clearly displaying malicious behaviour and any potential benign behaviour is not 
documented by the browser/application or O.S. in question.  Some behaviours that 
are not always observed, cannot inherently be seen or classified as malicious and 
are not documented. These can be referred to as 'grey’ behaviour. Example log file 
behavioural entries are provided in Figure 4.0a, Figure 4.4 and log files in the 
appendix B. Consequently, the decision of the malware analyst to exclude these 
behaviours can also mean that exclusion lists would fail to detect certain exploits. It 
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is argued that it is therefore a requirement for a malware analyst to follow the good 
practice and guidance provided in the methodology when developing exclusion lists: 
more specifically if grey behaviour is observed they are not included in the exclusion 
list until a higher confidence level can be obtained.  
Finally, behavioural filters can require a large sample set of data to be analysed so 
that trends and new behaviours which are limited by time are given the opportunity to 
display when their conditions are met. In the created data sets, a number of these 
behaviours are found and these are discussed in the log file analysis section with 
potential solutions explored in the next chapters.  
4.7 Contributions to knowledge and key findings 
 The chapter undertook behavioural exploration within Windows 7: typical 
system behaviours for file system, processes and registry explored and 
classed as benign, ‘grey’ or malicious to aid in the decision-making process of 
understanding behavioural log files and the creation of filters. The labelled 
behaviours provides insight on the expectation of manifestation and typical 
activities undertaken by a type of behaviour. This is useful as it allows a log 
file analyst to classify a behaviour or filter out noise within log files. The latter 
enables the creation of filtered datasets whereby identification of malicious 
behaviour or anomalies is easier. Section 4.4.1-4.4.4. 
 Comparison of system calls between Windows 7 and Windows XP and the 
inclusion of Windows 7 native behaviours in the context of acceptable and 
benign behaviours. This is done in section 4.4.5 of Chapter 4.  
 Methodology for creating benign behaviour filters in the context of the initial 
interaction and system call when attempting drive-by-download analysis.  
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 Adaptation of Capture-BAT from a Windows XP environment to Windows 7 
environment: Example exclusion lists shared and published for Capture-BAT 
in the new environment, Windows 7.  
 The methodology provides knowledge of the development lifecycle of 
behavioural filters provided which can be applied to any sandbox or honeypot 
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Chapter 5 – Behaviour analysis environment experiments 
This chapter presents the findings from the experiments undertaken. The first 
experiment seeks to assess the efficiency of the created behavioural filters. This is 
necessary in order to measure and evaluate the performance of the behavioural 
filters that were created in the previous chapter. Secondly, in the interest of 
answering the research question on behavioural environments and how the 
application of critical patch alters system behaviour manifestation, an experiment is 
conducted.  
5.1 Assessing the efficiency of the created behavioural filters  
This section is written up in experiment format as an experiment is undertaken to 
measure the performance of the created behavioural filters. Created behaviour filters 
assessed within real world context provided the means to determine the efficiency of 
filters created. Efficiency in this context refers specifically to the percentage amount 
of benign behaviours that are blocked by a behavioural filter in comparison to the 
recording all behaviours regardless of behavioural type (malicious, grey and benign). 
5.1.1 Aim 
To evaluate efficiency of created exclusion lists by calculating the reduction in 
behavioural data of confirmed benign behaviour that is filtered using the behavioural 
filter. 
5.1.2 Hypothesis 
It is hypothesised that the created behavioural exclusion lists are very effective at 
filtering non-essential or benign behaviour.  
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5.1.3 Experiment description 
This experiment was tasked in comparing behavioural log files from visiting 3,011  
real-world and potentially malicious websites in August 2016. These behavioural logs 
were compared from two gathered datasets, the former with the created exclusion 
lists and the latter without exclusion lists. The purpose of this is to assess the 
efficiency of created exclusion lists in line with real-world drive-by-download analysis.  
Constant variable: 
 Capture-BAT: Environment: O.S., browser, applications including same 
versions as well as same software.  
 URLs that are visited must be the same.  
 Capture-HPC server and settings: Server version, configurations including 
same amount of allocated time per website interaction.  
Changing variables:  
 Log files that are filtered using created behavioural filters (exclusion lists) vs. 
unfiltered log files. 
5.1.4 Limitations & mitigations 
Only one Capture-HPC server was available: This means both drive-by-download 
analysis cannot be simultaneously executed at the same time. To keep the test fair 
as possible, batches of URLs were broken down into groups and each changing 
variable (E.g.: Same URLs with and without exclusion lists) were run subsequently. 
Additionally, it is not possible to control which Capture-BAT client gets to visit which 
website. This is typically problematic as the behaviour analysis tool should be 
constant for each analysis. However, the two Capture-BAT clients that were utilised 
for this experiment are identical clones with the only difference being their Media 
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Access Control (MAC) address and Private IP address. It is logical to assume that 
this should not adversely affect the behaviours in each Capture-BAT client and thus, 
this therefore means that the observed system behaviours should be identical. In 
order to endorse this assumption, a small scrambled sample of 100 known and 
confirmed benign URLs were executed two times on a single Capture-BAT client 
setup. This was done so that each Capture-BAT client has the ability to analyse the 
100 URLs at least once and there were no variations in the found behaviours 
between Capture-BAT clients.  
Testing on a live website also has limitations: malicious web servers are short lived 
and malware writers could have updated their web servers between analysis which 
would mean different behaviours being observed from the time of the first analysis to 
the second analysis. Therefore, in terms of malicious behaviours, it would be 
possible to see different maliciousness in the same URL analysis when analysed at 
different times. However, benign system behaviours should not really be affected by 
these changes to malicious web servers, which makes the experiment realistic and 
correct in terms of assessing the benign behaviour filtering efficiency within the 
presence of real-world, dynamic and malicious web servers.   
In order to replicate our results, it is important to note that there are limitations within 
real-world cyber security research: some malicious websites may be offline or have 
fully changed behaviours if analysed at a different date. Consequently, this would 
result in different observations from log file analysis accordingly, especially on the 
malicious behaviour perspective. Furthermore, it is possible to observe slight 
differences in behaviours if different Capture-BAT systems due to varying 
application, browser and O.S. versions or more static features such as the user 
name used within Windows 7. Controlling the application and O.S. versions are 
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within reach of replicability, however observing the exact behaviour is out of the 
researcher’s power. In order to provide full transparency of our results and mitigate 
some of the mentioned limitations to create exact reproducibility, which are beyond 
my control: all the data used in the experiment is made available freely and I provide 
a detailed Capture-BAT setup as well as the created Windows 7 exclusion lists. 
Moreover, in the available log file data in raw format, the date and time of analysis of 
each malicious URL analysed is listed, in line with transparency guidelines provided 
by prudent practices within malware experimentation (Rossow et al., 2012).  
5.1.5 Experimental set-up 
The exact same setup that was previously used to create exclusion lists is used with 
the only difference being the server is now hosted on an allocated router within a 
home network’s DMZ. This section of the network is secluded to the actual home 
network which additionally has a firewall in place to prevent malware propagation. 
Analysed malware interactions are therefore given full, unrestricted internet access 
and the Capture-BAT environments have a small virtual network between the 
Capture-HPC server which provides a bridge connection within Virtual Box to both 
Capture-BAT environments.    Full details about the Capture-HPC server, Capture-
BAT clients, their interactions, configurations and versions are documented in 
Chapter 4.5.1, in line with prudent guidelines by Rossow et al. (2012).  
5.1.6 Methodology & justification 
1. Analyse 3,011 URLs twice, once with exclusion lists and another without 
using the set-up discussed in Chapter 4.5.1.  
 Dynamic analysis requires a significant amount of processing time as 
this analysis is done in real time using real world visits to website and 
record behavioural interaction and thus the time between first and last 
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analysis should ideally be as close as possible (at least within 72 hours 
apart).   
2. Export behavioural data of Capture-BAT log files and create a list of unique 
behaviours for both sets. 
 This reduces the amount of behavioural data that would need to be 
individually analysed. This is important as the sheer volume of data 
that is gathered from real-world malware analysis is overwhelming to a 
malware behaviour analyst.   
3. Count frequency of unique behaviours.  
 This provides insight on which behaviours are most common and which 
are least common. This variable is important, especially for identifying 
‘standard’ or ‘regular’ system behaviour. Frequently observed 
behaviour (particularly if these behaviours are then again captured 
from analysing benign webpages) which do not inherently show any 
signs of maliciousness can often be classified as benign behaviour.  
4. Understand and label behavioural data (malicious & benign behaviours are of 
key interest: grey behaviours are ambiguous and inconclusive at times). 
 It is imperative that all benign behaviours are labelled as this would 
give the indication as to the amount of behaviours that exclusion lists 
are filtering. This would provide the statistics necessary for the 
evaluation of exclusion lists and their efficiency, thus proving or 
disproving the hypothesis.  
 Gathering malicious behaviours would provide insights on how the 
client system was attacked on different occasions which may provide 
variations in attacks that is of keen interest to a malware analyst. 
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5. Compare behaviours: 
 Benign behaviour in each dataset would provide an indication of the 
amount that is being filtered. 
 Counting frequency of behaviours in both datasets allows the 
quantification of how well or unwell exclusion lists responded to 
behavioural filtering. 
 If there are significantly higher malicious data in the unfiltered list, it 
would be subject to further full log file and attack investigations as there 
would be a requirement to understand if the exclusion lists were 
wrongly filtering malicious behaviours or if external factors affected the 
malicious behaviour outcome. However, there were not more malicious 
behaviours detected in the unfiltered dataset.  
 
Figure 5.1: Overview of methodology used to calculate behavioural reduction 
in filtered exclusion list dataset. 
Run 3,011 URLS in 
Capture-BAT twice: 
(with and without 
exclusion lists) using 
same URL and 
experimental setup.
Export behavioural data 
from all log files in two 
behavioural databases: 
Filtered alpha set vs 
unfiltered beta set.
Count and process  
behaviours in each list: 
Create unique 
behavioural lists and 
count frequency.
Behavioural analysis: 
label behaviours: grey 
vs benign vs malicious.
To test the hypothesis: 
compare benign 
behaviours between 
both sets and calculate 
the percentage 




The results from the data capture of both changing variables are presented here. As 
this experiment is attempting to quantify the efficiency of exclusion lists, it is 
expected that filtered log files would have significantly less behaviours and log files 
altogether. Filtered log files which do not contain any potentially malicious 
behaviours found by the exclusion list are not created by Capture-BAT as the URL is 
marked as benign.  Fully benign URL analysis in filtered Capture-BAT therefore does 
not create log files for a given analysis. This is the rationale behind the filtered 
dataset having less log files than the unfiltered list.  
Alpha dataset overview: 
 Capture-BAT created 112/3,011 potentially malicious filtered log files. 
 Total of 17,018 behaviours within the dataset.  
o 16,102 of alpha dataset’s total behaviours were benign. 
 Consisting of 209 unique behaviours within the dataset 
Beta dataset overview:  
 Capture-BAT created 3,011 /3,011 potentially malicious un-filtered log files. 
 Total of 703,721 behaviours within the dataset.  
o 696,000 of beta dataset’s total behaviours were benign. 
 Consisting of 3,173 unique behaviours within the dataset.  
Table 5.1: Comparison if goodware behaviour from Alpha and Beta datasets.  
Behaviour type Alpha Beta  Difference Filter reduction(%) 
File system write 13118 476519 463401 97.25% 
File system delete 480 29405 28925 98.37% 
Process creation 65 3424 3359 98.10% 
Process termination 22 244 222 90.98% 
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Registry set key 2215 174284 172069 98.73% 
Registry delete key 202 12124 11922 98.33% 
Total benign 16102 696000 679898 97.69% 
Average (Ex total) 96.96% 
 
Average of filter reduction excluding total = 96.96  
 
Figure 5.2: The percentage reduction in benign behaviour per behaviour type 
from using exclusion lists in Windows 7 Capture-BATs. 
5.1.8 Conclusion 
Having created exclusion lists to adapt Capture-BAT to a Windows 7 environment, 
there was a requirement to test the effectiveness of behaviour filtering that the 
exclusion lists were developed for. Accessing the efficiency of the exclusion lists 
would provide insight into how effective or ineffective the filter performed during real-
world drive-by-download analysis. As the exclusion lists were created based on a 
large sample of benign webpages (~around unique 1000 benign URLs and several 
re-tests), the hypothesis was that exclusion lists would be highly effective at filtering 
benign and normal system behaviours. The experiment procedures were simply to 
















Effeciency of exclusion list filtering benign behaviours
179 
 
recorded both times: once with the usage of our Capture-BAT exclusion lists and the 
second, without exclusion lists. With the exception of timing and the usage of 
exclusion lists, variables such as environment version, applications, URLs, Capture-
HPC server and Capture-BAT were kept identical to ensure fair and prudent malware 
experimentation.  In terms of safety, this experiment was undertaken in on separate 
network dedicated for the Capture-HPC server and the two Windows 7 based 
Capture-BAT clients. Additionally, after each behavioural analysis a full revert of 
changes undertaken in the Capture-BAT environment were undertaken to ensure a 
constant and identical state was available for the next test in addition to wiping out 
any possible infections from malware.  
As the assessment, here is purely focused on the ability of exclusion lists blocking 
known benign system behaviours, the occurrence of behaviours (referred to as the 
count or behavioural frequency) is arguably a good measure for observed behaviour 
quantity. This is because within dynamic behavioural analysis, it is observed often 
that a large percentage of behaviours are regular system behaviours which are 
present even in malicious dynamic behavioural analysis. These are in fact normal 
goodware behaviour that gets manifested regardless the presence of malware or 
not. By calculating the frequency of behavioural occurrence, it is possible to calculate 
and observe the effect that exclusion lists have on filtered log files. A large 
percentage in reduction of behavioural data is highly desired as this would allow a 
malware analyst to focus attention on malicious behaviours as well as unknown 
‘grey’ behaviour during system interactions. Additionally, it is logical to assume that 
datasets absent large volumes of redundant, noise data would likely result in 
significantly more accurate classification and clustering.   
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In conclusion, the results for benign behaviours proved that the created behavioural 
exclusion lists reduce the amount of benign behaviours in total by 96.96%. Within 
each category there does not seem to be major differences as the percentage 
decrease for each behaviour was roughly the same. The only minor exception to this 
is the process termination behaviour which seemed to have the least difference 
(90.98% as opposed to an average of 97.06%). Within both datasets, benign 
process terminations tend to have a slightly larger variety of unique behaviours due 
to the Process Identifier (ID) being included by Capture-BAT. The inclusion of 
process IDs within behavioural analysis simply creates more unique behaviours as a 
result which causes a slight limitation within Capture-BAT if a particular behaviour 
has taken place. This behaviour is the termination of an unknown process by 
Services.exe and has a raw value frequency of 14. Should this have been included 
in the created exclusion list, process termination the percentage reduction for 
process termination would be much closer and in line with other behaviours at 
96.72%. 
Each behavioural category within the alpha dataset showed a huge decrease in 
behaviours within the log files that were gathered. Having this result is promising as 
this means that the created exclusion lists succeeded in achieving the identified 
goals in section 4.3. At least 96.96% of all identified, confirmed benign and normal 
O.S. system calls were not present in the filtered dataset, thus effectively reducing 
the volume of behaviours that a malware behaviour analyst would need to look at. 
Secondly, within the analysed 3,011  URLs, malicious behaviours were identified and 
formed part of several log files. These log files in the filtered experiment, contained 
only behaviours that were new and not present in the exclusion list with the exclusion 
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of all normal O.S. system calls. This showed once again that created exclusion lists 
were able to further meet the set goals of successful behavioural exclusion lists.  
5.1.9 Evaluation 
A key aspect of this experiment was to test the effectiveness of the created 
behavioural filters by measuring the amount of known benign behaviour whilst 
analysing real-world potentially malicious websites. The approach undertaken was a 
computing-intensive method that required dynamic analysis of webpages at least 
twice. An alternative and less process-intensive method could have been to run 
Capture-BAT without exclusion lists once and use behavioural filters to identify which 
benign behaviours would be filtered out.  The secondary approach would be more 
suited to the task should the aim have been to query the knowledge within 
behavioural filters. This approach would have also resulted in the assumption that 
our behavioural filters would actually filter a given benign behaviour as opposed to 
performing real-world experimentation and observing definite, non-theory crafted 
results. By undertaking the more computer-intensive approach, the margin of human 
error and the level of bias from a malware analyst’s judgement would be kept to a 
minimum. Capture-BAT sorts benign from malicious behaviours from a list of set 
principles. To elaborate:  if a given behaviour is not listed in an exclusion list’s ignore 
sections, no matter how small or insignificant the variation, it would be marked as 
malicious. In comparison, small variations (such as single character file path 
variations) could arguably be missed by a malware researcher and would have to be 
accounted for in log file analysis scripts.  
In addition to this, real-world adaptation of the exclusion lists would have the 
opportunity to be tested: this is important as within cyber security and malware 
analysis, known working lab experiments always have the potential perform much 
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worst in real-world scenarios as agreed by the prudent practices for malware 
experiment designing by Rossow et al. (2012). By running the experiment within 
real-world context generalisations are avoided as it is possible to observe real-world 
performance.  Finally, running analysis multiple times on the same domains at 
different time frames should be actively encouraged as often malware writers change 
exploits or reboot and modify exploits. Tanaka & Goto (2016) show this is the case in 
their dataset of 43,000 malicious websites where 10% of their ‘changed occasionally’ 
category had malicious websites revival over 15 times. These rational together with 
the potential of being able to discover a deeper insight into actual malicious 
behaviours supported the decision-making process. Positively, this proved to be the 
case as in addition to finding the percentage reduction in benign behaviours within 
filtered exclusion lists, a specific domain was found to project two initially similar 
behaviours but in both occasions, different system components were targeted. 
Observed malicious attacks were identified in each dataset which suggests that 
created exclusion lists did not inherently impacted negatively on capture. Malicious 
behaviour analysis on this case in undertaken in the next chapter.   
This experiment was conducted towards the end of September 2016, showing that 
the exclusion lists are still fairly efficient (average 97% reduction) at filtering 
goodware behaviour. 
5.2 Understanding how analysis environment changes different versions of an 
operating system 
In this section, the work is focused on answering the research question: are there 
significant key behaviours that manifest differently in an analysis environment if the 
operating system has various levels of patches?  This is an important design 
consideration as the proposed methodology requires behavioural filters to be tailored 
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specifically for the actual analysis environment that will be used to capture potentially 
malicious interactions. This is justified in the risk-averseness approach within design 
required to minimise the risk of potentially malicious behaviours to be filtered out by 
created expert driven behavioural filters. The experiment seeks to identify key 
differential behaviours as this would provide knowledge of their existence and 
support the risk-adverseness nature of the proposed methodology to create expert 
driven behaviour filters.  
5.2.1 Aim 
The aim of this experiment is to understand how the behaviour observed in malware 
analysis environment behaviours differ from a clean Service Pack 1 (SP1) Windows 
7 O.S. to fully patched Windows 7 O.S. which includes both critical and security 
patches released by Microsoft as of August 2016.  
5.2.2 Hypothesis 
1. It is hypothesised that there would be significant behaviours additions within 
the behavioural environments as numerous critical patches within Windows 7 
was applied.   
 Core processes such as svchost.exe control a large amount of 
behavioural interactions and if the new patches do not introduce a 
large amount of core processes, it is likely that there will be some new 
unique system calls introduced in the applied 164 critical and security 
patches. The reasoning behind the minor changes in behavioural 
environment is justifiable as new patches within operating systems 
often can include diverse ways to perform existing tasks or perform 
new tasks. Modification of existing tasks and creation of new tasks 
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would undoubtedly result in new behaviours manifesting within the 
environment regardless.  
2. It is hypothesised that due to a large number of patches being installed on the 
patched Windows 7 analysis environment, it is likely that a larger amount 
(frequency) of the unique behavioural interactions may be observed. This 
refers to the amount of times a given unique behaviour is observed.  
 The justification here is again in line with the potential of new behaviour 
and the likelihood that a large number of patches would likely increase 
the amounts of observable behaviour.  
5.2.3 Experiment description 
This experiment seeks to identify key behaviours that are occurring in the instance of 
an updated Windows 7 behaviour analysis environment. In order to identify these 
new behaviours, there was a requirement to observe the system calls that executed 
in an unpatched Windows 7 environment.  Findings are of crucial importance when 
designing and creating analysis environments as further insight were gained from 
studying benign and newly introduced behavioural interactions. Furthermore, should 
the hypothesis be proven: insights on how analysis environments can provide 
different results may be synthesised. Finally, this experiment reinforces existing 
knowledge where different versions of the same operating system behaves 
differently. 
To describe the experiment as a summary: Windows 7 SP1 with no updates 
Capture-BAT clients were cloned and updated fully to September 2016 critical 
updates. Existing and un-updated Capture-BAT environments and the newly 
updated Capture-BAT clients performed analysis on the same set of benign URLs. 
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Benign behaviour of each type of Capture-BAT clients were then analysed and 
differences in behaviour investigated and evaluated.  
Constant variable:  
 In addition to the main variables discussed, chosen benign URLs that are 
visited must be the same domains.  
 Capture-HPC server and settings: Server version, configurations including 
same amount of allocated time per website interaction.  
 Capture-BAT analysis environment: applications, browser (IE8).  
Changing variables:  
 Capture-BAT analysis environment: Windows 7 O.S. version: Un-updated 
Windows 7 Service pack 1 vs fully updated Windows 7 Service pack 1 for 
critical patches.  The full list of applied patches utilised in the experiment is 
available in Appendix C to provide full experimental transparency.  
5.2.4 Limitations & mitigations 
 Time: websites can often change behaviour as they are updated, for this 
experiment to be a fair test there should be no more than 72 hours between 
first and second analysis. This is more applicable for malicious websites 
however, but there is still a distinct possibility which can mean the chosen list 
of benign URL could have been altered. However, if the behaviour observed 
is still benign, this is unlikely to have an impact on what Capture-BAT 
classifies as malicious.  
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5.2.5 Experimental set-up 
Two cloned and fully identical Capture-HPC servers with different Windows 7 
Capture-BAT environments were needed and created using the same experimental 
setup used in section 4.6.5 of the thesis with the exception here being no exclusion 
lists were used in the process to identify varying behaviours in both datasets.  It is 
important to ensure that clones were used for both the Capture-BAT and Capture-
HPC server to ensure a high confidence level of identical settings, software version 
and application system calls.  
A sample of 800 benign URLs were analysed in two different Capture-BAT 
environments: a fully patched Windows 7 environment with all the critical windows 7 
patches installed and an unpatched Windows 7 environment from a default SP1 
copy.  
5.2.6 Methodology & justification 
This experiment seeks to answer, ‘How does applying Windows 7 operating system 
critical patches affect the benign interactions undertaken in an analysis 
environment?’ There was therefore a requirement to create two analysis labs: one 
patched and an unpatched version. By performing analysis on the same list of URLs 
in a similar time frame, it was possible to create specific datasets for each analysis 
environment. These two analysis environments were hypothesised to have different 
system calls and the captured behaviour from both datasets can be compared. 
Differences and newly observed behaviour from either type of analysis environments 
can be quantified and assessed, which lead to findings on actual real-world 
behavioural changes in analysis environments. As this method controls the factors 
that may affect the results, including: analysis environment, URLs visited and keeps 
the same list of enabled start-up services and applications it is fair to state that the 
187 
 
results obtained were correct, transparent and accurate. In terms of safety, this 
particular analysis used confirmed benign webpages which underwent thorough 
testing, utilising the proposed benign website picking methodology introduced in 
section 4.5.2 in Figure 4.3. In addition to this, the same safety precautions discussed 
in chapter 3 are applied for further confidence relying upon defence in depth.  
In terms of analysing the data: behaviour filtration was a required activity in this 
experiment. Initially before the behaviours were compared, behaviours within log 
files that were shared by both datasets were filtered out. The purpose of the 
experiment was to identify key behaviours that are significantly different between 
patched and unpatched Windows 7 systems.  Having similar behaviours that are 
present in both sets and are 100% identical therefore adds additional noise in the 
dataset as they did not help the assessment of the hypothesis.  In order to do this, 
only full matches in behavioural entries were compared from both sets.  Identical 
unique behaviour would then need to be removed before analysis of each 
behavioural datasets is conducted. This was carried out using an exact string match 
function that looked for exact matches of a given behaviour in the unpatched dataset 
and then this would be compared with all other behavioural entries in the patched 
dataset. Exact matches present in both datasets were then excluded. The purpose is 
to perform investigation upon differences between behaviours that are not co-
existent in both data sets making this process of crucial importance, especially due 
to the large volumes of behavioural data contained.  
In terms of sample size evaluation, the nature of the test is aimed at studying the 
normal system behaviours.  800 benign URL tests were carried out in each 
behaviour analysis environments. This figure should be more than sufficient to 
provide a good overview of constant and regular system behaviours. It is important 
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to note that the visitation of benign webpages has been observed beforehand and it 
is typically it is very rare for new behaviours to be observed as there is a level of 
regularly occurring system behaviours that can be observed in a benign behaviour 
test dataset.  If this experiment was aimed at identifying malicious behaviour 
changes, it is fair to say that the figure of 800 would not be fully representative of the 
real-world outlook. However, the two main reasons listed here justifies the figure of 
800 being reasonably sufficient for the purposes of answering the patch and 
unpatched behaviour analysis environment research question which relies on 
datasets that are not poisoned by maliciousness.  
5.2.7 Results 
The results show that the patched analysis environment had over 5 times more 
behavioural interactions than the unpatched Windows 7 dataset. There were 
significant differences between the system calls experienced in both analysis 
environments. The result’s section of the experimental writeup was written from the 
perspective of the process that is undertaking (or executing) a given system call. The 
presence in respective datasets are identified and unique, observable behaviours 
are evaluated in light of answering the hypothesis. The behaviours that were of 
interest are predominantly the ones that are not observed at all in the unpatched 
dataset as these behaviours are the ones that provide direct insight on newly 
observed system calls within patched Windows 7.  
Keys: 
 ~ = Grouped similar unique behaviours.  
Green = Identical behaviours shared between both post unique behaviour filtering. 
Red = Native behaviours to either patched or unpatched. 
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Grey = Observed anomaly behaviour: behaviours that were too rare to be considered 
as discovered differences between patched and unpatched datasets. 
It was observed in the patched dataset that Sppsvc.exe which is responsible for 
download, installation and enforcement of digital licences was executed by 
services.exe multiple times. The design of Capture-BAT’s log files for process 
behaviours can inaccurately represent processes as a created or terminated process 
is given a process identifier. This identifier contains a process ID which is added into 
the log files for processes. The impact of this caused multiple unique entries (59) 
with a frequency of 309 times in the patched dataset. In comparison, the same 
process interaction was limited to 12 unique entries and observed 32 times within log 
files from the unpatched dataset. In terms of behaviour analysis, as the behaviour of 





In this example, it is evident that services.exe is creating a Sppsvc.exe process in 
each case but the process ID is different. As this process identifier is unique only to 
the process field in Capture-BAT log files, as part of transforming the dataset we 
assume the behaviours are similar despite minor variations (different process 
identifier) within log files. It is reasonable and feasible to ignore unique variants of 
the same behaviour as they are essentially the same behaviour manifesting in 
different instances. This therefore leaves us with the comparison of the frequency as 
the same number of websites were analysed in both datasets. From the results, it is 
suggested that the updated dataset experienced this particular behaviour 9.6 times 
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more than the unpatched Windows 7 Capture-BAT instance.  Furthermore, this 
particular process had numerous interactions with the windows registry and file 
system writes in the patched dataset which was not observed at all in the unpatched 
dataset. Specific behaviours are listed below and it would appear that file system 
behaviours of write were very frequent whilst registry interactions from a benign 
Sppsvc.exe was rare and limited to a single section of the registry. As the table 
below shows, sppsvc.exe was constantly writing log files and the system folders 
within the Windows 7’s System32 directory. The high occurrence present in the log 
file suggests that this is a difference in behaviours from patched to unpatched 
Windows 7 analysis environments.  
Table 5.2: Additional observed behaviours for Sppsvc interactions present 
only in the patched dataset.   



















Svchost.exe process was found to have a few groups of similar behaviour.  In this 
context, similar behaviour refers to behaviour that isn’t identical due to variations in 
the behavioural entry but essentially is observed to be performing the same action. 
For instance, a different folder name is used at one point in the behavioural 
interactions. Results from svchost.exe process interactions are presented in 5.3 
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below.  In the unpatched dataset, these groups which were controlled by 
Svchost.exe displayed sets of three main behaviours: Svchost.exe creating and 
terminating mobsync.exe, writing (.etl) log files in drifted windows 32 system 
directory folders (401 unique but similar  and 1203 total count) and writing 
Cryptneturl content files in the user directory. On rare occurrences, it was observed 
that Svchost.exe had 3 unique registry SetValueKey entries of a single frequency in 
the WBEM directory of the registry. These incredibly low occurrences of this 
particular behaviour are anomalies which dynamic (real-world) analysis can 
sometimes capture. While causations of anomalies behaviours are beyond the scope 
of this work it is important to identify them so they are not included in the list of 
behaviours which differ from the patched and unpatched dataset.  
In contrast to this, the patched Windows 7 setup was observed to have a higher 
sheer volume of behavioural interaction for Svchost.exe. However, the quantity of 
occurrence alone does not help identification of the key benign behaviours that are 
manifested. Further investigation in observed behaviours concluded with three native 
behaviour groups for Svchost.exe (outlined in red in the table below) that was 
present only in the patched Windows 7 version. Recent file cache logs seem to be 
monitored and edited frequently. Windows driver install was triggering at every 
analysis and in comparison, to the unpatched system, there were  large amounts of 
unique registry entries that added values in the object table part of the registry done 
by Svchost.exe.  
Table 5.3: Comparison of Svchost process interactions in patched and 






~Writing .etl files in System 32 1686 1203 
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Writing recent file cache log 548 0 
~Writing CryptnetUrlCache metadata 22 28 
~Created / terminated mobsync.exe 21 57 
~Registry WBEM transports set keys 0 3 
~Created / terminated drvinst.exe 2540 0 
~Object table set registry keys 1839 0 
Registry WBEM last service start set key 1 0 
Registry Audio policy config set key 1 0 
 
The Internet Explorer process (iexplore.exe) interactions was observed in both 
datasets and other than having almost double Windows Error Reporting files being 
written, there were no significant differences observed during the analysis of 800 
benign URLs.  






~Writing and deleting Flash Player .sxx files 96 60 
~Writing Windows error reporting files in user 
folder 2922 1386 
~Clearing .dat files in user IE folder 2 0 
~Adding registry keys in session filter 2 5 
Writing DAT files in user directory 1 0 
Adding registry keys notifying completion of 
download 1 0 
Adding registry keys in Admin Active 
recovery  1 0 
Deleting .dat files in user directory 2 0 
 
Table 5.5: Services.exe behavioural interactions in both datasets. 





~Executes and terminates sppsvc.exe and 
wsqmcons.exe 333 49 
Writes system.log1 in System 32 folder 59635 0 
~Writes folder in System 32 folder 60073 0 
 
Table 5.6 Taskhost.exe behavioural interactions in both datasets.  
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Writing .tmp file in program data 
directory  12 12 
 
In addition to the discussed differences that were observed between both datasets, it 
was observed that the patched Windows 7 behavioural environment had a number of 
native system calls. One such example is the triggering of Windows 7’s Rundll32.exe 
process which executed and terminated dinotify.exe 402 times. Rundll32.exe was 
observed to manifest with multiple deletion of keys in the registry as shown in Table 
5.7 below.  
Table 5.7: Patched behavioural environment showing unique Rundll32.exe 
interactions. 
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exeDeleteValueKeyHKCU\Software\Microsof
t\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName-1 298 
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exeDeleteValueKeyHKCU\Software\Microsof
t\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass-1 298 
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exeDeleteValueKeyHKLM\SOFTWARE\Micr
osoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName-1 298 
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exeDeleteValueKeyHKLM\SOFTWARE\Micr
osoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass-1 298 
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exeSetValueKeyHKCU\Software\Microsoft\W
indows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\AutoDetect-1 298 
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exeSetValueKeyHKCU\Software\Microsoft\W
indows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\UNCAsIntranet-1 298 
 
Dinotify.exe and Drvinst.exe (previously identified above) are both related processes 
controlling the installation of device drivers in the Windows 7 environment. Further 
behavioural interactions were observed in the patched dataset which were 
consequently captured as a result of the same types of process interaction. 
Drvinst.exe performed a number of similar registry set and delete interactions. These 
are available in Appendix C and were registry entries that controlled device driver 
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information that is held within the Windows 7 registry. Out of all the registry 
interaction inclusive of with Drvinst.exe, it was noticed that setting MuiCache 
language set value was often triggered (4665). While this path often is accessed by 
other services such as Iexplore.exe or Explorer.exe, it was observed that this 
particular process was adding values in the patched dataset. Finally, the process 
Drvinst.exe also wrote log files within the C:\Windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log-1 multiple 
times (467) which was not present in the unpatched Windows 7 dataset.  
A few unknown behavioural interactions were observed natively in the patched 
dataset. The system was recorded to be adding registry entries within volume 
shadow copy service. Unfortunately, the lack of information about the values being 
added meant this behaviour could not easily be classified initially. Further 
investigation revealed that this technology is an included and benign service that 
runs in Windows which manages snapshots of computer files and volumes and is 
often used to create shadow copies of services. Windows backup was disabled on 
the client machines (both patched and unpatched datasets). This makes the 
discovery of these behavioural interaction in the patched dataset interesting and 
noteworthy and useful for creation of exclusion lists aimed at patched Windows 7 
honey clients.  










Finally, the remainder of observed behaviours that were native to the patched 
Windows 7 analysis environment had a number of varying processes. The single 
occurrence of each behaviours suggests that these behaviours are rare and not 
regularly seen (as they only flagged up once in 800 benign webpage analysis). 
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Table 5.9: Rare and native behaviours observed within patched Windows 7 





















The main aim of the experiment was to identify the differences in behaviour that 
could be observed from a patched Windows 7 behaviour analysis environment in 
comparison to an unpatched environment. The created hypothesis is proven to be 
true as the lists of behaviours available in the results section show that there are 
several entries of new and unique behavioural interaction in the patched Windows 7 
dataset. Core processes including Sppsvc.exe, Svchost.exe, Rundll32.exe and 
Services.exe were found to be the processes that had the most amount of new and 
unseen behavioural interactions when comparing between patched and unpatched 
dataset was undertaken. Furthermore, it was observed that the exclusively executed 
system calls in the patched dataset were often occurring very frequently upon the 
analysis of benign websites. Examples of specific behaviours that are only observed 
in the patched Windows 7 behaviour analysis environment are presented in the 
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result section and quoted here for illustration purposes: Sppsvc.exe wrote log files 
386 times during the analysis of 800 websites. Svchost.exe wrote recent file cache 
log 548 times, created and terminated drivinst.exe processes 2540 times and had a 
total of 1839 entries in the object table field of the registry. Services.exe wrote logs 
59,653 times in the system 32 folder within Windows 7. These specific behaviours 
were not observed at all within the unpatched Windows 7 and therefore contributed 
to the conclusion that they were native to the patched Windows 7 system. 
Undoubtedly, finding these specific behaviours mean that there are significant 
changes between unpatched and patched datasets in terms of observable 
behaviours. In this case, significant changes refer to two core aspects of observed 
behaviour: frequency of observed behaviour and behavioural uniqueness. The 
frequency simply is a count of occurrence of a particular behaviour while the 
behavioural uniqueness observes new behaviour.  
One of the core procedures of comparing the datasets involved finding out which 
behaviours were not shared between both datasets. This task additionally meant that 
a large amount of noise was removed. In order to create these lists, string/text 
comparison formulae were used to compare each behaviour in the unpatched 
dataset with the patched dataset. Upon identification, these behaviours were studied 
and mapped into behavioural groups which were generated by the process that 
initiate the system call.  The created groups were then thoroughly analysed in both 
unpatched and patched Windows 7 datasets as discussed in the results section. It is 
important to note that every observed behaviour that was native to a single dataset 
was assessed during this analysis stage. All new behaviours that were identified 
were then flagged accordingly. The flagging process would assign a colour 
appropriate to a specific, unique and observed behaviour. These then meant that 
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concrete evidence could be gathered from the grouped system calls in terms of 
relevant differences between unpatched and patched Windows 7 analysis 
environments.  
In terms of the second hypothesis, regarding the higher volume of observed benign 
behavioural interactions in the patched Windows 7 system: it is concluded that this 
was the case in the majority of processes present in the unpatched dataset, 
effectively proving the hypothesis.  Evidence of this can be observed in the results 
provided: the unpatched set had a total of 1386 Windows Error Reporting system 
calls and the patched Windows 7 analysis environment had 2922 of the same 
system calls, which is 2.1 times more than the unpatched set. Flash player file 
manipulation was triggered 60 times in the unpatched dataset whereas the in the 
patched dataset it was triggered 96 times. Both small scale and large scale 
Svchost.exe interactions were found to be significantly higher in the patched data 
set. Small scale grouped interactions such as Svchost.exe writing snapshot log files 
are triggered 1203 times in the unpatched dataset and 1686 times within the patched 
dataset.  Full process interaction for the major process, Svchost.exe had a total of 
6658 occurrences in the patched dataset in comparison to 1253 in the unpatched 
dataset, clearly supporting the hypothesis from multiple process interaction 
perspectives. It is important to note that these finding offer perspective over the 
observed behavioural interactions on the analysis labs that was created based on 
Windows 7. These behavioural quantities are likely to differ in other analysis labs 
which use different versions of applications and operating system. The quantity of 
observed behaviour is an important metric within this research as this provides 
indications on two core aspects: firstly, exclusion list efficiency can be measured and 
secondly, it is often a safe metric to use in behaviour labelling when a behaviour is 
199 
 
observed. Frequently observed behaviour in known, uninfected from malicious web 
exploits and clean systems allows a malware analyst to classify the behaviour as 
benign which subsequently can be added to behavioural filters. Alternatively, rare 
behaviours can be viewed as anomalies that would require further investigation 
before any knowledge is concrete.  
From undertaking of this experiment, it is fair to conclude that the results provided 
further evidence of the need for exclusivity in the creation of filters for different 
behavioural environments. The justification behind this claim is backed up by the 
significant differences in behaviour that benign and well established processes were 
exhibiting. For instance, the results showed that Services.exe was performing a lot 
more log file writes in a patched Windows 7 dataset in comparison to the unpatched 
version where this behaviour was not captured.  Whilst experimental prudence 
requires not generalising results observed, it is fair to conclude that in the case of the 
experiment undertaken: operating system behaviour was significantly different with 
the application of critical and security patches within the Windows 7 environment.   It 
is likely that different versions of software installed upon the analysis environment 
would result in significantly different behaviour which would require specialised and 
personalised filters. It is not new knowledge that when it comes to behavioural 
environments, the creation of tailored exclusion lists that are created for a specific 
analysis environment is a requirement. The findings of this experiment are in line 
with this existing knowledge as the results section showed two versions of operating 
system having different system calls. 
5.2.9 Evaluation 
The assessment of the hypothesis undertaken was successful. This is because the 
created methodology when applied to the experiment allowed the creation of two 
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datasets which when analysed proved to have significant differences thereby proving 
the hypothesis. In addition to this, the experiment was closely monitored and 
controlled: external factors which would affect the experiment’s correctness of 
dataset such as hardware, virtual machine configurations, benign website URL lists, 
application versions, browser version, start-up programs and Windows 7 
configurations were kept identical in both instances of analysis labs. This practice is 
in line with the correctness of data aspect of the prudent experimental framework 
discussed in chapter 3. To ensure correctness of data, the benign website picking 
framework created in Chapter 4, was used to select benign URLs and at the time of 
analysis, none of the chosen URLs displayed any signs of being compromised within 
12 hours before analysed in the high interaction client honeypot.  
The only condition that was changed, was the Windows 7 updates that was applied 
in each case and this was the changing variable which would provide observable 
knowledge when behaviour of the environment analysis was undertaken. In addition 
to these, the decision of running these experiments without created behavioural filter 
was made. This decision meant that observable benign behaviours would be in great 
abundance in the created log files as they were not being filtered. This decision 
meant that quantity or frequency of behavioural occurrence could be measured for 
this experiment which, according to the conclusion proved to be an area where 
patched behavioural analysis labs typically had more system calls than unpatched 
labs.  The datasets created are thus correctly created in line with applicable 
experimental prudence guidelines and with careful consideration regarding relevant 




Some aspects regarding experimentation transparency which Rossow et al. (2012) 
discuss that include malware specific conditions are not applied to this particular 
experiment. Examples include stating employed families, malware sample selection 
and reasoning for false positive and negatives. These are not applicable for this 
particular experiment as the focus was on understanding how environment labs differ 
in behaviours if they are patched: which by requirement focuses on normal, benign 
behaviours. However, aspects of data creation replicability such as environmental 
variables used in the experiment and the URL list analysed are provided in addition 
to the actual dataset.   
In terms of alternative ways to perform behaviour drift and change analysis between 
different operating systems, a lightweight approach could be to use the Process 
Manager or Task Manager application to identify new processes within a patched 
operating system. According to Russinovich & Solomon (2009),  Windows b ased 
operating systems also have a Process Monitor tool built in Sysinternals which can 
be used to monitor processes. These would provide a malware analyst with a 
number of processes that are executed in both versions of the operating system and 
this information can be used to identify new processes that are running in a patched 
operating system. This method however would not provide insight on how a process 
interacts with the analysis environment but if the goal is merely to identify new 
system call vectors, this would be suitable. In terms of improvement, an alternative 
approach to this experiment could have been to incrementally break the available 
updates into a monthly set of groups. Every month, all released updates would be 
required to be installed on the Capture-BAT analysis environment and perform 
analysis over a consistent set of benign URLs. These datasets could be used in 
monthly analysis to provide in depth behaviour changes in the Windows 7 Operating 
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System from patch to patch. While this approach is highly exhaustive and in depth, it 
did require the Capture-BAT environment to be updated every month which was not 
possible as when this research question was identified towards the end of the study 
after noticing variable differences from a pilot study. It is important to note that while 
the undertaken approach does not provide the potential level of detailed a dedicated 
study of that nature would provide: it does provide valuable insight between updated 
and non-patched Windows 7. Knowledge from these can be useful in terms of setting 
up appropriate honey client and behaviour analysis labs to address specific user-
needs from client matching requirements.  
While utmost experimental prudence and attention to detail was undertaken, it was 
observed that a set of behavioural interaction was triggered in the patched Windows 
7 dataset which are related to Windows 7 driver behaviours. These behaviours tend 
to occur on a ‘as-need’ basis where Windows discovers a new device and attempts 
to find drivers for that new device. Part of the task list of performing updates on the 
Windows 7 Capture-BATs involved unlocking the immutable Virtual Disk Image 
(.VDI). This requires the virtual device to be detached from the virtual machine prior 
to modifying the settings for the disk image file. Post the installation of updates, this 
task should happen once more as the virtual drive image is changed from the normal 
mode within settings back to immutable mode to keep the behaviour environment 
constant and unchanged by website analysis. During this process, it is good practice 
to reboot the virtual machine a few times prior to the final setting locking in order to 
achieve a constant environment where behaviours such as driver install prompts 
caused by attaching the virtual disk to the virtual machine. Unfortunately, the 
environment’s virtual drive image was locked before the full successful installation of 
the required drivers which caused the prompt in Windows at every boot up, resulting 
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in a number of device driver related interactions. In order to address this concern, 
the hard drive was unlocked, the drivers required was allowed to be installed before 
being re-unlocked. Unfortunately, while the expectation of this task was so that these 
behavioural interactions caused by the virtual disk image should have stopped, 
further benign website analysis proved that despite drivers being installed, these 
interactions were still observed. The actual reasons behind these behavioural 
interactions in the patched dataset could have been as a result of the virtual hard 
drive manipulations undertaken but in actuality this was observed to not be the case, 
having tested under the correct conditions. It is therefore concluded these changes 
were the actual observed changes in the patched Windows 7 environment. Exploring 
the actual reasons for why some system calls are triggered at certain times are 
beyond the scope of this research and is a viable path for future research as often 
causes for system calls being triggered are simply not justifiable with the information 
available on how processes in Windows 7 works.    
5.3 Key findings 
 Tested the ability to assess the created exclusion lists in Chapter 4. The 
filtered behaviour contained in log files was reduced by an average of 
96.96%. These did not miss exploits and malicious behaviours but in turn 
provide the benefit of sorting between malicious and benign behaviours in an 
ever-growing web of malicious web servers. This proves that the created 
method for creating exclusion list as well as created exclusion lists were 
highly effective at reducing noise in log file datasets.  
 Differences in observed benign behaviours between patched and unpatched 
Windows 7 behaviour analysis labs with identification of natively found 
behaviours in patched systems.  
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 Identification of existing core processes namely Sppsvc.exe, Svchost.exe, 
Rundll32.exe and Services.exe were found to have the most amount of new 
and in some cases unknown behavioural interactions within the study that 






Log file analysis and observed Windows 7 attacks 




Chapter 6 – Log file analysis and observed Windows 7 attacks 
6.1 Behavioural drive-by-download log file analysis 
This section presents knowledge, patterns and trends from the gathered data 
corpus. Behavioural information on malicious drive-by-downloads is identified, 
explored and evaluated with conclusions on findings drawn. In the gathered 5,132 
log files a large number of behaviours were observed. The volume of behaviours for 
the gathered log files consisted of 294,264 behavioural entries. It was observed that 
within the sample, there were 9,533 unique behaviours. In the following discussion 
on behavioural findings they are undertaken from a file system, process and registry 
behaviour perspective and key results will be highlighted.  
6.1.2 Behavioural distribution analysis 
Figure 6.1 and 6.2 below show the distribution of system calls in the 5,132 malicious 
log file dataset. Values utilised in the behavioural distribution charts are available in 
Appendix D, presented as tables 6B-6I. From the behavioural distribution, it is 
concluded that the vast majority (80.01%) of drive-by-download utilise the file 
system’s write as their primary attack vector. In addition to this we found that within 
our log file data set that the most commonly faced malicious behaviour is: 
‘C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe Write 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe’  
This means a compromised Internet Explorer browser is writing a suspicious 
svchost.exe file in the user’s temp folder. The parts in bold are the parts of interest to 
an analyst: the iexplore.exe process is the actual browser in the default location. The 
keyword write is a file write on disk function and the final part is the actual file with 
the maliciously chosen directory path.   This particular behaviour formed 21% 
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(encountered 62,488 times) of a possible total of 294,864 behaviours. It is likely that 
this behaviour could vary should different browsers have been chosen for the 
analysis process as some browsers have different file system location for temporary 
files. This particular strain of malware, due to its persistence is the most popular 
attack vector in the entire data set. This therefore demanded further investigation on 
the file that was being downloaded and saved into the user temp folder in each 
instance. Table 6.0 below shows 7 anti-virus vendor classification that found all 
instances of the captured binary by Capture-BAT. These submissions to Virus Total 
all contained the particular file write where Internet Explorer process was hijacked 
into writing a malicious Svchost.exe in the user temp folder.  
Table 6.0: Malware analysis of the malicious file write (Svchost.exe) within the 
user temp folder to find signatures and family classification by Anti-Virus (AV) 
vendors.  
Signature distribution between AVs Percentage within the dataset (%) 






Avware   
Trojan.Win32.Encpk.aak (v) 28.57% 
Virus.Win32.Ramnit.a (v) 9.52% 
Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT 47.62% 
Packed.Win32.Zbot.gen.y.5 (v) 14.29% 






















Furthermore, in the top 20 most commonly encountered behaviour in the 5,132 
Capture-BAT log file datasets which is available in Appendix D, table 6D file system 
writes dominated the count table, by claiming 15 out of a possible 20 spots with the 
rest being registry’s set value changes.  
These results support the behavioural distribution in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
Furthermore this raises a number of concerns within cyber security and drive-by-
download research as far too often, the same behaviour is observed where a 
compromised browser process usually through process injection writes a malicious 
executable without user consent in the user’s temp folder within Windows 7. Modern 
browsers have built in sandboxes which would likely lessen the occurrence of known 
malicious Portable Executable files saved by drive-by-downloads.  Clearly whilst 
visiting a webpage, Windows executable files (or any file which has the potential to 
run automated scripts) should not be downloaded without at least asking the user for 
the permission to do so. Due to the vast amount of captured behaviour that follow 
this pattern, it is concluded that the browser process is one of the most targeted 
exploit vectors susceptible to process injection attacks which additionally shows (due 
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to the large volume of successful attacks in our 5,132 log file dataset) numerous 
vulnerabilities within the Windows 7 environment. Additionally, the user temp folder 








File system write behaviour Registry set value key
File system delete behaviour Process create behaviour
Process terminated behaviour Registry delete value key
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Figure 6.1: Behavioural distribution analysis pie chart.  
 
Figure 6.2: Unique behaviour distribution pie chart.  
6.1.3 Malicious file writes 
Further behavioural log file analysis showed that 116009 / 294864 (39.34%) of all 
recorded behaviours of visiting real-world malicious websites included the writing of 
a malicious executable file in the user temp folder. Whilst clearly the Svchost.exe 
malware was the most common one, there are several other malware samples which 
seem to be inhibiting the same behaviour and sometimes the only difference 
observed is merely the name of the drive-by-download executable. Some examples 







Registry set value key File system write behaviour
Process create behaviour File system delete behaviour
Process terminated behaviour Registry delete value key
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Table 6.1: Examples of malicious executable exploits being written in the user 
temp folder of Windows 7.  














ws\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\wrar501ru[1].exe 675 
Note: Malware family information provided in Appendix D within table 6A and 6D. 
6.1.4 Visual basic exploits within Windows 7 
 Unless modified or replaced by a malicious alternative, the wscript.exe in the 
Windows System32 folder is in fact a genuine and non-malicious executable that 
allows the execution of Visual Basic scripts (.vbs file). In the Windows O.S., this can 
be done by opening the run tool, typing the name of the Visual Basic (VB) script 
executable (wscript.exe) followed by the pathway of the script. This has the potential 
for malicious behaviour within a client system and by using the run method 
described, this is one way this particular sample could have caused the wscript.exe 
to execute and download the rad959E0.tmp.exe binary.  This type of attack has been 
seen before as malware which exploit this service start by downloading a .vbs file 
and perform the execution of the script would cause further malicious binaries to be 
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downloaded and saved (in this particular case, to the temp folder). This particular 
attack was observed very rarely with only a total of 67 occurrences in the dataset.  
6.1.5 Malicious .bat file exploits 
One of the rarer type of attack observed within the data set that exploited file system 
vulnerabilities was the creation of .bat files in the user’s temp folder. This write was 
performed in two occasions with its prime process being a new and malicious 
process. The executable file was also saved also in the user’s temp folder prior to 
self-execution.  Other malicious behaviours of the same nature to the Svchost.exe 
and Internet Explorer example discussed at the start can be seen below: the only 
difference between these behaviour is merely the name of the saved malicious 
binary, thus showing patterns in malicious drive-by-download behaviours. Whilst 
protecting against these attacks are beyond the scope of this work, it is important to 
note that one simple yet seemingly effective way of protecting client systems against 
these attacks could be to implement strict file monitors within these known 
vulnerable directories within anti-viruses as a start and preventing the browser from 
gaining access to executables such as the wscript.exe which allow malware 
propagation from potentially unseen sources. Some browsers perform protection of 
client systems using sandboxed techniques when a new file is saved on a client 
machine and since the evidence found within this thesis reinforces existing 
knowledge that these drive-by-download attacks are still actively attacking client 
systems perhaps it is time for more browsers to implement these security 
enhancements to client systems.  
6.1.6 Observed malicious executables manifesting process behaviours 
In terms of observed malicious process behaviours, the volume of processes flagged 
up in Capture-BAT exclusion lists are relatively small in number when compared to 
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file system or registry behaviour. This was expected as a process is the bridge 
between the registry or the file system interactions:  it is process that initiate 
behavioural interactions of sending data from an executed computer program to a 
saved file or registry field. From a distribution perspective one process can be 
responsible for multiple behavioural interactions, for instance: Internet explorer 
writing multiple files as a result of visiting a website with a large number of icons and 
graphic saved in temp folder or internet explorer deleting a large number of expired 
.tmp files. The number of processes (Portable Executables) within a behaviour 
analysis environment is limited in comparison to the large number of files that gets 
changed, hence the one-to-many relationship between process and multiple files or 
registry entities.  The two-main observed behaviour were process creation and 
process termination. Determining the maliciousness of process behaviours are a lot 
more straightforward than file changes and much simpler in comparison to registry 
changes: The initiation of a process in its directory should always be the first point of 
check. Within the dataset, the vast majority of process creation behaviour observed 
that were marked as malicious could be identified as malicious due to the process’s 
saved directory.  While malware would often be attempting to mask itself by using 
famous system names, such as svchost.exe, directories such as 
%SystemDrive%:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Local\Temp\ are often targeted to be 
the initiation path of a malicious process.  
In terms of Capture-BAT log files, one minor limitation within capture observed was 
that in the log files, there is a process identifier (ID) field given which often means 
unique behaviours being generated unnecessarily. This is shared by other Capture-
HPC based work, Amorim & Komisarczuk, (2012) also discuss removing the process 
ID field from behavioural log file. This particular data transformation requirement is 
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explained in section 5.17 of chapter 5. However, to overcome this minor limitation 
during the analysis process, it was decided that similar behaviour would be grouped 
based on executing process path and actual path of executed process: if both these 
values are identical, the process ID differences would be ignored. This is a different 
approach to previous work by Amorim & Komisarczuk (2012), where the paths to 
executables in addition to the process ID in a behavioural interaction are removed 
features. The justification behind this is simply because the path to a file can often 
indicate whether a file is benign or malicious based on known operating system 
defaults.  Malicious svchost.exe processes (situated in the dataset at every 
occurrence) was in the user temp folder when in fact should have been present in 
the default Windows 7 location, C:\Windows\System32\Svchost.exe. This was being 
called by a hidden process (Capture-BAT reported it as ‘UNKNOWN’) and by 
Internet Explorer. There were 62 process creations in total for this particular 
behaviour which is relatively low but the fact that this sample had the ability to self-
execute within milliseconds of being delivered made it highly dangerous to a client 
system.  We observed a single occurrence with this behaviour where a process 
termination was called by Internet Explorer after the exploit was carried out.   
6.1.7 Observed malicious Dynamic-link library (.dll) and Temporary file (.tmp) 
process behaviours 
Execution of malicious files were not limited to Windows executable files, in the 
gathered dataset, we observe malware exploiting genuine windows executables and 
create processes out of dynamic-link library (.dll) files and even temporary (.tmp) 
files. Files which use the .dll extention often contain code and instructions that are 
typically executed by an executable. Malicious process behaviour tables for both of 
these file types are available in Appendix D. It is observed that some malicious .dll 
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files have the ability to self-execute or hijack the running Internet Explorer process to 
launch:  
Dynamic-link library files maliciously saved in the temp folder self-executing: 
 C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\fhfy.dll  created  
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\fhfy.dll 
 C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\qhywf.dll  created  
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\qhywf.dll 
An injected internet explorer browser launches malicious dynamic-link library files: 
 C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe created  
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\oydgn.dll 
 C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe created  
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\fhfy.dll 
In some cases, it would appear the malicious .tmp files have the ability of calling 
genuine windows processes such as explorer.exe: 
 C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\8075.tmp  created  
C:\Windows\explorer.exe 
The compromised web browser manipulating and executing .dll files have been 
around for a few years as shown by Dhanjani et al. (2009) and finding these 
malicious behaviours several years after shows that created and detected malware 
is widely distributed as of the time of writing. Within behaviour analysis, process 
creation is one of the most powerful exploits for drive-by-downloads as processes, 
when executed can often allow for a range of malicious activities to take place (such 
as downloading other executables or files).  It was observed in some cases that 
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malicious processes added keys in the registry. Therefore, should these particular 
malicious behaviours be scaled, it is evident that those are of the highest priority for 
identification by a malware analyst.  
6.1.8 Exploits targeting scheduled tasks within Windows 7 
Other malicious processes discovered targeted other executables such as 
Schtasks.exe which allows the creation, deletion and modification of scheduled tasks 
on a client system. We could not find a single justifiable reason why the 
Schtasks.exe would ever need to be accessed when a system is merely visiting a 
webpage, especially since Capture-Bat does not have the ability to create such tasks 
and merely loads up a webpage and records behaviour.  Unfortunately, we were 
unable to capture what manifestation the ‘UNKNOWN’ process that initiated the 
modification actually did in the scheduled tasks. It is evident however that this area 
being targeted is alarming and likely malicious as addition to Schtasks.exe could 
provide the capabilities of new malicious codes being downloaded periodically or 
even run malware when the machine is not being used.  
6.1.9 Observed registry behaviours within the dataset 
With respect to observed registry changes in our Capture-BAT instances we found 
the largest amount of variance in the data to be with the registry SetValueKey 
behaviour: this can be seen in Figure 6.2 which shows unique behavioural entry 
distribution. In terms of malicious behaviours observed, the registry monitor showed 
the least amount of actual verifiable and quantifiable malicious attacks: The full list of 
confirmed malicious registry attacks can be seen in section D of the Appendix witin 
table 6H and 6I. A typical registry attack observed was a malicious file (binary in 
most cases, but it was noticed that malicious sound (.mp3) files and compromised 
web browsers that were installed but never used by capture (in this case, Google 
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Chrome) was adding malicious keys into different sections of the registry such as the 
sections that saved Internet Explorer data, (location) zone data and shell commands.  
6.1.10 False positives within dataset 
On the benign side of behavioural registry entries, out of the filtered dataset of 
294264 behavioural entries, 2645 were found to have been triggered by Internet 
Explorer, 6613 were found to have been triggered by Svchost.exe and the rest by 
other Windows processes such as keys being added by Windows error reporting, 
Windows software protection, and processes controlling devices (printers and fax – 
Spooslsv.exe). Upon investigation, it was concluded that none of the unique 
behavioural entries displayed maliciousness despite their inconsistent manifestation. 
With respect, to Internet Explorer, the vast majority of this group of observed 
behaviour were keys being input in the registry which notified of a completed 
download, Windows error reporting, Shockwave player app data and a large 
variance within clearable data lists which was saved by Internet Explorer. This was 
rather unexpected as the browser, Internet Explorer in our case, tends to be one of 
the highest exploitation vectors within the system as can be seen by the file system 
exploits where the browser is typically injected and a malicious binary is saved and it 
seemed reasonable to expect the same with regards to registry exploits.  
Svchost.exe (from the default, uncompromised location) performed the vast majority 
of our captured registry changes within the data set of 5,132 malicious logs (333 
unique registry SetValueKey behaviours with a total count of 26483). These 
behaviours can be grouped as they are not inherently malicious and fairly similar 
with the difference in many cases of a folder name. For instance, all four of these 
behaviours are for slightly different registry folder and do not display any inherent 
malicious behaviour but over time there are alterations to the Object Table folder 
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where the file ID is stored. This can be seen in table 6.2. It was concluded that these 
behaviours were part of drifted operating system behaviours over time that were 
missed by the created exclusion list, thus classed as false positives.  
Table 6.2: minor differences between benign behaviours which were not being 
filtered by our exclusion lists. The behavioural similarity is highlighted. 
Similar benign svchost.exe set value key behaviour that exclusion lists 
missed 
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  SetValueKey  \REGISTRY\A\{186A02FD-
0C82-11E4-A1B8-080027E9ED53}\DefaultObjectStore\ObjectTable\129\AeFileID 
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  SetValueKey \REGISTRY\A\{92F7356C-
1F48-11E4-8EA0-080027E9ED50}\DefaultObjectStore\ObjectTable\129\AeFileID 
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  SetValueKey \REGISTRY\A\{35F43F1C-
1F49-11E4-A577-080027E9ED50}\DefaultObjectStore\ObjectTable\129\AeFileID 
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe  SetValueKey \REGISTRY\A\{F31127CC-
0E00-11E4-9E86-080027E9ED50}\DefaultObjectStore\ObjectTable\129\AeFileID 
 
Similarly, it was observed that System was adding keys in variations of the Windows 
7 Network Store Interface (NSI) section of the registry. This service is important for 
our Capture-BAT machines which need to be connected to the Capture-HPC server. 
While the count is a steady 70 which is concluded to be on the high end of set 
registry keys as the average of count per unique behaviour is 6.51. The variations 




Table 6.3: Minor differences between benign behaviours which were not being 
filtered by our exclusion lists. The differences are highlighted.  
Similar ‘benign’ NSI  set value key behaviour by system Count 

















There are two methods to approach this limitation: the significantly unsafe technique 
would be to use a wildcard that tells Capture-BAT to ignore the folder name that 
comes after the REGISTRY\A\ path. The more risk-averse technique and expectedly 
more exhaustive way to overcome the large volume of SetValueKey behaviours 
would be to add each of the files as they are observed in the exclusion lists. 
Regardless of which method utilised, initially when we created the exclusion lists, the 
system did not display these registry value keys being entered which shows the long 
term testing requirement that exclusion lists really benefit from.  Moreover, this 
shows one way that behavioural filters require maintenance over time as system 
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behaviours evolve and change. The registry filter and the large amount of ‘unique 
behaviour’ is found to be the filter with the highest levels of required maintenances in 
comparison to the file system, while the process exclusion list is found to be fairly 
static and low maintenance.  This is in line with findings of behavioural filter 
development in Chapter 4.  
6.1.11 False positives and grey behaviours within the dataset and improving 
creating exclusion lists 
Within the dataset there were a number of benign behaviours over the period of two 
years of analysis: Windows Error Reporting (.wer) file writes contained 98 unique 
variants with a total count of 2865 (0.97%) where the vast majority were reported by 
Internet Explorer (97 unique variants written by the web browser) and a single 
unique entry written by Diagnostic troubleshooting wizard(msdt.exe).  The writing of. 
wer files is relatively safe and it is recommended that wildcards are used to allow 
these changes in a behavioural filter. Examples for Capture-BAT exclusion lists are 
provided: 
Exclude a .wer file write in file monitor exclusion list as long as file is a .wer file: 
+ Write C:\\InsertBenignFullPathHere\\iexplore.exe
 C:\\FullPathToDefaultFolder\\.+wer 
Exclude a .wer file delete in file monitor exclusion list as long as file is a .wer file: 
+ Delete  C:\\InsertBenignFullPathHere\\iexplore.exe
 C:\\FullPathToDefaultFolder\\.+wer 
In the dataset, a small number (29 unique variants of a total count of 87) file writes 




The written files were in eXtensible Markup Language (XML) format and did not 
seem inherently malicious by themselves as these files were not executed or seen to 
perform interactions with other aspects of the file system, registry or processes. 
These behaviours as they were quite rarely seen were concluded to be grey 
behaviour which was not added in our created exclusion lists. Additionally, 
Taskhost.exe was found to be writing a range of differently name .tmp files (29 
variants 254 total count) in the ProgramData folder within Windows 7. The 
ProgramData directory allows different applications to save data which is essentially 
what Internet Explorer is doing in this particular behaviour. Conversely, this 
behaviour formed a very small sample within the dataset and appeared infrequently 
enough to require more information and be marked as grey before being classified 
benign.  
6.2 Case study advanced drive-by-download exploits: Full log file analysis 
In this section, the reporting and analysis of a fairly advanced drive-by-download is 
undertaken. This sample had a very large log file (1025 KB) text file which is slightly 
less than double the second largest file size (693 KB) and considering 5115 log files 
out of the possible bank of 5,132 were text files under 100 KB, demanded further 
investigation.  Interesting and non-repeating snippets of the log file will be explored.  
This is the data we have regarding this sample on Capture-HPC:  
Log identifier: 2052617255  
URL: http://fadedboys.com/forum/ 
Visited on: 24.03.2014 22:24:50.136  
Capture Client: 192.168.33.3   
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Status: malicious  
This sample has over 8000 lines of reported malicious behaviours. Sample snippets 
of interest to a malware analyst from the log file is available in Appendix D.  
The vast majority of the log file shows that the drive-by-download is attempting to 
manipulate a malicious svchost.exe. It is possible to confirm the maliciousness of 
this log file if we analyse the behavioural information: The svchost.exe in the log file 
is a new executable in a different directory from the one assigned by Windows 7 
which is currently in the user local temp folder: 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe as opposed to the default directory 
of: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe. It is important to note at this stage that an 
executable was downloaded without user consent whilst simply opening the 
http://fadedboys.com/forum URL. This behaviour alone classifies the interaction as 
highly malicious.   
1. Moreover, the fact that it’s being written by the web browser shows that the 
web browser has been compromised by the malicious web server – as 
capture analysis does not interact with download-prompt windows when web 
browsing. 
2. It’s attempted to mask its true intention by attempting to appear as a genuine 
windows 7 application and process, Svchost.exe. 
3. The malware sample hijacked the Internet Explorer process and executed the 
malicious Svchost.exe binary which was saved in the User’s temp folder. 
4. Upon execution the malicious binary opened an unused browser on the 
machine, Google Chrome and added keys in Chrome’s section of the 
windows registry in addition to the Winlogon\userinit folder. (Userinit is used 
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by Winlogon to execute logon scripts and stablish network connections). It is 
likely that the malware writer saved malicious scripts to run at the next logon. 
Such exploits often lay the foundations for commonly seen ransomware 
attacks.  
5. When the attack was over, internet explorer was used again to terminate the 
malicious svchost.exe process.  
Having explored this sample’s drive-by-download behaviour, which had a large 
number of malicious behaviours raging from over 6000 file creation attempts, registry 
entries and creation and execution of malicious executables and binaries. In this 
section this sample is ran through Virus Total and other malware analysis platforms 
in order to obtain some more insight about this rare sample.  
Unfortunately, this file was not analysed or found malicious due to the lacking 
executables that were corrupted from the drive-by-download collection process in 




Figure 6.3: Output from Malwr.com in analysing the malicious file captured by 
Capture-BAT (Based on Cuckoo sandbox). The malicious file is undetected 
when analysis was attempted.  
 
Figure 6.4a: output from VirusTotal.com in analysing the malicious file 
captured by Capture-BAT (Based on multiple Av-Vendors) 







Figure 6.4b: output from VirusTotal.com in analysing the actual URL which 
was detected by Capture-BAT ac malicious.  
As the above figures, 6.3 and 6.4a  showed: the malware did not allow any malicious 
Portable Executables to be captured within the analysis process despite the fact that 
the malware was observed to have written multiple malicious.exe files within the user 
directory. In order to verify this was the case, URL analysis was attempted 10 times 
at different times on the same URL using capture-BAT and the output was identical 
each time. It was therefore important to verify that this attack.  Websense was used 
to assess the malicious URL and in the malicious code analysis section, an idrame 
was identified that points to a malicious domain 
(bigzhopa1.ftp1./discountjustifies.php) as shown in figure 6.5 below.  It is possible 
that the domain was compromised and launches Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks 
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on client systems which is picked up by the analysis envornment that was used 
within the study. 
 
6.5: Websense analysis of the Fadedboys webpage showed that an IFrame that 
points to a malicious website.  
6.3. Conclusion 
This section initially identified the timestamps in log files as a possible vector to 
identify trends and patterns from Capture-BAT log files. Having analysed multiple 
angles of the behavioural interactions contained in Capture-BAT log files, it is fair to 
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conclude that the dataset gathered contained a significant of malicious behaviours 
captured while visiting potentially malicious webpages with limited interactions other 
than opening the URL in the internet browser. A large number of captured behaviour 
were identified and filtered into unique behavioural entries with frequencies. This 
allowed the creation of behavioural distribution charts and unique behavioural 
distribution charts. From this activity, the most popular behavioural vector (file write, 
process created, registry key) were identified. This allowed the synthesis of 
knowledge with regards to the most commonly observed attack vectors that targeted 
and hijacked Internet Explorer 8 within the behaviour analysis environment and 
caused malicious SvcHost.exe executables to be saved in the user folder within 
Windows 7. Analysis of log files also allowed us to identify web exploits that 
executed wscript.exe and exploited malicious .vbs scripts. False positives such as 
Windows error reporting process triggering and causing a range of unique entries in 
Capture log files were identified and concluded as a particular process that faces a 
large amount of behavioural drive over the time that a behaviour analysis lab is used. 
It was identified that in a given instance malware code downloaded had ability to 
self-execute malicious code downloaded using an unknown process. .DLL files that 
were downloaded in the user temp directory were self-executing which is a highly 
malicious behaviour. Malware targeted features in Windows such as Schtasks.exe to 
attempt to add ‘launch on boot’ scripts.  
Finally, it is important to reflect on some findings that support previous decisions and 
offer some research pathway suggestions for future research. In chapter 2 where the 
scope was defined, it was specified that the application of machine learning within 
this work was out of scope due to this task usually falling part of the next level of 
analysis within the context of drive-by-download analysis stages. The argument 
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presented to support this decision is simply because the application of machine 
learning techniques to the level of data presented was simply another research 
project in itself due to the high data dimensionality levels. To support this, Table 6J 
and Log file 6K in Appendix D are presented. Within the context of a single malicious 
URL analysis in context with the anatomy of drive-by-download presented in chapter 
2, figure 2.3 and 2.5, there are two main stages: firstly, the drive-by-download 
analysis stage which was the focus of this thesis and secondly the malware analysis 
stage where any dropped Portable Executable is analysed within a sandbox or 
analysed by anti-virus vendors. Both analysis result in vastly huge dataset 
dimensions ranging and stripped to the core (by removing unnecessary fields such 
as time stamp of behaviours, anti-virus meta data, such as date and previous 
analysis results of the same MD5/Hash files) from actual behaviour entries still result 
in large dimensional datasets as can be seen in Appendix D tables and log file 
aforementioned. As discussed in chapter 2, the scope of the detection of malicious 
webpages is vast due to both the growth in the internet (Internet Live Stats, 2017) 
and the availability of toolkits and growth in malicious websites (Seifert, 2010; 
Symantec, 2016; Garnaeva et al. 2016) and if the data dimensionality for a single 
run-time malicious URL analysis presents this vast level of data, there needs to be 
further research approaches that are able to analyse run-time log files reasonably 
fast whilst taking into account the features that are included in the decision making 
process, much like the created exclusion lists in Chapter 4. In this context, some of 
these features can include aspects such as: the file path, the downloaded file name 
and type, the process hijacked, created and behaviours, or registry path exploits, the 
order of exploit triggering within a system, the vast levels of available anti-virus 
vendor data or sandbox data from analysis within multiple systems including any 
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previously assigned signature to a given hash file. This is because a number of 
aspects need to be considered in the decision making process of what to include for 
the analysis process.   
6.4 Key findings 
The Observed malicious behaviour in the 5,132-log file dataset that were identified 
ofrom a Process, File and Registry perspective, deciphered and evaluated. Within 
the context of the dataset, malicious attacks are seen to infiltrate the analysis system 
predominantly through a hijacked browser process which is then exploited to write 
and execute malicious Portable Executables.  
Key process and behavioural interactions analysis providing typical web exploits 
observed that target Capture-BAT and the Windows 7 operating system. These 
include Internet explorer which is most commonly observed to be compromised and 
used to save malicious code, the targeting of Schtasks and Wscript to compromise a 
system into running scripts.  
Behaviour analysis distribution and unique behaviour analysis distribution within the 
dataset is presented. This identifies the most commonly observed behaviours in 
each instance and provides knowledge on which vectors within the behaviour 
analysis lab cause more behavioural entries. In the case of this study, the file system 
was significantly targeted most often, and the registry seemed to face the highest 











Chapter 7 – Conclusions  
This section concludes the work in the thesis. The set goals of this thesis were to 
optimise the output from dynamic analysis, detect malicious webpages, identify 
active attack vectors and understand behavioural analysis environment interactions. 
An overall conclusion is provided which evolves in chapter-specific conclusions. 
These conclusions evaluate the extent to which these goals were met. The 
contributions to knowledge are revisited and a discussion on evaluation, limitations, 
delimitations and future work concludes the thesis.  
7.1 Overall conclusion 
The issue of drive-by-download attacks has been around for several years and is a 
growing problem. This could have been due to the growth in the internet and the 
volume of websites in addition to the increased availability in exploit kits. Drive-by-
download attacks target client systems with the goal of violating confidentiality, 
integrity and the availability of computer systems. Run-time client honeypots are 
often used within detection and intelligence gathering to identify drive-by-download 
attacks and compromised web servers. Within the detection and intelligence 
gathering scene, there are limitations that are faced: the volume of websites 
available and the ever-increasing use of malicious web servers by malware 
organizations within cybercrime can often be viewed as the needles in haystack 
scenario. The run-time analysis of websites approach has proven to be a viable 
method of detecting both existing and new threats whilst not being limited to knowing 
the nature of web-based threats beforehand. However, applying run-time analysis is 
not without challenges. For instance, the detection accuracy is dependent on the 
trigger aspect of malware attacks.  The high resource and time requirement nature of 
run-time analysis makes it infeasible for run-time analysis to be the sole approach in 
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analysing the entire world wide web.  Furthermore, the volumes of data that are 
created during run-time analysis of websites are huge and contain a large 
percentage of noise. These undesired interactions are generated from an operating 
system booting, performing regular start-up activities and initiating system calls that 
are benign. As part of this thesis, a method of finding out, labelling and removing 
these activities from log files is proposed. This methodology is applicable to future 
operating systems as the concept of identifying, studying and assessing the potential 
for malicious remains similar.  Within this work, the issue of reducing log file sizes 
from honeypots was explored and it was proven that a large volume of benign 
interactions within log files can be removed without compromising detection 
mechanisms (in the experiments undertaken, there was a reduction of 96.96%). This 
is highly desirable especially when a security analyst is manually examining 
interactions. Additionally, it was shown that it is possible to apply a behaviour 
analyst’s expertise within behaviour manifestations to  filter out noise within dataset 
and label goodware datasets. The application of synthesised knowledge from 
investigating behaviours is desired as behaviours are thoroughly tested and 
observed before inclusion, with high levels of conviction. As part of the research, it 
was discovered that over time, some behaviours change exact file paths. This is 
referred to as behavioural drift and is often found to have very slight variations of 
older, known behaviours, often a single string in file path or a new folder name. 
Additionally, core system behaviours within different versions of analysis 
environments were identified. This proved that different versions of the same 
operating system could have significantly different behaviour manifestations. This 
finding shows that there is a requirement for critical thinking in the design aspect of 
behaviour analysis environments as different versions are subject to different 
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behaviour manifestations. This contributes to existing knowledge: behaviour analysis 
environments that are being used within dynamic analysis affect the contents of log 
files even if the parent operating is kept the same (e.g.: Windows 7). Different 
versions of the respective operating system displays significant behavioural 
manifestation. Therefore, when behavioural filters are being created, it is important to 
take this knowledge into account and apply the filter creation methodology to the 
same version of operating system that will be used in research or detection 
purposes. The conclusions for the thesis chapters are provided:  
7.1.2 Chapter 4 – Behavioural exclusion list development 
Chapter 4 presents the design, development and creation of the study’s main 
artefact, behavioural filters. The chapter introduces the concept of behavioural filters 
in the form of an existing and well established run-time drive-by-download analysis 
software, Capture-BAT. The importance and potential of behavioural filters are 
introduced.  Exclusion lists, which serves as behavioural filters for Capture-BAT were 
defined as low-level filters for separating and capturing behaviours that take place as 
a result of an analysis environment booting and running. The perspective of 
behaviours that are relevant to this study included: process, file system and registry 
interactions. Within this chapter, the rationale for the creation of exclusion lists within 
the Windows 7 operating system was provided. These include: the gap in research 
approach and development focus on the exclusion lists within Windows 7. The 
unexplored potential as log file filters for behavioural filtering and the problem of 
huge datasets containing large amounts of known benign behaviour. Finally, 
knowledge on the expected behaviours generated at run-time analysis. These were 
all of the conclusive factors that justified the creation of the behavioural filter creation 
methodology and the Capture-BAT exclusion lists.  
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From this, the chapter explored the three main requirements of successful 
behavioural filter: Firstly, behavioural filters should be filtering out known benign and 
confirmed behaviours that have no sign of maliciousness in log files to reduce the 
amount of log files that need further analysis. Secondly, within a malicious log file, 
only malicious behaviours should be present. This is in line with the separating 
goodware from malware datasets prudent malware experimentation guideline by 
Rossow et al. (2012). Thirdly, created exclusion lists should be done with a risk-
averse approach by design therefore, any new behaviour, no matter how similar to 
expected behaviours should be reported and investigated. This chapter was focused 
on the observed Windows 7 behaviours. Behaviours are explored thoroughly from 
process, file and registry interactions to provide typical expected behavioural 
interaction tables. Behaviours within these tables are evaluated and critiqued in light 
of their potential to be malicious. This applies the behavioural evaluation expertise 
from an analyst in the creation of behavioural filters.  A list of differential behaviours 
from Windows XP to Windows 7 is explored. Finally, a development methodology for 
the creation of behavioural filters is proposed. This is evaluated and exclusion lists 
for Capture-BAT are implemented using this methodology. This chapter managed to 
create behavioural filters using the behavioural filter creation methodology whilst 
answering the principle research question regarding behavioural filters.  
7.1.3 Chapter 5 – Behaviour analysis environment experiments 
Chapter 5 presents findings of two major experiments undertaken within the study. 
Both experiments were designed using the adapted prudent experimental framework 
in chapter 3. In continuation with the development and implementation of behavioural 
filters within Chapter 4, the created exclusion lists required assessment and 
evaluation. The first experiment sought to evaluate the efficiency of the created 
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exclusion list by calculating the actual reduction in behavioural log files whilst 
conducting the experiment using potentially malicious websites active on the 
internet.  This experiment concluded that filtered log files yielded between 90-98% 
less behavioural entries than unfiltered log files. This finding meets the requirement 
of finding out the filter efficiency when tested in the real-world. In addition to this, the 
number of log files that would be analysed by a malware analyst, was drastically 
reduced: 112 as opposed to 3,011 in unfiltered datasets. The experimental 
conclusion therefore was that the application of the behavioural filter was successful 
in achieving the requirements set out in the previous chapter whilst significantly 
reducing the noise present in log file datasets. More importantly, this experiment 
allowed the research question regarding behavioural filter efficiency to be answered 
thereby, fulfilling the set objective.  
The second experiment was tasked at providing understanding how observable 
benign system behaviours differ in patched and unpatched experimental 
environments. This would provide key behaviour identifications that differed and 
would need to be accommodated for in future exclusion lists. It was concluded that a 
there were a number of key processes and behavioural interaction that differed in 
patched Windows 7 operating systems thereby answering the research question.  
7.1.4 Chapter 6 – Log file analysis and observed Windows 7 attacks 
Chapter 6 analyses key behaviours within the analysis of 110,000 potentially 
malicious websites. These were analysed and a dataset of 5,132 malicious log files 
was gathered over the course of 4 years. A behavioural distribution analysis initiated 
the discussion of observed behaviour within the dataset. This is where key system 
interaction: file writes are concluded to be the most commonly observed behaviour 
and the registry set value is the behaviour type that offers the most variance and 
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consequently the most amendments in created filters over time. Captured malicious 
behaviours within relevant system exploitation were presented and discussed.  
Common attacks were synthesised from the dataset and explored. This lead to a 
range of client attacks being identified. False positives within the dataset are 
presented, discussed and analysed.  These answered the research questions on the 
observed malicious behaviours and attack vector identification that were targeting 
the honeypot. Finally a case-study of an advanced drive-by-download is presented 
where the malicious domain seemed to have been compromised by an iframe.  
7.2 Contributions to knowledge 
From undertaking this study, three contributions to knowledge is made. First, the 
proposed methodology of developing expert driven behaviour filters. Second the key 
differences in behaviour from the same operating systems operating at different 
patches are identified presented. Third the observed malicious behaviour and 
attacks active on the section of the analysed internet is presented. These 
contributions are discussed.  
7.2.1 Expert driven behavioural filters 
This study was focused on an alternate approach to filtering the large volumes of 
behavioural interaction entries which are captured during run-time analysis and 
stored in behavioural log files. Detection using dynamic analysis log file datasets 
contains complicated behavioural interactions which are present in large volumes: 
log files can contain several thousand entries of system behavioural interactions. As 
the amounts of malicious web pages on the rise, this would mean that a larger 
amount websites need to be analysed to detect malicious web pages.  The creation 
and implementation of expert driven behavioural filters is the main contribution of the 
work that addresses the issue of the large volumes of behavioural interactions in log 
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files. This is because within this research, the complexity of system behaviours is 
explored and labelled in behavioural tables leading to the understanding of system 
interactions. This leads to the creation of expert driven behaviour filters which are 
designed using the expertise of behavioural interactions. These filters drastically 
reduce both the size of log files and the number of log files that would need analysis. 
The behaviour filtration method explored within the study does not rely on the 
application of machine learning but instead applies the expertise of the security 
researcher in the design. The expert driven filters were designed at providing an 
understanding of behavioural interactions from log file datasets before filtering out 
benign interaction. This is a risk-averse method as required by malware detection 
mechanisms so that false negatives are as limited as possible. The risk-averseness 
claim is backed by the design of the behavioural filter: only known behaviours that 
have been confirmed to be observable and reproducible at boot in a tested, clean 
and benign system is included in the behavioural filter. New, malicious and unknown 
behaviour are therefore reported. The filters were implemented for Capture-BAT 
which performs run-time analysis of a malicious website and outputs the interaction 
between client and server as a log file. The focus on behavioural filter design within 
the literature has been very limited and outdated therefore this contribution updates 
and explores the unexplored area within the literature. Furthermore, the application 
of expert driven behaviour knowledge to the filtering of run-time analysis log files 
within the Windows 7 operating system has been another unexplored area of 
research. In their very nature, behavioural filters required careful considerations at 
their implementation stage for a given behaviour analysis environment as different 
operating system versions, applications installed or web-browser used would result 
in a number of different behaviour manifestation. The implemented behavioural filters 
238 
  
proved to reduce the benign output of behavioural log files by 96.96% when tested in 
real-world context. It is important to note that the created artefact, were used in 
academic research (Javed, 2015 and in some future research).  
7.2.2 Identifying key behaviours within different versions of behaviour analysis 
environments 
The research identified key significant differences between operating systems that 
would affect the contents of a log file should the same potentially malicious website 
be analysed. These observable key differences provide an insight in exactly what 
behaviour manifestations are different within two operating systems. The knowledge 
of key behaviours can be used in the decision-making process when designing a 
behaviour analysis environment when the version of operating systems may matter 
when hunting specific instances of a given vulnerability. Behaviour analysis 
environments that are used in run-time analysis were investigated to find observable 
key system interactions that differentiated from two perspectives:  
(1) Predecessor operating system Windows XP was compared with Windows 7 
where a range of changes to the operating system architecture and design 
resulted in a number of different system calls.  
(2) A patched and unpatched system which found a number of core processes 
that differentiated over the course of windows 7 SP1 being released to a fully 
patched as of September 2016 operating system.  
The contribution here were original as the literature within design of behaviour 
analysis environments did not include investigations or identifications of observable, 
key differential behaviours. It was found that even the same operating system with 
varying versions had a number of key behaviours that were different. The overall 
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conclusion reinforces the identified behavioural filter requirement that filters should 
be customised on a per-environment basis. This is an important contribution 
because it shows that analysts need to take design considerations of behaviour 
analysis environments into account when designing a honeypot or analysis 
environment. When attempting to detect anomalies within log file analysis using a 
different operating system with a behavioural filter that was designed for another 
version may result in false positives and negatives. Falsely flagged benign behaviour 
as malicious behaviour defeats the purpose of having an optimised log file or more 
worryingly, filter out potentially malicious content. 
7.2.3 Observed malicious behaviour and attack vector insight  
The study undertook behavioural analysis of drive-by-download attacks that were 
recorded using Capture-BAT from the analysis of 110,000 potentially malicious 
webpages. This minor contribution applied existing analysis environments that were 
designed for Windows XP to the Windows 7 operating system. Within the context of 
the literature, Capture-BAT has been applied to a large number of research based 
on the Windows XP operating system and by performing run-time analysis on a large 
potentially malicious list of URLs, it was possible to identify a small level of current 
trends within drive-by-download exploits.   
7.3 Evaluation, limitations and delimitations 
Having concluded the work and contributions, this section evaluates core aspects of 




7.3.1 Evaluating Capture-BAT 
The tool used in analysing malicious interactions, Capture-BAT was several years 
old at the start of the study. This could have been an issue if the amount of malicious 
web servers that attacked client systems were all actively coded to avoid detection 
within Capture-BAT. However, the study proved that Capture-BAT was still able to 
detect a number of attacks when adapted to the Windows 7 operating system 
environment. This conclusion is derived from 2 core datasets:  
1 The vast amounts of gathered malicious log files where malicious behaviour was 
manually verified in context of what is expected from a benign interaction and the 
potential of maliciousness from a given malicious behaviour.  
2. Some captured malware attacks (3,526/5,132) yield modified and created files by 
the drive-by-download. These were verified and analysed using ~ 54 anti-virus 
vendors on Virus Total and 29.52% of 3,526 were known malicious samples. The 
rest of the samples were malicious but not detected by AV vendors.  
7.3.2 Limitations of the research 
It was experienced that file corruption was a rare but occurring issue when a 
malicious Portable Executable file was dropped as part of a drive-by-download 
attack. Malware could have corrupted binary after exploiting a Capture-BAT client. It 
may be possible for the executables to be corrupted upon zip creation or for instance 
if Capture-BAT crashes prior to the completion of zipping modified files. This could 
either be from a run-time error or from the malware’s detection avoidance 
mechanisms. The latter issue can be addressed in future work by applying analysis 
approaches that seek to avoid detection by malware such as Ether (Dinaburg et al., 
2008). Within this study, it was observed that advanced malware samples can often 
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attempt to corrupt created files but the memory-based exploits are still observable as 
seen in case study 6.2. 
Capture-BAT has been around for a large number of years and it is possible that 
newer malware samples that detect the presence of analysis environments may 
avoid detection. The detection of analysis environment can often occur within the 
context of virtual machines as it is possible to detect virtualised analysis environment 
features. This could lead to malware not triggering exploits or self-deleting or lack of 
malware delivery to prevent detection.  
Malware samples could be missing vital exploit vectors that are resulted from 
loopholes and security vulnerabilities of given applications installed on the analysis 
environment: if these vulnerabilities are not present, tailored malware would be 
unable to exploit the system fully if at all. Triggering malware manifestation within 
Capture-BAT may also be hindered by clever malware design. Some malware 
samples are only triggered after sleep timers are reached. This issue forms part of 
the limitations of using Capture-BAT. This is because these advanced detection 
mechanisms are not currently supported. It is likely that should these features be 
implemented within future research; this issue could be resolved making Capture-
BAT more prominent in detecting more attacks. Alternatively, a different yet simpler 
approach where honeypots are allowed to run for long periods of time may provide 
similar results.  
The typical weaknesses of run-time analysis such as requiring the webpage that is 
being analysed to actually be malicious at the time of analysis is faced. If a malicious 
website is not manifesting malicious behaviours, it won’t be flagged as malicious 
during that instance of analysis.  It is not uncommon for malicious web servers to be 
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short-lived and taken offline, modified or migrated thus causing this limitation. Due to 
the resource and time intensive nature of dynamic analysis, it was a pragmatic 
decision to only analyse potentially malicious domains once. The included URLs 
within the created dataset used the ‘ignore duplicate URLs’ function in Capture-HPC. 
A different decision on the amount of times that a potentially malicious website may 
have resulted in a lot more malicious samples gathered from the analysed 110,000 
URLs however, this was out of scope and is a pathway that can be explored by 
future research.  
Tanaka & Goto (2016) showed that 10% of their 43,000 malicious websites survived 
for over 500 days and around 10% of their captured sample that involved malicious 
website with changed behaviour is revived over 15 times. Steps were taken to 
overcome this issue and overcome the risk the captured dataset consisting only of 
websites present in the long lived and unchanged category. This was mitigated by 
analysing potentially malicious websites hours from being released on malicious 
domain site making the dataset rather current in terms of being analysed and 
captured soon after being discovered. 
7.3.3 Delimitations discussion 
The ability to generalise results presented of results relies on various factors. The 
analysis of behaviours within a behaviour analysis environment may vary if 
environmental conditions are different. Similarly, it is possible that different types of 
run-time analysis clients under different versions, patches or applications to be 
targeted differently. The lack of the targeted exploit plugin being present for instance 




 Chosen operating system: Windows 7 unpatched SP1 system was the 
operating system of the behaviour analysis environments used in the analysis 
of web-based threats. The decision to use Windows 7 is justified in chapters 
2, 3 and 4. The attacks and artefacts created by this study are focused purely 
on this version.  This is in line with prudent experimental guidelines by 
Rossow et al. (2012). It is imperative that attacks observed within this study 
are not generalised. This therefore means that a number of attacks that were 
observed within his analysis environment are likely to be different to studies 
conducted within the same web-based threats context that choose to use 
different analysis environments. This is logical as different versions of analysis 
environments may have patched existing vulnerabilities or have new 
vulnerabilities all together meaning a difference in observed malicious 
manifestation.  
 The utilised browser: Internet explorer 8.0 was chosen as the operating 
browser to visit malicious pages. Internet explorer 8.0 was released in 2009 
and at the beginning of the study there were several alternatives, such as 
Internet explorer 9.0 released in 2011, Mozilla Firefox and google chrome and 
several others. The decision to use internet 8.0 was a pragmatic decision as 
the requirements for the study was to have a browser that was supported by 
Windows 7 and fairly vulnerable to attacks as a study by Rahul (2014) 
showed this is the most likely browser to face client attacks. Having a browser 
that facilitates the entry of malware by being more vulnerable was a desirable 
trait and therefore stands as the justification behind this choice.  
 Geo-location of web-page analysis: While the majority of the data was 
gathered in a university network and thoroughly validated in chapter 3 using 
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an external source offsite, it may be possible that there were unseen impacts 
as there was an indirect assumption that was based on the geo-location of the 
analysis environments.   
 Applicability of machine learning: the application of machine learning to log file 
data sets have been actively researched. Within run-time analysis and the 
applicability of various machine learning techniques to a dataset with large 
dimension, there are a number of issues to analysing the log file data. For 
instance: considerations on the log file features that are weighted more can 
often affect the way a dataset is clustered. Within this issue, the work 
presented in the thesis offers an alternative approach that simply takes into 
account all known behaviours and attempts to filter them out. Despite filtering, 
the application of machine learning is a complex field where a number of 
algorithms may be applied to the data to facilitate detection. The choice 
approach however is a complex decision worthy of another fully dedicated 
study. The vastness of data for a single analysis was provided in chapter 6 
and Appendix D to justify this claim. It may be possible for future research to 
link and synthesise further information within the context of the drive-by-
download attacks by applying machine learning algorithms. This was however 
well of scope of this work.  
 Sample sizes used: a number of samples are used within the experiments 
carried out following the prudent experimental guidelines. For each 
experiment written within the work, justifications for appropriate sample sizes 
are provided. In summary, however: this work had two main focus areas. The 
first involved the understanding of known, benign, and expected system 
behaviours. This is applied both in the creation of exclusion lists and the work 
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related to identifying key behavioural differences within patched and 
unpatched systems. These experiments, by nature would require a limited 
number of tests as the requirements were to run analysis on benign 
webpages until no new ‘expected’ system behaviours were captured.  The 
second aspect of the work relied on the run-time analysis of malicious attacks 
from the interaction of client honeypots with potentially malicious webpages. 
Due to the size of the internet, a larger sample size here was more desirable 
as it would be more statistically likely that more exploits and more varied 
attacks would be observed by analysing more malicious URLs. It is fair to say 
as discussed in chapter 3 that the run-time analysis of 110,000 potentially 
malicious webpages costing typical rate of 5 minutes per webpage was a 
sufficient amount in light of other related research (Amorim & Komisarczuk, 
2012; Cova et al., 2010; Tanaka & Goto, 2016; Song et al. 2010) to depict a 
relatively small section of web-based attacks are hosted on malicious servers 
on the internet.  
7.4 Future Work 
While undertaking this research, there were a number of potential future work 
prospects that were identified. These are discussed.  
 Behavioural filter extensions and adaptations.  
o The thesis presented and tested a methodology in the identification 
and labelling of behaviour. This model and labelling feature can be 
applied to alternative operating systems such as Windows 8, or 
Windows 10.  
 Studies within behavioural difference between analysis environments 
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o Differences between patched and unpatched systems can be 
undertaken in a per-major patch increment approach as described in 
chapter 5. 
 Applicability of analysis techniques to filtered datasets  
o Future research could attempt to use the behavioural knowledge 
provided in the filters and behavioural tables as part of the data 
transformation process before applying further analysis techniques. An 
example could include the usage of the labelled behaviour as part of a 
semi-supervised learning approach.  
 Within the context of honeypots, false negative investigation remains a 
challenge:  it is not possible to identify false negatives when the potential for 
attacks are not known beforehand.  
 As an ongoing issue, run-time analysis is dependent on constant extensions 
for detecting evasive malicious behaviour. Having discussed limitations to 
capture, the implementation of bare-metal analysis labs that have an anti-file 
tampering feature or a memory snapshot approach within analysis may help 
in the Portable Executable analysis aspect of malware analysis after a given 
malware is dropped by a malicious website. This would enable further studies 
to be carried out on advanced malware samples.  
7.5 Summary 
The internet has been growing rapidly with availability of website deployment 
facilitating the creation of websites. Web-based threats which pose as high security 
risks to a client and network system’s confidentiality, integrity and availability have 
been and are expected to continue to rise. Identifying malicious web sites by 
performing the analysis of drive-by- faces several challenges which are dependent 
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on approach. Run-time client honeypots are actively used in the detection of web-
based threats. They face limitations in the number of the sheer volume of analysis 
required which is a resource intensive and infeasible task to scan the whole World 
Wide Web and the volume of data that is generated in behavioural interaction 
capture. The latter issue of huge datasets additionally contains significant amounts 
of behaviour that are generated as a result of a system booting and running and can 
therefore be classed as noise. Multiple examples are provided within that depict the 
vastness of data that can be obtained on a single exposure to a malicious website. 
This work sought to address this issue by exploring a method for creating 
behavioural filters in order to achieve the set goals in Chapter 1. As part of this work, 
the implementation of behavioural filters to address this issue was carried out. These 
filters when assessed using prudent practices for malware experiment guidelines, 
proved to reduce the size of log files by 96.96% in average. A number of behaviour 
analysis environments are also studied to gather knowledge on operating systems 
and their sensitivities to fulfil the research objectives around understanding 
behaviours in analysis environments. Finally this work captures and studies a 
number of malicious domains and their active attack vectors to provide knowledge 
on the observable active exploits to fulfil the research objectives on identifying 













Attack vector – The means by which an external party was able to gain access.  
Behaviour analysis environment – The analysis machine containing the behaviour 
analysis tool that monitors a system’s behavioural interactions while attempting to 
analyse a malicious web page.   
Behavioural drift – the change in behavioural interactions observed over time in a 
behaviour analysis environment. These could be due to new file paths being required 
or changes in naming conventions.  
Behavioural filtering – The filtering process of behavioural log files to separate 
malicious and anomalous behaviours from benign behaviours.  
Behavioural filters – The implemented instance of a particular behaviour vector.  
Behavioural log file – A text based file containing behavioural interactions recorded 
upon analysis of a website in the World Wide Web.  
Benign – a non-malicious entity. A behaviour that does not show any signs of 
misdoings that may result in a system being compromised.   
Capture-HPC – The server component of the behaviour analysis tool that is used 
within this work to manage behaviour analysis clients.    
Capture-BAT – The analysis aspect of the Capture software that executes websites 
and monitors behaviour saves it to log files and sends it back to the server.  
Client – the machine that is used by a user to execute a program or service from 
other computers by using networking. Within this work clients initiate requests to web 
servers for content.  
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False negative – An actual malicious behavioural event that is not detected. This is 
the least desirable outcome within the detection and intelligence gathering spectrum 
as an attack is missed by the detection mechanism.  
False positive – A non-malicious behavioural event that is wrongly flagged as 
malicious. This is a false alarm that causes noise in a given log file.  
Malicious web site – A website that attempts to exploit a client system upon 
exposure, redirection or visitation.  
Prudent experimental guidelines – Framework of experimentation that is designed to 
provide realistic, transparent, correct and safe malware experimentation.  
Patched operating system – An operating system that includes security patches that 
were released by the operating system’s vendor to fix identified vulnerabilities.  
Run-time analysis – The analysis of computer software by performing execution of 
software or websites on a real or virtual processor.  
Unpatched operating system – An operating system that does not include any 
security patches or fixes and contains stock versions of files. This is useful in the 
design of honeypots that seek to identify older threats that are still active on the 
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Figure 2C: Screenshot of Virus Total.  
 
Virus Total features include:  
1. The web interface can be used to upload a file/ submit a URL or search for a 
known hash / URL / malware 
2. Email can be used to submit files and receive results via inbox 
3. Virus Total uploader windows application can be used to send  




Figure 2D: Potential data obtainable from Virus Total part 1. 
 




3.4 Testing the validity of the experimental setup 
This experiment is a validity test on the experimental setup to ensure malware is 
able to attack the honeypot. The purpose of this experiment is to access whether the 
behavioural interactions saved on the Capture-HPC server post behavioural analysis 
by the Capture-BAT clients were correctly experiencing malicious behaviour attacks 
despite being placed behind a firewall. The majority of the URLs analysed were 
sourced from malicious domain lists.  
It was observed that only a small percentage (around 20% per batch) were actively 
displaying malicious or unknown behaviours when analysed within the Windows 7 
behaviour environment in a pilot study. There are likely a number of reasons behind 
this low percentage, particularly that a malicious web server can be inactive at times. 
This could conflict with the time that Capture-BAT is analysing a malicious web 
server as the analysis could take place during the inactive period.  
There are also possibilities that a number of these malicious websites are tailored to 
attack a specific client which runs specific to a specific operating system or 
application version. Therefore, a large volume of attacks which target alternative 
client systems would not attack the honeypots used in this study. It is likely that 
some malicious web servers require user interaction. These signs of interaction are 
used to filter typical analysis environments as one very important goal of malware is 
to be undetected. Lack of user interaction in Capture-BAT would mean the criteria of 
triggering the web-exploit would not be satisfied meaning attacks would not take 
place. Furthermore, it is a possibility that the virtualised behaviour analysis 
environment was detected, thus preventing a number of malware from exploiting to 
277 
  
avoid detection. This small percentage of detected active malware per analysed 
batch raised the concern that perhaps the firewall was blocking too much malware 
and therefore contributed to the need of testing the experimental set-up.  
The current experimental setup at the University of West London is mirrored with a 
cloned setup situated at a large organisation in Brentford (UK) protected by a non-
disclosure agreement. The difference between the setup is that the current university 
setup is placed on a virtual network behind a vendor supplied web filter firewall 
whereas the setup at the large organisation is placed in their network’s De-Militarized 
Zone (DMZ) without any protection. The reasoning behind this test is to identify if 
there is any variance between the behaviour analyses taken place and effectively 
evaluate if there are significant malware being blocked by the university’s network 
defence mechanisms.  
3.4.1 Hypothesis 
It is expected that the university setup with the web filtering firewall is likely to 
experience smaller quantity of attacks as known drive-by-download exploits would 
be blocked. 
3.4.2 Test control 
In order to keep this experiment fair and valid, honey client systems running had to 
be exact cloned copies on both test sites. The dependant variables within this 
experiment consisted of identical systems. Both systems therefore needed the exact 
configuration and versions for the listed variables:  
 Capture-HPC server version,  
o Capture-HPC_NG server. 
 Capture-BAT client environment (O.S., browser, Applications), 
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o Windows 7 ‘n edition’ clean SP1, with windows updates kb/3172605 
and /kb/3020369 installed.  
o Internet explorer 8.  
o Flash player, Java, and Real Player 
 Capture-HPC exclusion list, 
o Created Windows 7 exclusion lists: ProcessMonitor, FileMonitor and 
RegistryMonitor, available in the appendix B.  
 Capture-HPC virtual network design and configuration,  
o Capture-HPC server bridged to both Capture-BAT clients 
 Capture-HPC configuration, 
o The used ‘Config.xml’ configuration file for Capture-HPC is available in 
the Chapter 4, Figure 4.2b.  
 Time: Malicious web servers can be offline or inactive at certain times during 
the day, therefore both sites would need to be analysing the same website at 
the same time in order for the experiment to remain a fair test within real-
world behavioural analysis. 
The Capture-HPC servers were cloned using VirtualBox’s clone feature 
(https://www.virtualbox.org/) which effectively allows easy copies of client 
environments as well as the ability to revert a given Virtual Machine (VM) to a clean 
state. These copies are completely mirrored meaning that system environment, 
applications and files are similar on both experimental setups (Reed, 2011).   
The experiments were carried out concurrently and running each URL at the same 
time. This was achieved with the use of the remote-access and control software, 
TeamViewer. (https://www.teamviewer.com). The same batches of URL lists were 
inputted within both Capture-HPC servers and then the command to run was issued 
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at the same second. The lists used on both sites were cloned copies which meant 
that Capture would run the URLs on both site in the same order in addition to 
running the analysis simultaneously. As a result of the time-consuming nature of 
dynamic of drive-by-download analysis, this experiment was conducted over the 
period of three weeks with no changes such as software or O.S. updates to the four 
analysis (Capture-BAT) environments in order to keep the test valid and fair.  
3.4.3 Results 
An identical set of 2500 potentially active malicious URLs were simultaneously 
analysed starting at the exact same time in both locations. Out of both sets of 2500 
URLs there was a 100% identical match in websites found malicious, thus disproving 
the hypothesis. In both cases 543 potentially malicious log files were created by 
Capture-BAT. This means that URLs which found to be malicious by the client 
honeypot system set up at University of West London were also identified as 
malicious at the large organisation in Brentford with no network and computer 
system defences in place to filter results.  
Furthermore, both instances of Capture-HPC identified the same drive-by-download 
and the Capture-BAT clients was compromised by the same exploit in every case. 
The justification of this statement was concluded from the analysis of malware 
behaviours in both sets of data. This revealed that log files from both locations were 
identical thus Capture-BAT was detecting the same exploit. Worryingly, it would 
appear that the malicious behaviours that Capture-BAT was capturing in either cases 
were not hindered by the University’s defence mechanisms which included an 
enabled firewall solution with web filtering. This could be due to the relatively newly 
setup malicious domains which were not identified by the defence mechanisms in 
place. The results of this experiment may not generalise over to another university 
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with different defence mechanisms in place as different security solutions may offer 
different levels of protection and restriction towards attack vectors that are known. 
Specific results from malicious URL behaviour analysis are discussed, analysed and 
these are presented in chapter 6. 
It is important to note that the 543 log files were identical in both datasets: false 
positives identified by Capture-BAT were also shared between the datasets thus 
proving that the Capture-BAT and URLs analysed at the same time displayed similar 
manifestations.  
3.4.4 Conclusion 
There was no difference within the gathered data sets from both networks. It is 
therefore fair to conclude that the security systems in place at the University were 
unable to filter out any drive-by-download attacks that were targeting the Windows 7 
client. This is a justified conclusion as every attack that took place within the 
unsecured and unfiltered honeypot deployment, in place were also detected at the 
university. Log files gathered for these attacks were checked and again the 
behavioural changes flagged by Capture as malicious were found in both instances 
of the test. As the results of the validation test were so promising, it is certain that the 
experimental setup was ideal for drive-by-download analysis and that there were no 
impeding factors based on the network environment that were preventing malware 
attacks while running the server on the university network.   
The disproval of the hypothesis however does require critical thinking. While the 
attacks and behaviours remained identical in both cases, the low percentage of 
observed malicious behaviour may be due to unconsidered factors.   It is likely that 
the firewall and web filtering option which is controlled by the university’s network 
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team could have been offline at the time of the experiment. However, this is unlikely 
to have stayed offline for the course of 16 days which was the time required to 
analyse the 12556 URLs.  Sample choice could have been unknowingly limited to a 
sample of newer and undetected web exploits. This could mean that the analysis 
environment would still face malware attacks on both sites and since the results on 
both sites were identical, it is likely that this could have been a viable reason why the 
security systems in place at the university were not stopping any of the drive-by-
download attacks.  
In terms of evaluating the choice of applications: arguably, it is good practice for 
honeypots to attempt to use older versions of software as on the world wide web, as 
malicious websites can often be seen active over 500 days after initial detection 
(Tanaka and Goto, 2016). The rationale is simply that older patched software often 
contains unpatched vulnerabilities that some of the remaining active malicious web 
servers will continue to target in order to infiltrate the client machine. It may be 
possible that not enough older applications were installed on the analysis 
environment or perhaps the versions that chosen and installed contained a large 
number of vulnerability patches which prevented malicious attacks seen in the wild, 
this would explain the relatively low (543/2500) levels of attacks discovered. 
The experiment design was successful in achieving what it was designed for: the 
testing of validity of our main experimental setup. This is because a completely 
similar setup operating on a different network was analysing the same websites at 
the same time. This provides indication that observed behaviours should really be 
identical, which was also concluded from the log file analysis undertaken. With 
regards to the test itself, as all of the listed variables were kept under control and the 
only difference between the analysis environments being the geographical location 
282 
  
and defence structures in place, it proves to be a fair test of the validity of the 
Capture analysis environment. In conclusion, both the test being designed fairly and 
the results being promising meant that the Capture behaviour analysis environment 
was set up validly in line with the aforementioned prudent practices discussed in 3.1-
3.1.5.  
3.5 Evaluating twitter as a source of gathering malicious domains 
The purpose of this experiment is to analyse URLs shared in “tweets” from the 
Twitter website (https://twitter.com/) and capture malicious behaviours using 
Capture-HPC. The point behind this is to access whether Twitter is a viable resource 
for the gathering process of malicious URLs within this thesis. Strickland & Chandler 
(2014) describe a tweet as “a message sent on Twitter”. The aim behind this 
experiment is to use a different data source that combined a list of both malicious 
and benign websites as opposed to purely malicious websites from malware domain 
and black listed website repositories.  
3.5.1 Experimental purpose and background 
This experiment allowed us to determine the viability of using social media to find 
compromised and malicious websites as opposed to relying on malware domain 
databases. Additionally, the knowledge gathered may lead to future experiments that 
analyse the malware propagated using social media in comparison to the captured 
malware originating from malware domains repositories. These may help determine 
whether these malwares samples inhibit similar malicious behaviours or whether the 
malware is from the same family or not. 
The nature of the dynamic analysis of malware is time consuming and resource 
intensive on client systems. Each URL takes about 5 minutes to run and about 3-5 
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minutes to boot and reboot which is necessary after each malware test to revert our 
Capture-BAT to its original unmodified (by malicious behaviour) state. The value of 5 
minutes per page is a shared variable with previous work by Burnap et al. (2015). 
The authors were able to observe malicious behaviour within their gathered 
malicious URLs within the first minute.  There are around 500 million tweets 
everyday according to InternetLiveStats (2015), and is clearly it would be difficult to 
analyse that many tweets and gather URLS to be analysed by Capture-HPC. 
Consequently, an event namely the World Cup in 2014 was chosen and analysis of 
1% of all the randomly selected daily tweets, which contained the hashtag 
#Worldcup.  The first part of the experiment involves capturing the URLs from these 
specific tweets on that specific date. A script is used to gather these URLs and 
duplicates of the URL captured are excluded from our URL list. 
This experiment allowed the determination of which data source to use when 
attempting to gather as many attacks as possible targeting client systems.  The 
same test bed and experimental setup discussed in 5.1 is used and the Capture-
HPC system was cloned and provided to the alternative setup that was used to run 
the other half of the dataset. This isn’t a problem despite different geographical 
locations and hardware being utilised as results were 100% identical when verified 
using same the URLs simultaneously as concluded in experiment run in section 3.4 
of the chapter.  
3.5.2 Results 
Table 3.4: Percentage URLs classified as malware originating from twitter 











15-Jul-14 1276 119 1395 8.53% 
16-Jul-14 1133 262 1395 18.78% 
17-Jul-14 1124 271 1395 19.43% 
18-Jul-14 1058 337 1395 24.16% 
19-Jul-14 1239 156 1395 11.18% 
25-Jul-14 1206 189 1395 13.55% 
26-Jul-14 1045 351 1396 25.14% 
30-Jul-14 1173 222 1395 15.91% 
31-Jul-14 1241 154 1395 11.04% 
 Total 10495 2061 12556 16.41% 
 
These results are purely from the behaviour analysis undertaken by Capture-BAT 
from the interaction between the client honeypot and the website link found on 
Twitter in tweets containing the hashtag, #worldcup and a URL. It is important to 
note that since 16% of all the analysed tweets were being posted by twitter users, it 
seemed unlikely that such a high percentage would contain links to a compromised 
malicious website. This therefore required fine-grained analysis for behavioural 
verification purposes and identification of possible false positives and false 
negatives.  
In order to perform fine-grained analysis of Capture log files, one approach was to 
identify malicious behaviours contained in the log files created by Capture-BAT. 
These would provide behavioural information on the actual interactions that took 
place during website analysis. Fine grain analysis of log files within Capture-BAT is 
an exhaustive process as often Capture-BAT log files contain hundreds of 
behavioural interactions as can be seen by examples in Appendix B. However, the 
log files created during the Twitter evaluation as a source for malware gathering 
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were filtered using exclusion lists at the data gathering process. Highly detailed 
information about these filters’ creation, configurations and usage are provided in 
Chapter 4. The filtered log files were then combined and behaviour lists which 
included unique behaviours were created. These lists included the behavioural 
frequency observed. Performing these data transformation operations reduced the 
raw dataset of 73769 behaviours down to 4568 unique behaviours, netting a 93% 
reduction. This step is important as the maximum amount of reductions prior to the 
fine-grained analysis results in the least data redundancy when a malware analyst is 
performing manual investigation of behaviours.  
Initially, for the fine-grained analysis captured behaviours are verified and compared 
with expected behaviours for each known process (which can be seen in the next 
chapter’s behaviour tables). Secondly, unknown behaviours are thoroughly 
investigated and compared with a database of known benign behaviours. This 
provides further indication of maliciousness. Performing these two tasks yields a 
conclusion on whether a behavioural interaction is malicious, benign or simply 
unknown.  In terms of the findings of the fine grain analysis, it was observed that the 
vast majority (2059/2061) of log files that Capture flagged as malicious were false 
positives: the behaviours contained within log files did not show any signs 
maliciousness despite being classified as such. The misclassification by Capture-
BAT is caused by utilised exclusion lists (discussed in Chapter 4) which by default 
mark any new behaviour as malicious. Since the drifted behaviours that Capture-
BAT clients identified in the 2059 instances were not present in the exclusion list, 
Capture-BAT would mark these as malicious, which then proved to be false positive.  
Out of the log files that Capture-BAT found malicious, it was concluded that there 
were only two traces of malicious behaviour where Internet explorer was hijacked 
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and wrote malicious .tmp files which were executed. Possible reasons for these 
findings on analysed Twitter URLs are explored below. 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
Out of the combined 12,556 URLS analysed for this experiment, the vast majority 
were benign and did not attack the Windows 7 based client systems directly. 
However, a varying number of behaviours were flagged as malicious by Capture-
BAT. In terms of gathering a large list of user shared URLs, comparing the amounts 
of unique flagged malicious URLs obtained from Twitter it would appear that Twitter 
has some potential for providing researchers with large volumes of URLs.  This 
source for malware propagation and certainly can be very viable for client honeypot 
research, specifically if the client honeypot solutions are able to handle extreme 
amounts of URL analysis. It is agreed that dynamic analysis by Capture-BAT is 
however not quite suitable to perform analysis on large amounts of URLs with very 
low potential of malware attacks. Dynamic analysis is resource intensive and 
therefore has a very low percent of detection ratio from the URLs from Twitter. This 
yields a poor overall maliciousness capture rate. A better approach as often research 
in this field undertakes would combine low-interaction client honeypots or hybrid 
systems to perform emulated analysis and identify key URLs that are likely to be 
malicious prior to dynamic analysis.  
However, this method would be unsuitable to gather a data corpus for this research 
as the frequency of attack was far too low compared to the percentage found using 
malicious URL repositories.  Results are displayed in table 3.4 and discussed in 
section 3.5.2. Clearly, for us to gather more malicious behaviours within the available 
Capture-HPC server and Capture-BAT clients: it is much more effective to use a 
data source originating from a malicious domain repository. It should be noted that 
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we observed a number of the URLS shared on Twitter as potential phishing attacks 
but that is beyond the scope of this research as the focus is on client attacks with 
limited user interaction. Further research especially using static analysis to detect 
phishing attacks are discussed by Lee and Kim (2012). 
More concerningly with the conclusion, from analysing the log file data from Twitter, 
it would appear that log files contained a large number of false positives which were 
caused from a concept that is introduced as ‘environmental behaviour drift’ and 
irregular system behaviours often observed. The concept of behavioural drift is 
explored further and discussed in chapters 4, and 6. Irregular system behaviour 
observed could be caused by communication between the operating system, 
Windows 7 and Microsoft. It is evident that from these results, we can conclude that 
the output of behaviour analysis labs can sometimes vary despite the same system 
being utilised for analysis. These slight variations in system calls creates some false 
positives which can be identified with fine-grain analysis of log files. In order to avoid 
this pitfall however, it is possible to refine filters utilised within dynamic analysis by 
developing and updating filters regularly. The creation, use and implementation of 
filters are discussed thoroughly in Chapter 4.  
3.5.4 Evaluation 
The evaluation of Twitter as a potential source for gathering malicious behaviour was 
undertaken by actively gathering a large number of user shared URLs in their tweets 
containing a very specific hashtag (#Worldcup), time frame (shared on the day of the 
Word Cup final in 2014) and contained a unique URL. This was necessary as the 
data potential available on Twitter is far too huge in its entirety to perform dynamic 
analysis on every shared URL. It was felt that this approach was able to access the 
main problem which were URLs on Twitter sufficiently malicious for client honeypot 
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research to perform dynamic analysis and collect malware samples. This was found 
to not be the case as from the small and limited set of data analysed the amount of 
malicious interaction was far too low (2/12556 URLS).  
It is however important to not generalise within cyber security research as the 
dataset used in assessing the tweets from Twitter as a possible source for malicious 
URL gathering was limited in several ways:  
 Only 1% of the total tweets which contained the #Worldcup phrase and a URL 
was analysed. 1% of the hash tag is a very small sample size even though 
dynamic drive-by-download analysis is being undertaken. Repeated URLs 
which would cause duplicates were removed from the selection of URL to 
avoid redundant data and processing. Twitter API however limits developers 
to 1% of tweets per day.  
 It is probable that different hashtags, typically focused on illegal, porn, warez 
might typically be more suited and likely to containing links that are malicious. 
Assessing the hashtag and the categories are a research question in itself 
and out of scope of this research.  
 It could be possible that the analysis environment was lacking operating 
system vulnerabilities, applications with specific versions containing 
vulnerabilities or was simply detected by malware. These factors may cause 
malware to not manifest and attempt compromising the client honeypot.  
 The analysis of multiple of the dataset was conducted a few days (15th – 31st 
July 2014) after the World Cup final 2014 (13th of July 2014) due to the sheer 
time requirements and equipment limitation of dynamic analysis. During the 
time of analysis, it could be possible that potentially malicious websites had 
changed malicious behaviours or been inactive.  
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 Capture-BAT analysis environment despite running on a slightly higher level 
of privilege (within the Kernel mode) than malware (user mode), is susceptible 
to malware detection which upon detection may choose to not execute or 
infect a system. Despite running on a higher privilege level, the 
captureclient.exe component is visible as a process which could compromise 
behavioural analysis capture from a malicious attack.  
 Similarly, despite having taken precautions from not installing Guest Additions 
on VirtualBox which facilitates the detection of the virtual environment by 
malware, newer malicious drive-by-downloads detect the presence of the 
virtual machine and cease any attempts to execute and be detected. It is 
possible that the virtual environment was still discovered and malware did not 
trigger to avoid detection.  
Noticeably, as a result of the low level of experienced malicious attacks it was not 
possible to conclude malware diversity and potential similarities between malware 
families. Despite being a very limited dataset and having a number limitations, the 
bottom-line was that the ultra-low occurrence actual and confirmed maliciousness 
observed in the dataset displays Tweets as a poor source for dynamic drive-by-
download analysis for this study.  The ultra-low occurrence conclusion is sufficiently 
low enough to conclude that pursuing pure dynamic analysis on datasets which 
include a large number of benign websites is not worth the resource and time 
requirements associated with dynamic analysis. This therefore evaluates Twitter as a 
poor source to gather malicious URLs for this research. In terms of future prospects, 
it is recommended that some form of pre-filters be applied to the URL selection 
process prior to analysing shared URLs in tweets as this may result in better 
malicious URL yields, as the existing knowledge within hybrid systems prove (Seifert 
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et al. 2008; Le. et al. (2011).  Consequently, a range of different malicious domain 
websites and the bank of potentially malicious websites provided by the large 
organisation were used to gather malicious behavioural interactions attacking our 




Figure 4A: Example log file of figure 4.0a in full. 
This is an unfiltered log file showing the  large volumes of benign behaviours that can be present in behavioural log files from 
Capture-BAT. 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:5:44.264","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:5:44.264","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:5:44.264","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:5:44.264","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:5:44.264","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:5:44.264","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:5:44.264","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:5:44.264","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:5:44.274","C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Classes\Local Settings\MuiCache\B\52C64B7E\LanguageList","-1" 

















































































































































"registry","18/8/2016 17:6:47.821","System","SetValueKey","HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\WMI\Autologger\Circular Kernel Context Logger\Status","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:6:48.81","C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe","SetValueKey","HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\LowRegistry\ErrorReporting\LastShipAssertTime","-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 





"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\NonCritical_iexplore.exe_12df8271b62395a348f102b12959f9768e2baf9_0a72158a\Report.wer",
"-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:6:48.832","C:\Program Files\Internet 
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"-1" 
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"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:8.450","System","SetValueKey","HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\UMB\UMB\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\Device Parameters\NodeID","-1" 

























"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:11.484","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Print\Printers\DefaultSpoolDirectory","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports\Ne00:","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\S-1-5-19\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Devices\Microsoft XPS Document Writer","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\S-1-5-19\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\PrinterPorts\Microsoft XPS Document 
Writer","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports\Ne01:","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\S-1-5-19\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Devices\Fax","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\S-1-5-19\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\PrinterPorts\Fax","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports\Ne00:","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Devices\Microsoft XPS Document Writer","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\PrinterPorts\Microsoft XPS Document 
Writer","-1" 




"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Devices\Fax","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\PrinterPorts\Fax","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports\Ne00:","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Devices\Microsoft XPS Document Writer","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\PrinterPorts\Microsoft XPS Document Writer","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports\Ne01:","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Devices\Fax","-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:7:12.416","C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe","Write","C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network\Downloader\qmgr0.dat","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\PrinterPorts\Fax","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports\Ne00:","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Devices\Microsoft XPS Document 
Writer","-1" 
"file","18/8/2016 17:7:12.466","C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe","Write","C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network\Downloader\qmgr0.dat","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\PrinterPorts\Microsoft XPS Document 
Writer","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Ports\Ne01:","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Devices\Fax","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:13.387","C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe","SetValueKey","HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\PrinterPorts\Fax","-1" 
"registry","18/8/2016 17:7:14.689","C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe","DeleteValueKey","HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\LowRegistry\AddToFavoritesInitialSelection","-1" 




Figure 4B: Our Windows 7 process monitor exclusion list. 
These exclusion lists was the artefact created and used within the creation of the filtered datasets.  
************************************************************************************************************************************************ 
#[+,-] [Process Created] [Parent Process] [Process Path] 
################################################### 
### Clean Windows XP SP 2 System  ### 
################################################### 
#issue in the way process path information is communicated to capture client 
+ UNKNOWN .* UNKNOWN 
#capture client itself 
+ CaptureClient.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\CaptureClient\.exe 
+ CaptureClient.bat .* C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\CaptureClient\.bat 
+ 7za.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\7za\.exe 
#Windows update (it runs even if disabled) 
+ wuauclt.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe 
# 
+ savedump.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\savedump\.exe 
#Standard screensaver 
+ logon.scr .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\logon\.scr 
#defragmenter 
+ dfrgntfs.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\dfrgntfs\.exe 
+ defrag.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\defrag\.exe 
#7za 




+ wmiadap.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap\.exe 
+ wmiprvse.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse\.exe 
#vmware tools 
+ VMwareUser.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\VMwareUser\.exe 
################################################### 
### Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0  ### 
################################################### 
+ iexplore.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe 
+ IEXPLORE.EXE .* C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\IEXPLORE.EXE 
#agent server is an activeX control that starts upon displaying multimedia content 
+ agentsvr.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr.exe 
#messenger activeX 
+ msmsgs.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs.exe 
+ rundll32.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\rundll32.exe 
#imapi 





Figure 4C: Our Windows 7 File monitor exclusion list. 
************************************************************************************************************************************************ 
#[+,-] [File Access] [Process Name] [File Path] 
################################################### 
### Clean Windows XP SP 2 System  ### 
################################################### 
+ Read .* .* 
+ Create .* .* 
+ Open .* .* 
#issue in the way process path information is communicated to capture client 
+ Write UNKNOWN .* 
+ Delete UNKNOWN .* 
#capture 
+ Write .* C:\\program files\\capture\\logs\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\program Files\\capture\\captureclient\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\.+\.zip 
+ Delete C:\\program Files\\capture\\captureclient\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\logs 
+ Delete C:\\program Files\\capture\\captureclient\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\logs\\.* 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\captureclient\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\capture\.log 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\capture\.log 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\.+\.zip 
+ Delete C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\.+\.zip 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\progra~1\\capture\\capture\.log 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\progra~1\\capture\\.+\.zip 




+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\Prefetch\\.+ 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\Prefetch\\.+ 
#NTFS Metadata 
+ Write .* c:\\\$mft 
+ Write .* c:\\\$mftmirr 
+ Write .* c:\\\$logfile 
+ Write .* c:\\\$volume 
+ Write .* c:\\\$directory 
+ Write .* c:\\\$AttrDef 
+ Write .* c:\\\$boot 
+ Write .* c:\\\$bitmap 
+ Write .* c:\\\$badclus 
+ Write .* c:\\\$quota 
+ Write .* c:\\\$upcase 
+ Write .* c:\\\$ReplaceAttribute2 
+ Write .* c:\\\$converttononresident 
#Performance 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\Performance\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\Perf.* 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\Prefetch\\.+ 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\Prefetch\\.+ 
#System Log Files 
+ Write System C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\.+\.LOG 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\.+\.LOG 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\Debug\\UserMode\\userenv\.log 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents\.log 
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+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\winlogon\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\Debug\\UserMode\\userenv\.log 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\.+\.log 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\.+\.LOG 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\SAM 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\system 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\SECURITY 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\Logs\\wmiprov\.log 
#Windows update 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\DataStore\\Logs\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\WindowsUpdate\.log 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\DataStore\\DataStore\.edb 
+ Delete C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\DataStore\\Logs\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\WindowsUpdate\.log 
+ Delete C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\DataStore\\DataStore\.edb 
#System Events 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\AppEvent\.Evt 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\SysEvent\.Evt 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\SecEvent\.Evt 
#Mapping 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\.+ 
#Cataloging 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\CatRoot2\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\CatRoot\\.+ 
#System restore 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\WuRedir\\.+ 




+ Write System C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local Settings\\Application Data\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UsrClass\.dat 
################################################### 
### Internet Explorer 6.0 SP2   ### 
################################################### 
#somehow VMwareService & System accesses the same files when IE is browsing. 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\VMwareService\.exe .* 
+ Write System .* 
# IE Temporary Files/Internet Cache.  
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local Settings\\Temporary Internet Files\\Content\.IE5\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local Settings\\Temp\\.+tmp 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local Settings\\Temporary Internet Files\\Content\.IE5\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local Settings\\Temp\\.+tmp 
# History 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local Settings\\History\\History.IE5\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local Settings\\History\\History.IE5\\.+ 
# IE Cookies 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Cookies\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Cookies\\index.dat 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Cookies\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Cookies\\index.dat 
# User data 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Application Data\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\UserData\\.+ 
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+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Application Data\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\UserData\\.+ 
# Plug ins (like Flash player) 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Application Data\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Application Data\\.+ 
# DRM related stuff 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\DRM\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\DRM\\.+ 
# msg activeX 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\NTUSER.DAT.LOG 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\NTUSER.DAT.LOG 
################################################### 
### Minus List - General Malicious Activity ### 
################################################### 
# Alert about executables or scripts that are written to disk 
#- Write .* .+\.bat 
#- Write .* .+\.cmd 
#- Write .* .+\.exe 
#- Write .* .+\.inf 
#- Write .* .+\.lnk 
#- Write .* .+\.msi 
#- Write .* .+\.msp 
#- Write .* .+\.pif 
#- Write .* .+\.reg 
#- Write .* .+\.sct 
#- Write .* .+\.shs 
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#- Write .* .+\.scr 
#- Write .* .+\.wsc 
#- Write .* .+\.wsf 
#- Write .* .+\.wsh 
#commented out for IE because \.com cache files and \.vb script files are very common 
#- Write .* .+\.vb 
#- Write .* .+\.com 
# Alert about modifications to startup locations 
- Write .* C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup.+ 
- Write .* C:\\WINDOWS\\win.ini 
- Write .* C:\\WINDOWS\\Tasks\\.+ 
320 
  
Figure 4D: Our Windows 7 Registry monitor exclusion list. 
************************************************************************************************************************************************ 
#[+,-] [Registry Event] [Process Name] [Registry Path] 
################################################### 
### Microsoft Windows XP SP2   ### 
################################################### 
+ OpenKey .* .* 
+ CreateKey .* .* 
+ CloseKey .* .* 
+ EnumerateKey .* .* 
+ EnumerateValueKey .* .* 
+ QueryValueKey .* .* 
+ QueryKey .* .* 
#issue in the way process path information is communicated to capture client 
+ SetValueKey UNKNOWN .* 
+ DeleteValueKey UNKNOWN .* 
+ SetValueKey .* HKU\\.+\\SessionInformation\\ProgramCount 
+ SetValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam.* 
+ SetValueKey .* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Installer\\UserData\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey .* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\RNG\\Seed.* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\CaptureClient.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\nm\\Parameters\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKCU\\SessionInformation\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
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+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache\\Paths\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\BagMRU\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\winlogon.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Group Policy\\State\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe \\REGISTRY\\USER\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKU\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EAPOL\\Parameters\\General\\InterfaceList 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\AuthRoot\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\PCHealth\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKLM\\SECURITY\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Protected Storage System Provider\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\WmiApRpl\\Performance\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Perflib\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\WDM\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey .* HKU\\.+\\SessionInformation\\ProgramCount 
+ DeleteValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam.* 
+ DeleteValueKey .* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Installer\\UserData\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey .* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\RNG\\Seed.* 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\CaptureClient.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\nm\\Parameters\\.+ 
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+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKCU\\SessionInformation\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\BagMRU\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\winlogon.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Group Policy\\State\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe \\REGISTRY\\USER\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKU\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\AuthRoot\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\PCHealth\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKLM\\SECURITY\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Protected Storage System Provider\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\WmiApRpl\\Performance\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Perflib\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\WDM\\.+ 
#defrag 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\dfrgntfs.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Dfrg.* 




+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\Eventlog\\Application\\ESENT\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\Eventlog\\Application\\ESENT\\.+ 
################################################### 
### Internet Explorer 6.0 SP2   ### 
################################################### 
+ OpenKey .* .* 
+ CreateKey .* .* 
+ CloseKey .* .* 
+ EnumerateKey .* .* 
+ EnumerateValueKey .* .* 
+ QueryValueKey .* .* 
+ QueryKey .* .* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\EUDC\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Window_Placement 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Fullscreen 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\NotificationDownloadComplete 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\TypedURLs 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Toolbar\\Locked 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\International\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Security\\P3Global\\Enabled 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\CmdMapping\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\PageSetup\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\MenuOrder\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\MountPoints2\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\UserAssist\\.+ 
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+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\CabinetState\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\UNCAsIntranet 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Toolbar\\WebBrowser\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\IntranetName 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\AutoDetect 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProxyBypass 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\UNCAsIntranet 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\MigrateProxy 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyServer 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Connections\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Ext\\Stats\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\BagMRU.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\Bags.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Ext\\Stats\\.+\\iexplore\\(Count|Time|Type) 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ParseAutoexec 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Passport\\.+ 
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+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Direct3D.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DirectDraw.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\RNG\\Seed 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AudioCompressionManager\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache. 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Hardware Profiles\\0001\\Software\\Microsoft\\windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ProxyEnable 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\EventLog\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\EUDC\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Window_Placement 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Fullscreen 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\NotificationDownloadComplete 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\TypedURLs 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Toolbar\\Locked 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\International\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Security\\P3Global\\Enabled 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\CmdMapping\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\PageSetup\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\MenuOrder\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\MountPoints2\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\UserAssist\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\CabinetState\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\UNCAsIntranet 
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+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\IntranetName 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\AutoDetect 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProxyBypass 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\UNCAsIntranet 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\MigrateProxy 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyServer 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Connections\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Ext\\Stats\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\BagMRU.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\Bags.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Ext\\Stats\\.+\\iexplore\\(Count|Time|Type) 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ParseAutoexec 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Passport\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Direct3D.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DirectDraw.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\RNG\\Seed 
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+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AudioCompressionManager\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Hardware Profiles\\0001\\Software\\Microsoft\\windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ProxyEnable 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\EventLog\\.+ 
+ DeleteKey .* .* 
#Plugins 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Scrunch\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\MediaPlayer\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Media\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Multimedia\\ActiveMovie\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\ActiveMovie\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\MPEG2Demultiplexer\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Multimedia\\msacm.imaadpcm\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AudioCompressionManager\\DriverCache\\msacm.msadpcm\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Agent\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\AppEvents\\Schemes\\Apps\\MSMSGS.* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\AppEvents\\EventLabels\\MSMsgs.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\MSMSGS 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EventSystem\\.+\\Subscriptions\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Scrunch\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\MediaPlayer\\.+ 
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+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Media\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Multimedia\\ActiveMovie\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\ActiveMovie\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\MPEG2Demultiplexer\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Multimedia\\msacm.imaadpcm\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AudioCompressionManager\\DriverCache\\msacm.msadpcm\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Agent\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\AppEvents\\EventLabels\\MSMsgs.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\AppEvents\\Schemes\\Apps\\MSMSGS.* 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\MSMSGS 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EventSystem\\.+\\Subscriptions\\.+ 
################################################### 
### Minus List - General Malicious Activity ### 
################################################### 
#Any modification to start/bootup sequence 
- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Run.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load.* 
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- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit.* 
- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell.* 
- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute.* 
- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad\\.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad\\.* 
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Table 4E: Process and default path table. 
Default path for executable Executable Name 
C:\program Files\capture\captureclient.exe Captureclient.exe 









C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe iexplore.exe 
C:\Program Files\Capture\CaptureClient.exe CaptureClient.exe 
C:\Program Files\Capture\CaptureClient\.bat CaptureClient.bat 
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C:\Program Files\Capture\7za.exe 7za.exe 
C:\Windows\system32\wuauclt.exe wuauclt.exe 
C:\Windows\system32\savedump.exe savedump.exe 















C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe winlogon.exe  
C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe userinit.exe 






C:\Windows\System32\wsqmcons.exe wsqmcons.exe  
C:\Windows\System32\sdclt.exe Sdclt.exe 
C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe sc.exe  
C:\Windows\System32\drvinst.exe drvinst.exe 
C:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe WerFault.exe 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe Iexplorer.exe 
C:\Windows\msagent\agentsvr.exe agentsvr.exe 








Table 5A:  Full list of applied updates for experimental transparency. 
Type Hot Fix ID 
Security Update KB2479943 
Security Update KB2491683 
Security Update KB2503665 
Security Update KB2506212 
Security Update KB2509553 
Security Update KB2510531 
Security Update KB2511455 
Update KB2533552 
Hotfix KB2534111 
Security Update KB2544893 
Update KB2552343 
Security Update KB2560656 
Security Update KB2564958 
Security Update KB2570947 
Security Update KB2579686 
Security Update KB2585542 
Security Update KB2604115 
Security Update KB2620704 
Security Update KB2621440 
Security Update KB2631813 
Security Update KB2653956 
Security Update KB2654428 
Security Update KB2656356 
Security Update KB2667402 
Security Update KB2676562 
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Security Update KB2685939 
Security Update KB2690533 
Security Update KB2698365 
Security Update KB2705219 
Update KB2718704 
Security Update KB2727528 
Security Update KB2729452 
Security Update KB2736422 
Security Update KB2742599 
Security Update KB2758857 
Security Update KB2770660 
Update KB2786081 
Security Update KB2789645 
Update KB2798162 
Security Update KB2807986 
Security Update KB2813430 
Update KB2836942 
Update KB2836943 
Security Update KB2840149 
Security Update KB2840631 
Security Update KB2847927 
Security Update KB2861698 
Security Update KB2862152 
Security Update KB2862330 
Security Update KB2862335 
Security Update KB2864202 
Security Update KB2868038 
Update KB2868116 
Security Update KB2871997 
Security Update KB2884256 
Security Update KB2892074 
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Security Update KB2893294 
Security Update KB2894844 
Security Update KB2900986 
Security Update KB2911501 
Update KB2929733 
Security Update KB2931356 
Security Update KB2937610 
Security Update KB2943357 
Security Update KB2957189 
Security Update KB2965788 
Security Update KB2968294 
Security Update KB2972100 
Security Update KB2972211 
Security Update KB2973112 
Security Update KB2973201 
Security Update KB2973351 
Security Update KB2977292 
Security Update KB2978120 
Security Update KB2984972 
Security Update KB2991963 
Security Update KB2992611 
Update KB2993651 
Security Update KB3003743 
Security Update KB3004361 
Security Update KB3004375 
Security Update KB3005607 
Security Update KB3010788 
Security Update KB3011780 
Security Update KB3019978 
Update KB3020369 
Security Update KB3021674 
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Security Update KB3022777 
Security Update KB3023215 
Security Update KB3030377 
Security Update KB3033889 
Security Update KB3033929 
Security Update KB3035126 
Security Update KB3035132 
Security Update KB3037574 
Security Update KB3042058 
Security Update KB3042553 
Security Update KB3045685 
Security Update KB3046017 
Security Update KB3046269 
Security Update KB3055642 
Security Update KB3059317 
Security Update KB3060716 
Security Update KB3061518 
Security Update KB3067904 
Security Update KB3071756 
Security Update KB3072305 
Security Update KB3074543 
Security Update KB3075220 
Security Update KB3076895 
Security Update KB3076949 
Security Update KB3078601 
Security Update KB3080446 
Security Update KB3084135 
Security Update KB3086255 
Security Update KB3087039 
Security Update KB3092601 
Security Update KB3093513 
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Security Update KB3097989 
Security Update KB3101722 
Security Update KB3108371 
Security Update KB3108381 
Security Update KB3108664 
Security Update KB3108670 
Security Update KB3109094 
Security Update KB3109103 
Security Update KB3109560 
Security Update KB3110329 
Security Update KB3115858 
Security Update KB3122648 
Security Update KB3123479 
Security Update KB3124275 
Security Update KB3124280 
Security Update KB3126587 
Security Update KB3127220 
Security Update KB3135983 
Update KB3138612 
Security Update KB3139398 
Security Update KB3139914 
Security Update KB3142024 
Security Update KB3142042 
Security Update KB3145739 
Security Update KB3146706 
Security Update KB3146963 
Security Update KB3149090 
Security Update KB3155178 
Security Update KB3156016 
Security Update KB3156017 
Security Update KB3156019 
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Security Update KB3159398 
Security Update KB3161561 
Security Update KB3161949 
Security Update KB3161958 
Security Update KB3163245 
Security Update KB3164033 
Security Update KB3164035 
Security Update KB3168965 
Security Update KB3170455 
Update KB3172605 
Security Update KB3175024 
Security Update KB3177186 
Security Update KB3178034 
Update KB3182203 
Security Update KB3184122 

















False positive file  
 
MD5 Time of analysis Signature 
Tmps     
1768605d24117b9ed7d29cfb4ebe5cf6 2016-07-29 17:51:18 Downloader.Generic13.BZCI 
1f8f5d16db62a998283ce45d48b67eeb 2016-07-27 21:31:03 Downloader.Generic13.BZCI 
server1.exe     
ed5d47f977e201719cbc8e220a6aa034 2016-07-28 17:00:08 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
b1b5346c6194670b82a20f864f8f0182 2016-07-26 14:52:09 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
ece4e4669fec483da92a28e9ba22c673 2016-07-29 20:33:45 MSIL.AP 
45fcea1d7ba007df48ce3c5cd9dc7062 2016-07-28 15:49:49 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
9737d7af2dcc9c57629cf56e3cbecba9 2016-07-25 20:09:05 PSW.ILUSpy 
2b78deeeca7d00807e120b8c62df332a 2016-07-27 21:47:30 Bladabindi.PDE 
1a4ac812a4554f4dc35f3641a5b0ebde 2016-07-28 17:04:00 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
e8359aff133f6b4e37c5663b274f97d0 2016-07-29 17:59:22 PSW.ILUSpy 
e1113c0609bb3bc7c868656fcb82c015 2016-07-27 21:43:00 PSW.ILUSpy 
f5c132c4a5560886b989cd1af59e096a 2016-07-27 22:01:55 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
727488c4dbde294a7f39221a2c85e7f7 2016-07-29 17:37:00 PSW.ILUSpy 
45f3c9adf8a3417710ae1baaffd9f47a 2016-07-28 15:51:37 MSIL.AL 
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9579c854f08428bbc0d25c2f65a5f1e8 2016-07-27 22:26:14 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
399235636f1aa9aa75d1f246eb2e7b42 2016-07-27 22:06:28 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
1bab5cb0fb1c03e7b45e81fe50818983 2016-07-27 21:37:57 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
e0737b3d5f94b2c2bd212df5cd8fd9a2 2016-07-28 17:52:50 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
1fcf408a1fc46629f26da4cad2dce16a 2016-07-29 20:55:57 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
15c241e87e30c0a80174f7bf70d0715a 2016-07-29 21:04:48 PSW.ILUSpy 
e84e4536f80e6a77904ded36715d4ce1 2016-07-28 16:13:08 PSW.ILUSpy 
321832e46efe46ec64de158e04fd1103 2016-07-26 18:10:50 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
b26a02e9e730fb94e98fc46b35eb1d24 2016-07-29 20:49:35 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
80ea2c1a63af7202cf58a5bd258b8375 2016-07-27 21:56:01 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
a420d4518cec086caefad603c3c24043 2016-07-27 07:00:07 MSIL.AP 
42482501e66e6409a714f33c741108aa 2016-07-27 22:11:01 PSW.ILUSpy 
047ef0610cf64100080295f18cfca893 2016-07-26 14:48:34 PSW.ILUSpy 
02661aa0cfb7ae047c8b2ca250a3836c 2016-07-28 06:41:47 PSW.ILUSpy 
7ac7683d6ee05a9c26bf2b5efd8a7d9d 2016-07-27 22:09:55 PSW.ILUSpy 
73a6d74b9400468eb87014531a7931ab 2016-07-25 20:33:27 PSW.ILUSpy 
dcb5badbecb6689e6dd491f1c22750de 2016-07-28 16:39:10 Packed2_c.HZK 
4e0ea6066b70a6f8e88d36f39a5dab48 2016-07-29 17:16:45 MSIL.AL 
79af8b4bce3e7aa61aad3f9ba1dc537f 2016-07-27 22:23:16 PSW.ILUSpy 
9a98316febcf196cdcba1cdce712d418 2016-07-28 17:40:38 MSIL.AP 
0d009d5163474dbbdf7b68f58fd392a7 2016-07-27 04:22:10 PSW.ILUSpy 
9baa105ba9cae3b6fff6068ae48592ac 2016-07-27 21:42:03 PSW.ILUSpy 
09a9509bd60f5032c52e85faf624e42d 2016-07-28 16:51:42 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
12e39b0533510e9d7d675b9acfc2ef4e 2016-07-28 04:09:47 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
bac5b1dd33b74ec055eda056f769949d 2016-07-27 22:15:57 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
1d8dc035d6b2b77e2b16cdd81731c2e7 2016-07-29 17:47:20 MSIL.AP 
f238334a4aeab486a963a84fdc076ce5 2016-07-27 21:43:09 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
3596ca8d661bf21c5c25ce2e11b21b38 2016-07-29 20:36:57 - 
9df442ae0ff682a59951a24e8ffffcff 2016-07-30 00:17:00 PSW.ILUSpy 
9df442ae0ff682a59951a24e8ffffcff 2016-07-30 00:17:00 PSW.ILUSpy 
72f088336d2278759c90d760c445302a 2016-07-27 21:42:19 PSW.ILUSpy 
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3407c6d264ed1d67873cc31b6bfc567c 2016-07-28 16:10:14 PSW.ILUSpy 
24aa75a5e90c696a184d3092c36079f4 2016-07-28 16:02:19 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
82fbb8785d2424ccc380c4e9705922f8 2016-07-29 17:11:54 PSW.ILUSpy 
0fd3d39412ddc35224f1b0f860885255 2016-07-28 16:13:24 BackDoor.Generic18.BINY 
eef3ce673431dd7dfb386939e66f987c 2016-07-27 21:38:24 PSW.ILUSpy 
ea29382503f2b6b0f8b449d3e357155b 2016-07-27 21:43:55 PSW.ILUSpy 
6c4e401791afae6ab2df57acd5b0775e 2016-07-29 21:36:21 PSW.ILUSpy 
edf95877a0d21c4deca0cdf9d969e178 2016-07-29 17:09:58 PSW.MSIL.JTO 
8c35a1ab7eab7d33bd9b58e248013b22 2016-07-27 21:34:41 PSW.ILUSpy 
73dfe7f51996ec998830fcf5cb301daa 2016-07-26 14:39:43 Generic35.CBXI 
7e6f4339e9b31b981f5732da25a31718 2016-07-26 15:58:52 PSW.ILUSpy 
ce63239f1b26df3026ba9952b5dace5b 2016-07-27 21:35:31 Worm/Generic3.KR 
6053353c5b993da7cfea07a681d2c7c0 2016-07-27 22:15:26 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
559ebfc16af3ab5c7ae16a9d3af84224 2016-07-28 16:03:32 - 
0ed9ced98bbf96fae78b9ac3d7679a3c 2016-07-28 16:55:44 BackDoor.MSIL.L 
8eb25343bbf93d3e658d3c511691f3ed 2016-07-29 17:24:48 Worm/Generic3.KR 
7edd48daf27984c0eeef924918958af7 2016-07-29 17:31:20 PSW.ILUSpy 
d5521deb126f8c36b33cfe7dbfbb50a0 2016-07-29 17:35:27 Generic35.CBXI 
4dde874c2512929f6f8e3f2c79c15743 2016-07-30 00:26:10 Generic30.ARGU 
95af8329ccc6844c1c465f39b1cdbd46 2016-07-30 00:05:16 Generic35.CBXI 
PluginFLashPlayer.exe     
e6b8621b67018ae8554114a2a943d237 2016-07-29 17:13:54 Atros.AQYA 
87db7336cff737e71ad36e1a7019238f 2016-07-27 21:22:05 Atros.AQYA 
wrar501ru[1].exe     
33a3ba5b1f4a49f60b94a4c62adbcae3 2016-07-28 16:55:21 - 
0d53a284515a84c731d172086acfccea 2016-07-30 00:25:27 - 
bbc13d82bb211413cb0bfcf4026a3bfe 2016-07-28 16:38:44 - 
3cdd6406c4fa32ea512e3a529cd0d711 2016-07-29 20:45:09 - 





The wrar501ru[1].exe files were Russian copies of the Win Rar program. This was analysed and found to be a false positive file 
write according to the AV vendors at Virus Total. It is however malicious drive-by-download behaviour that a file at all was 
downloaded upon mere visitation of a website without Capture-BAT having accepted or initiated the file download. It is likely that 
webmasters for these sites might have changed their malicious file drop to be this executable instead of a malicious file. This could 
have been as a result of the analysis environment being discovered.  
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Table 6B: Malicious process creations within the 5,132 dataset: 
Malicious executable process creation list Count 
UNKNOWNcreated3612C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe 6 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2876C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 5 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2856C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 5 
UNKNOWNcreated3832C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe 5 
C:\Program Files\Microsoft\DesktopLayer.execreated2892C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe 4 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2904C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 4 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2848C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 4 
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.execreated2896C:\Windows\System32\winrshost.exe 4 
C:\Windows\System32\cscript.execreated2904C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\natmasla.exe 4 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2952C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 4 




C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2844C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 3 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2908C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 3 





C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated3260C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\oydgn.dll 3 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.execreated2884C:\Program Files\Microsoft\DesktopLayer.exe 2 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2888C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\fhfy.dll 2 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\fhfy.dllcreated2900C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\fhfy.dll 2 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2868C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 2 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2884C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 2 















C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.execreated2856C:\Program Files\Microsoft\DesktopLayer.exe 2 










C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2800C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe 2 
UNKNOWNcreated3592C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe 2 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.execreated2828C:\Program Files\Microsoft\DesktopLayer.exe 2 
C:\Program Files\Microsoft\DesktopLayer.execreated2860C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe 2 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.execreated2868C:\Program Files\Microsoft\DesktopLayer.exe 2 
UNKNOWNcreated2904C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 2 
UNKNOWNcreated2936C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe 2 






C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2816C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 2 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.execreated2848C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe 2 














C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2940C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 2 
UNKNOWNcreated2852C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\ 
Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\IOJ4C46B\96[1].mp3 
2 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2856C:\Users\mp\AppData\ 
Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\IOJ4C46B\21[1].mp3 
2 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\IOJ4C46B\21[1].mp3created2864 









C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2808C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2808C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2908C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\ 
Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\U5WCBXIX\33[1].mp3 
1 
UNKNOWNcreated2908C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\ 




C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2804C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2804C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 














C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2812C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2812C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2836C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.execreated2872C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2836C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2852C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2852C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2856C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\qhywf.dll 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2856C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\qhywf.dll 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2788C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2788C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2908C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2916C:\Program Files\Microsoft\DesktopLayer.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2832C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2832C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2892C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\8075.tmp 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeterminated2892C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\8075.tmp 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2892C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\8075.tmp 1 
C:\Windows\System32\services.execreated3104C:\Windows\System32\VSSVC.exe 1 









C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2840C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2784C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2784C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2796C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2796C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.execreated2840C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeterminated2784C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2764C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2884C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2852C:\Users\mp\AppData\ 







Table 6C: Malicious .tmp files executed within dataset.  















C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.execreated2892C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\8075.tmp 1 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeterminated2892C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\8075.tmp 1 
UNKNOWNcreated2892C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\8075.tmp 1 




Table 6D: Examples of some malicious .exe file writes within the 5,132 dataset.  
Malicious file writes: executable (.exe) files Count 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe-1 62488 
C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\rad959E0.tmp.exe-1 4326 
C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\rad38BFE.tmp.exe-1 4105 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Server[1].exe-1 
1453 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\12321323[1].exe-1 
1316 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\PluginFlashPlayer[1].exe-1 
741 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\wrar501ru[1].exe-1 
675 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\kl[1].exe-1 
472 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\putty[1].exe-1 
451 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\2[1].exe-1 
409 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\cpu[1].exe-1 
395 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\nvm[1].exe-1 
372 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\ws[1].exe-1 
364 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\amd[1].exe-1 
339 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\1257844607.encrcyper[1].exe-1 
338 




C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\cclub02[1].exe-1 
322 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\1769382244.HDPlayer_BETA_installer_v2.55[1].exe-1 
318 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\100312839.CryptocurrencyTradingBotV1.4[1].exe-1 
311 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\paget[1].exe-1 
299 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\2139980916.S4_Crack[1].exe-1 
298 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Installation[1].exe-1 
296 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\record[1].exe-1 
288 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\pdf[1].exe-1 
286 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\1149332910.Host2_crypter_05[1].exe-1 
280 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\144[1].exe-1 
277 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\610411940.save[1].exe-1 
275 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\1844534592.avg[1].exe-1 
275 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Flash_Movie_Player_Plugin[1].exe-1 
273 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\FileZilla_3.7.3_setup[1].exe-1 
272 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\TorrentInjectorSmart[1].exe-1 
259 




C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\harddiskdrivers[1].exe-1 
250 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\printerdrivers[1].exe-1 
250 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Herb[1].exe-1 
250 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\oppp[1].exe-1 
246 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\164923136.cpu[1].exe-1 
245 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\calc[1].exe-1 
236 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\ptdb_yandex[1].exe-1 
234 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\f[1].exe-1 
231 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\535825339.androm[1].exe-1 
229 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\aveksynkens[1].exe-1 
228 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\ff[1].exe-1 
223 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\suba002[1].exe-1 
220 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\919691940.p-update[1].exe-1 
217 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\wav[1].exe-1 
215 
C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\flashplayer[1].exe-1 
215 




C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exeWriteC:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\841642867.johny[1].exe-1 
204 






Table 6E: Examples of malicious .bat file writes within the 5,132 dataset 




Table 6F: Examples of malicious .VBS file writes within the 5,132 dataset. 





Table 6G: Malicious additions to auto-start sections of the registry observed in 5,132 dataset. 











Table 6H : Observed Malicious registry behaviour within 5,132 dataset.  
Notice the high amount of variance when it’s registry behaviours.  
















































































































Table 6I: Observed Malicious registry behaviours triggered by malicious Portable Executable files within 5,132 dataset.  




























































































Table 6J : Record of a  malicious server1[1].exe that was submitted to Virus Total showing level and volume of data 



































































Trojan ( 003ca8581 ) 
K7GW 







































Log file 6K: Drive-by-download behaviour based on the malware shown in Table 6J.  
"file","4/2/2015 18:33:4.211","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Server[1].exe","-1" 
"file","4/2/2015 18:33:4.211","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Server[1].exe","-1" 
"file","4/2/2015 18:33:4.241","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Server[1].exe","-1" 





"file","4/2/2015 18:33:4.602","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Server[1].exe","-1" 
"file","4/2/2015 18:33:4.602","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Server[1].exe","-1" 
"file","4/2/2015 18:33:4.602","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Server[1].exe","-1" 
"file","4/2/2015 18:33:4.602","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Server[1].exe","-1" 





"file","4/2/2015 18:33:4.602","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\YELZ71EO\Server[1].exe","-1" 





Table 6L: Record of a svchost.exe discussed in chapter 6 files submitted to virus total showing level and volume of data 
currently stored for each analysed malicious files.  



































































Backdoor ( 04c4e9741 ) 
K7GW 







































Sample 6M of part Log file 6L drive-by-download filtered log file for the sample in Table 6L. 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 




"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"process","6/5/2014 18:30:45.687","UNKNOWN","created","2840","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 




"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 




"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 




































"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 




"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 
"file","6/5/2014 18:30:40.220","C:\Program Files\Internet 
Explorer\iexplore.exe","Write","C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe","-1" 













Screenshot 6N: Drive-by-download behavioural log file size.  




Screenshot 6: of a drive-by-download captured by capture bat submitted to Virus Total. 
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